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I.

Introduction
The modern definition of torture makes clear that torture can
be either physical or psychological in nature.1 The U.N. Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, which entered into force in 19872 and which the U.S.
ratified in 1994, defines torture in just those terms.3 In particular,
that convention defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on
a person” for a prohibited purpose, such as to obtain a confession
or to punish.4 The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture likewise defines torture “to be any act intentionally
1

2

3

4

The Oxford English Dictionary (1971) defines torture as “severe or
excruciating pain or suffering (of body or mind).” Accord David Luban,
Torture, Power, and Law 116 (2014); WMA Declaration of Tokyo, World
Med. Ass’n (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wmadeclaration-of-tokyo-guidelines-for-physicians-concerning-torture-andother-cruel-inhuman-or-degrading-treatment-or-punishment-in-relation-to-detention-and-imprisonment/ (“For the purpose of this Declaration, torture
is defined as the deliberate, systematic or wanton infliction of physical or
mental suffering by one or more persons acting alone or on the orders of any
authority, to force another person to yield information, to make a confession, or
for any other reason.”). The World Medical Association’s Declaration of Tokyo
was originally adopted by the 29th World Medical Assembly in Tokyo, Japan,
in October 1975. Id.; see also Bonita Meyersfeld, Domestic Violence
and International Law 78 (2010) (“The traditional definition of torture
contains four elements: severe pain and suffering, whether mental or physical;
intent; purpose; and state involvement.”).
A total of 163 countries are parties to the convention. United Nations
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, https://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV9&chapter=4&lang=en (listing parties).
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S 113
[hereinafter “Convention Against Torture” or “CAT”]; Jennifer K. Elsea
et al., The Treatment of Prisoners: Legal, Moral or Criminal?
211 (Ralph D. McPhee ed., 2006) (noting that the U.S. “signed CAT on
April 18, 1988, and ratified the Convention on October 21, 1994, subject to
certain declarations, reservations, and understandings”).
CAT, supra note 3, at art. 1. Cf. Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court art. 7(2)(e), July 17, 1998 (“‘Torture’ means the intentional infliction
of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in
the custody or under the control the accused; except that torture shall not
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to,
lawful sanctions.”); David Weissbrodt & Cheryl Heilman, Defining Torture and
Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment, 29 L. & Ineq. 343 (2011) (discussing
the definition of torture).

4
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performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted
on a person for purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of
intimidation, as personal punishment, as a preventive measure, as a
penalty, or for any other purpose.”5
Death threats, because of their unlawful and invidious nature6
and their potentially coercive effects, normally have significant,
adverse legal consequences.7 They may result in the evidentiary
exclusion of confessions obtained through such means,8 amount
to persecution,9 or lead to civil liability, whether for intentional
5

6
7

8

9

Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention to Prevent
and Punish Torture art. 2, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67. “Torture,” that
convention continues, “shall also be understood to be the use of methods
upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to
diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical
pain or mental anguish.” Id. As that convention further provides: “The
concept of torture shall not include physical or mental pain or suffering
that is inherent in or solely the consequence of lawful measures, provided
that they do not include the performance of the acts or use of the methods
referred to in this article.” Id.
See Lacey v. Allstate Indemnity Co., No. 2:12-cv-02051-SGC, 2015 WL
875379, at *7 n.7 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 2, 2015) (“‘barbaric means’ included death
threats toward the plaintiff and his children”).
1 Encyclopedia of Death and the Human Experience 553
(Clifton D. Bryant & Dennis L. Peck eds., 2009) (“In general, a death threat
is not protected speech if there is intent to follow through with the threat.
Other factors are considered in determining an unlawful death threat,
such as the context in which the threat occurred and whether the target is
fearful of serious harm. The means by which an illegal death threat can be
communicated include speech, telecommunications, mail, e-mail, and the
Internet.”).
See United States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1991) (“the beatings
and death threats alone were sufficient to make the initial confession
coerced”); id. at 940 (“the implicit threat of a repetition of the beatings and
the fear that the police might make good on their twice-promised death
threat were sufficient to render Jenkins’s 2:00 a.m. confession coerced”);
Browner v. State, 765 S.E.2d 348, 352 (Ga. 2014) (“Physical or mental
torture is the type of fear of injury that prevents a confession from being
admissible . . . .”); David H. Kaye et al., The New Wigmore: A
Treatise on Evidence, Expert Evidence § 8.8.3(5)(ii) (2d ed. 2018) (“A
credible death threat is an enormous risk factor for confessions in general—
when this factor is present, a confession is much more likely to occur . . . .”).
Lomtyeva v. Sessions, 704 F. App’x 677, 678 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted) (finding that “a ‘specific and menacing death threat’ from a police
official” is “‘strong evidence of persecution’”); Marcos v. Gonzales, 410
F.3d 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Credible death threats . . . can support a
finding of past persecution.”); Corado v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 945, 947−48
(8th Cir. 2004) (a “specific, credible, and immediate” death threat can
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infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”),10 by creating a hostile work
environment,11 or otherwise.12 For example, threats of murder13

10

11

12

13

constitute persecution); Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d 985, 991 (9th Cir.
2000) (“threats of violence and death are enough” to establish persecution);
see also Singh v. Lynch, 637 F. App’x 320 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Credible death
threats, combined with an actual assassination attempt shortly thereafter,
substantially supports a finding of past persecution. Therefore, Singh has
unquestionably demonstrated that he suffered past persecution . . . .”);
Gutierrez-Vidal v. Holder, 709 F.3d 728, 732 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Persecution
‘includes the credible threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s person or
liberty on account of a protected ground,’ but does not include ‘low-level
intimidation and harassment.’” (citing Matul-Hernandez v. Holder, 685
F.3d 707, 711 (8th Cir. 2012)); Mashiri v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 1112, 1120
(9th Cir. 2004) (“Persecution may be emotional or psychological, as well
as physical.”); id. at 1121 (“Viewed cumulatively, Zakia’s evidence of a
death threat, violent physical attacks against her husband and sons, a nearconfrontation with a violent mob, vandalism, economic harm and emotional
trauma compels a finding of past persecution.”); Reyes-Guerrero v. INS, 192
F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999) (death threats against prosecutor were on
account of his political opinion, supporting claim of a well-founded fear of
persecution).
Bobola v. F/V Expectation, 204 F. Supp. 3d 382 (D. Mass. 2016)
(“[A]llegations involving extreme or outrageous threats, such as death
threats, can be sufficient to state a claim for IIED.”); Denton v. Silver Stream
Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., 739 A.2d 571, 577 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding
that death threats by a coworker, who was found to be in possession of a
firearm at work, stated an IIED claim).
Pryor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 791 F.3d 488, 496−97 (4th Cir. 2015) (a
death threat left for an airline employee in a secure, restricted space, along
with the “ample evidence” that the employee was “subjectively terrified after
receiving the threats,” were sufficient to find a hostile work environment);
Allen v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 405, 411 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a hostile work environment existed where the individual received a
threatening letter that contained a death threat; the note was signed by the
“KKK” and contained a reference to lynching, a drawing of a stick figure
with a noose around its neck). Those making death threats to coworkers are
subject to termination of employment. Stephenson v. Amsted Industries
Inc., No. 09-CV-12267, 2010 WL 5894939, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 13, 2010)
(“[S]everal courts have held that death threats against coworkers constitute
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination . . . .” (citing Smith v.
Leggett Wire Co., 220 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2000)).
Death threats—it has been written—“are not ‘acts which merely
constitute harassment, disrespectful or disparate treatment, a hostile
work environment, humiliating criticism, intimidation, insults or other
indignities.’” Turley v. ISG Lackawanna, Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 217, 255
(W.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Lydeatte v. Bronx Overall Econ. Dev. Corp., No.
00 Civ. 5433, 2001 WL 180055, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001)).
Amouri v. Holder, 572 F.3d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (“To
establish persecution, an alien must demonstrate that the harm (whether

6
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or putting a gun to one’s head as part of a threat to kill can be
compelling evidence of past persecution.14 Death threats can also
lead to the dismissal of a civil case,15 result in criminal prosecutions
and convictions,16 show consciousness of guilt for an underlying

14

15

16

actual or feared) is more than the sum total of ordinary harassment or
mistreatment. We need not probe that point too deeply; this case involves
claimed threats of murder—and threats of murder easily qualify as
sufficiently severe harm.”); Lin Un v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 205, 210 (1st Cir.
2005) (citing Aguilar-Solis v. INS, 168 F.3d 565, 570 (1st Cir. 1999)) (“It
seems to us that credible verbal death threats may fall within the meaning
of ‘persecution.’ We have indicated that a threat to life could amount to
persecution.”).
Singh v. Holder, 585 F. App’x 530, 531 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Singh’s statement
that the KLF members held a gun to his head when they threatened him was
a particularly important aspect of his claim to consider in assessing whether
he had experienced past persecution.”).
Kalwasinski v. Ryan, No. 96-cv-6475, 2007 WL 2743434, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
Sept. 17, 2007) (“Death threats directed at an opposing party and a witness
are sufficiently serious to warrant the sanction of dismissal.”); see also
Michael v. Boutwell, 138 F. Supp. 3d 761, 785 (N.D. Miss. 2015) (“When
considering whether dispositive relief is an appropriate sanction for witness
intimidation, other courts have considered: (1) the nature of the threat;
(2) whether the threat is likely to have a chilling effect on testimony; (3)
whether the threats ‘are the result not of malice but of mental illness;’
and (4) whether the threats are the only instance of improper litigation
conduct.”).
United States v. Mann, No. 99-4115, 2000 WL 372243 (8th Cir. Apr. 12,
2000) (affirming conviction for mailing threatening letter to the President
of the United States); Li v. Shelhamer, No. 5:12-CV-1435 (LEK/DEP),
2013 WL 4483081, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2013) (following a jury trial,
a person was convicted of eleven counts of transmitting death threats in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 875 and sentenced to 114 months in prison); Baldwin
v. Commonwealth, No. 0740-17-4, 2018 WL 3430995, at *1 (Va. Ct. App.
July 17, 2018) (affirming conviction following man’s guilty plea for sending
written threat to kill or do bodily harm to woman and her daughter);
State v. Cameron, No. 48619-9-II, 2017 WL 2365118, at *1 (Wash. Ct.
App. May 31, 2017) (affirming conviction for “felony harassment-death
threats”); see also Radford v. State, 538 S.W.3d 894, 895 (Ark. Ct. App. 2018)
(citation omitted) (“A person commits the offense of first-degree terroristic
threatening if, with the purpose of terrorizing another person, he or she
threatens to cause death or serious physical injury to another person.”);
State v. Robb, 723 N.E.2d 1019, 1034−35 (Ohio 2000) (“Defendant’s
threats to kill a guard or cut off a guard’s hand helped prove his intent to kill
. . . .”).
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offense,17 create a conflict of interest,18 and lead to aggravated
sentences.19
Because of their severity, credible death threats have been
found to be torturous in nature,20 with the Convention Against
17

18

19

20

United States v. Castleman, 795 F.3d 904, 915 (8th Cir. 2015) (citations
omitted) (“[E]vidence of death threats against witnesses . . . is generally
admissible against a criminal defendant to show consciousness of guilt of
the crime charged.”); State v. Diggins, 836 N.W.2d 349, 357 (Minn. 2013)
(citations omitted) (“Evidence of a threat made by the defendant against a
witness is relevant to show the defendant’s ‘consciousness of guilt.’”).
Locascio v. United States, 395 F.3d 51, 57 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[N]o one would
question that a credible death threat from a co-defendant ordering a lawyer
to sacrifice a client’s interests constitutes an actual conflict of interest.”);
People v. Avila, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 657, 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (“Here,
there was a credible death threat resulting in the filing of new criminal
charges against appellant. The public defender is both the named victim and
a necessary witness at any trial on those charges. The trial court properly
concluded that the removal of the public defender and the appointment of
conflict counsel was an appropriate way to proceed.”); State v. Barrett, No.
M2009-02636-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 2870571, at *34 (Tenn. Crim. App.,
July 13, 2012) (“[E]vidence of the Defendant’s statements about having
killed before and his threats to kill other inmates was admissible.”).
United States v. Dougherty, 632 F. App’x 993, 995 (11th Cir. 2015) (“In
explaining why an upward variance was warranted in this case, the district
court also noted that it had considered the death threats made to bank
customers and employees . . . .”); United States v. Sogan, 388 F. App’x 521,
523 (6th Cir. 2010) (“This court has repeatedly held that notes containing
the statement, ‘I have a gun,’ qualify for the enhancement for threats.”);
United States v. Hunn, 24 F.3d 994, 999 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he district
court properly enhanced Hunn’s sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F)
for his death-threats made during the bank robbery.”); Perkins v. State, 559
N.W.2d 678, 692 (Minn. 1997) (“The sentencing judge found ‘particular
cruelty’ in Perkins’ death threats to A.L. and her children . . . .”); State v.
Brown, No. A15-0108, 2016 WL 281072, at *1−2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 25,
2016) (“The PSI identified aggravating factors, including . . . appellant’s
threats against her family . . . .”); State v. Jackson, 596 N.W.2d 262, 267
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (finding “multiple aggravating factors,” including
holding gun to victim’s head and threatening to kill her, made defendant’s
crimes “severe”; “death threats and use of handcuffs, and the psychological
impact of his crimes” justified “a double-durational departure from the
sentencing guidelines”).
Congressional Research Service, 7-5700, R40139, Closing the
Guantanamo Detention Center: Legal Issues 25 (2009) (“In
November 2008, a military commission judge ruled that statements made
by a detainee to U.S. authorities were tainted by his earlier confession to
Afghan police hours before, which had purportedly been made under threat
of death. The judge concluded that the coercive effects of the death threats
producing the detainee’s first confession had not dissipated by the time of

8

Bessler

Torture itself barring the use of any statement made as a result
of torture.21 The right to be free from torture is a universal, nonderogable right,22 and not even prisoners or heinous offenders can
be subjected to torturous treatment or punishment.23 As both

21

22

23

the second. Subsequently, a federal habeas court ruled that ‘every statement
made by the detainee since his arrest [was] a product of torture. . . .’”)
(citing United States v. Jawad, D-021 (Nov. 19, 2008)).
CAT, supra note 3, at art. 15 (“Each State Party shall ensure that any
statement which is established to have been made as a result of torture
shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person
accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.”).
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
art. 7 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter “ICCPR”] (“No one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”);
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 5 (Dec.
10, 1948) [hereinafter “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”] (“No one
shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.”). See also G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), annex, Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, at art. 3 (Dec. 9, 1975)
[hereinafter “Declaration on the Protection of All Persons”] (“No State may
permit or tolerate torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment. Exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat
of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not
be invoked as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”); ICCPR, supra, at art. 4(2) (“No derogation
from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made
under this provision.”); Daniel O’Donnell, The Obligation to Establish Sentences
for Torture that Are Commensurate with the Gravity of the Offense, 22 Buff.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 95, 96 (2015) (citation omitted) (“The prohibition of
torture is jus cogens—a peremptory norm that applies to all members of the
international community, independently of their treaty obligations. One
of the many obligations concerning torture recognized by international law
is that of criminalizing torture and making it ‘punishable by appropriate
penalties which take into account [the] grave nature’ of this crime.”).
Human Rights Watch, Ill-Equipped: U.S. Prisons and
Offenders with Mental Illness 204 (2003) (“The ICCPR is the
most comprehensive international human rights treaty the United States
has ratified and it includes provisions explicitly intended to protect
prisoners from abuse or mistreatment. Under ICCPR article 7, no one
‘shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment.’ The prohibition against such abusive treatment applies to
prison authorities, governing both actions against individual prisoners as
well as the overall conditions of confinement in which prisoners live.”). Cf.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“By protecting even those
convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of
the government to respect the dignity of all persons.”). The Grand Chamber
of the European Court of Human Rights has held on multiple occasions
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the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) make clear: “No
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment.”24 While courts have not always found
death threats to be credible or to amount to torturous conduct,25
threats that place individuals in great fear can (and often have been
found to) constitute acts of mental or psychological torture.26
With credible death threats producing psychological terror
already treated as torturous in nature, this article explores what
the collateral consequences are for capital prosecutions and death
sentences.27 After all, death threats are ordinarily unlawful28 and

24
25

26

27

28

that the prohibition against torture makes for no exceptions. E.g., El-Masri
v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Maced., App. No. 39630/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶
195 (2012).
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 22, at art. 5; ICCPR,
supra note 22, at art. 7.
See Velasco v. Holder, 436 F. App’x 379, 379 (5th Cir. 2011); Salan-Espinoza
v. Holder, 446 F. App’x 833, 834 (9th Cir. 2011). A finding of torture
requires a case-by-case examination, and factfinders must sort through
whether acts, including particular threats, rise to the level of torture or
not. Seth Lowry, Truth Be Told: Truth Serum and Its Role in the War on Terror, 20
Regent U. L. Rev. 337, 348−50 (2008) (“[C]ourts have opted to analyze
torture claims on a case-by-case basis and usually base their decision on the
gruesomeness, intensity, or shock value of the treatment alleged . . . .”).
John D. Bessler, The Death Penalty as Torture: From the Dark
Ages to Abolition 218 (2017) (“[T]he Tennessee Supreme Court noted
of ‘threats to kill’ that ‘the anticipation of physical harm to one’s self or a
loved one constitutes mental torture.’”); id. (discussing the interrogation of
criminal suspects who were suffocated with plastic bags and had loaded guns
pointed at their heads during rounds of Russian roulette).
Collateral consequences—in ordinary parlance—“are the legal disabilities that
attach as an operation of law when an individual is convicted of a crime but
are not part of the sentence for the crime.” Clair A. Cripe et al., Legal
Aspects of Corrections Management 505 (3d ed. 2013). “Examples
of collateral consequences include the denial of government issued licenses
or permits, ineligibility for public services and public programs, and the
elimination or impairment of civil rights.” Id. In this article, the collateral
consequences terminology is employed in a slightly different manner. It refers
here to the consequences flowing from the fact that death threats are already
treated by the law as illegal, cruel, and torturous acts.
Death threats are serious offenses. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1994) (“Whoever
knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for a delivery
from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print,
missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of, to kidnap, or
to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, the Presidentelect, the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession
to the office of President of the United States, or the Vice President-elect,

10
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capital charges and death sentences are, at bottom, nothing more
than state-sponsored threats of death.29 While the Convention
Against Torture has a “lawful sanctions” exception to torture,30 and
while the death penalty remains on the books in certain nations
and locales at this point in time,31 if death threats, because of their
immutable characteristics, qualify as acts of torture, then that
fact should logically have serious implications for death penalty
jurisdictions. The world’s nations, by signing and ratifying the
Convention Against Torture, have collectively agreed to prevent and
criminalize torture in all forms.32 Indeed, torture has, for decades,

29

30
31

32

or knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the
President, President-elect, Vice President or other officer next in the order
of succession to the office of President, or Vice President-elect, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.”).
Proponents of capital punishment frequently ground their defense of it on
the idea that the threat of death may deter crime. Glenn M. Bieler, Death
Be Not Proud: A Note on Juvenile Capital Punishment, 7 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum.
Rts. 179, 179 (1990) (“Proponents claim the threat of death deters severe
criminal behavior.”). In fact, the death penalty has not been shown to be
a greater deterrent to violent crime than life-without-parole sentences.
See National Research Council of the National Academies,
Deterrence and the Death Penalty (2012) (reviewing three
decades of research and concluding that the research on the effect of
capital punishment on homicide is not informative about whether capital
punishments decreases, increases or has no effect on homicide rates).
The definition of torture in the Convention Against Torture “does not include
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful
sanctions.” CAT, supra note 3, at art. 1(1).
Facts About the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last updated
Sept. 17, 2018) (listing death penalty and non-death penalty states); The
Death Penalty in 2016: Facts and Figures, Amnesty International (Apr.
11, 2017), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/04/deathpenalty-2016-facts-and-figures/ (giving statistics on the death penalty’s use
worldwide).
The Convention Against Torture provides: “Each State Party shall take
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent
acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.” CAT, supra note 3, at
art. 2(1). “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war
or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency,
may be invoked as a justification of torture.” CAT, supra note 3, at art. 2(2).
“An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked
as a justification of torture.” CAT, supra note 3, at art. 2(3). The Convention
Against Torture also provides: “Each State Party shall ensure that all acts
of torture are offences under its criminal law. The same shall apply to an
attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which constitutes
complicity or participation in torture.” CAT, supra note 3, at art. 4(1); see also
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been universally prohibited by international law and been seen by
U.S. courts as a clear violation of the “law of nations.”33
Although judges seem to have no difficulty identifying and
condemning physical torture,34 they have been more reticent to
recognize psychological forms of torture, at least in certain contexts.35
This article argues that twenty-first century jurists need, at long last,
to take psychological torture seriously. And in the death penalty

33

34

35

CAT supra note 3, at art. 4(2) (“Each State Party shall make these offences
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their grave
nature.”). “CAT claims require the adjudicator to consider the possibility
of future torture.” Saleh v. Sessions, No. 18-3212, 2018 WL 5304812, at
*3 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 2018) (citation omitted); accord Gomez-Domingo v.
Sessions, No. 16-2669, 2018 WL 4492433, at *2 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2018)
(“The agency must consider ‘all evidence relevant to the possibility of future
torture’ . . . .”) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) (2018)); Bartolome v.
Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 808 (9th Cir. 2018) (“During the reasonable fear
determination, the asylum officer elicits ‘all information relating both to
fear of persecution and fear of torture.’”) (quoting Reasonable Fear of
Persecution & Torture Determinations, INS AOBT 8/6/2008, at *21, 2008
WL 7226112 (Aug. 6, 2008)).
E.g., Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884−85 (2d Cir. 1980) (“[O]fficial
torture is now prohibited by the law of nations. The prohibition is clear and
unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between treatment of aliens and
citizens . . . . [I]nternational law confers fundamental rights upon all people
vis-a-vis their own governments. While the ultimate scope of those rights
will be a subject for continuing refinement and elaboration, we hold that the
right to be free from torture is now among them.”).
“One of the reasons physical torture is constitutionally out of the question,”
one legal commentator has noted, “is that the constitution protects bodily
integrity against invasion and physical torture always involves such an
invasion.” Jeremy Waldron, Torture, Terror and Trade-Offs:
Philosophy for the White House 240 (2010) (citing the work of
Seth Kreimer). In 2008, the Nebraska Supreme Court forthrightly declared
the electric chair to be unconstitutional and torturous in nature. “[S]ome
prisoners will be tortured during electrocutions,” the court ruled, noting
that “unconsciousness and death are not instantaneous for many condemned
prisoners” and that “[t]hese prisoners will, when electrocuted, consciously
suffer the torture that high voltage electric current inflicts on the human
body.” State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 270, 279 (Neb. 2008).
Sean Kevin Thompson, The Legality of the Use of Psychiatric Neuroimaging in
Intelligence Interrogation, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1601, 1625 (2005) (“Thus far,
cases of mental torture tend to be limited to severe forms of mental suffering
occasioned by actions such as mock execution or threatened dismemberment
or castration.”) (citing War Crimes Documentation Cent., U.S. Dep’t of the
Army, Report on Iraqi War Crimes (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) 8 (1992)
(unclassified version), reprinted in U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., at 16−18, U.N.
Doc. S/25441 (1993)).
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context, that means recognizing capital prosecutions and death
sentences for what they are: torturous threats of death.36 Death
threats and mock executions, both of which inflict trauma and severe
pain and suffering, are already classified as psychological torture,37
and many sources,38 including a U.N. guide to investigating torture,
36

37

38

Death threats are made in many contexts for a wide variety of reasons. E.g.,
U.S. Dep’t of State, 110th Congress, Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices for 2007, 568, 2402, 2590, 2593, 2615, 2664, 2666
(Joint Comm. Print 2008) (describing anonymous death threats against
journalists, human rights activists and a political cartoonist); Sara Schatz,
Impact of Organized Crime on Murder of Law Enforcement
Personnel at the U.S.-Mexican Border 83 (2014) (describing death
threats by organized crime elements); The SAGE Encyclopedia of
Terrorism 200 (Gus Martin ed., 2d ed. 2011) (“One of the most famous
‘death’ fatwas in modern times was the 1989 decree issued by the Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini, the then leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, calling
for the death of the British writer Salman Rushdie. The fatwa declared that
Rushdie should be executed for having insulted Islam in his novel The Satanic
Verses, published in late 1988.”).
See generally The Trauma of Psychological Torture (Almerindo E.
Ojeda ed., 2008). Accord 1 Trauma Psychology: Issues in Violence,
Disaster, Health, and Illness 37 (Elizabeth K. Carll ed., 2007)
(“Psychological torture occurs in many forms, some of which are highly
subtle, yet quite devastating.”); id. (citations omitted) (“Threats of death and
mock executions convince the victim that he or she could certainly die at the
hands of the torturer. Often torturers threaten to arrest, torture, or kill a
victim’s family members, including children. Another devastating form
of torture is to be forced to listen to others being tortured without being able to
intervene, or to witness the torture of others, including family members and
friends.”); Donna E. Arzt, The Lockerbie “Extradition by Analogy” Agreement:
“Exceptional Measure” or Template for Transnational Criminal Justice?, 18 Am.
U. Int’l L. Rev. 163, 206 n.143 (2002) (“Forms of psychological torture
and ill-treatment include death threats and threats of abuse against the
prisoner’s family . . . .”).
E.g., Handbook of Multicultural Assessment: Clinical,
Psychological, and Educational Applications 168 (Lisa A. Suzuki
& Joseph G. Ponterotto eds., 3d ed. 2008) (“Psychological torture may
include, among other techniques, humiliation, degradation, death threats,
mock executions, being forced to violate taboos, forced confessions, being
forced to reveal intimate personal information, and being forced to witness
the torture of others, including family members.”). Some of the “more
commonly used psychological torture methods” have been listed as follows:
“Threats,” “Mock executions,” “Isolation,” “Witnessing torture sessions,”
“Sleep deprivation,” “Loud noise,” “Constant exposure to bright light,”
“Total sensory deprivation,” “Sexual humiliation,” “Not allowed to wear
clothes,” “Constant interrogation,” “Not allowed to wash or to go to toilet,”
“Not allowed to be alone in the toilet,” “Excrement abuse.” Forensic
Medicine: Clinical and Pathological Aspects 62 (Jason Payne-
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list varieties of mental torture (e.g., “Threats of death, harm to family,
further torture, imprisonment, mock executions”; “Threats of attack
by animals, such as dogs, cats, rats or scorpions”; and “Forcing the
victim to witness torture or atrocities being inflicted on others.”).39
Part II of this article describes the illegality of death threats,
highlighting how credible death threats are ordinarily treated as
criminal, tortious, or torturous acts.40 The article then describes
the process by which the death penalty is administered, laying
out the collateral consequences for capital punishment of credible
death threats already being classified as illegal and as unlawful
acts of torture. Part III thus details the process by which capital
charges are leveled and death sentences are sought, obtained, and
carried out. That section reveals that threats to execute offenders
are, in effect, nothing more than torturous threats of death, albeit
ones made by state actors in a particular context. Finally, Part IV
argues that, given the absolute and existing legal prohibition against
psychological torture, lawyers and judges should no longer tolerate,
or be complicit with, criminal justice systems that make use of death
threats of whatever kind or nature. Because death threats are already
properly classified as torturous acts in multiple contexts, including

39

40

James et al. eds., 2003); see also id. (“Sham executions are an ultimate form
of psychological torture and they are carried out with the utmost care to
make them realistic. The victim is not always relieved when the soldiers fire
blanks, but may end up wanting them to end his life.”).
Office of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (Geneva),
Professional Training Series No. 8/Rev. 1, Istanbul Protocol: Manual on the
Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment p. 29, ¶ 145 (2004).
See, e.g., Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 300 F. Supp. 3d 758, 781
(E.D. Va. 2018) (citing a 1997 report of the Committee Against Torture
concluding that “threats, including death threats,” constitute torture);
Jordan J. Paust et al., International Criminal Law 712, 866
(4th ed. 2013) (discussing the Committee Against Torture’s condemnation
of “threats, including death threats,” as “either torture or cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment”). See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, art. 75(2)(e), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 (proscribing “[t]hreats to commit” “[m]urder”, “[v]iolence to the life,
health, or physical or mental well-being of persons”, “[t]orture”,
“[m]utilation”, “humiliating and degrading treatment and any form of
indecent assault”); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts, art. 4(2)(h), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (proscribing
threats to commit the same and additional conduct).
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in the context of torture-murder prosecutions, the use of death
threats as part of any crime and punishment regime is inconsistent
with human rights principles.41 The article concludes that the death
penalty should be classified under the rubric of torture.
II. The Illegality and Torturous Nature of Threats of Death
A. Existing Legal Protections Against Death Threats Against
Individuals
Death threats may be either express or implied.42 Public
officials sometimes receive illicit death threats,43 but state actors—
as history shows—also sometimes make death threats or fail to
protect prisoners or others following the making of death threats.44
In the latter circumstances, death threats can result in liability for
government officials for which there is no qualified immunity.45
41
42
43
44

45

This article provides an in-depth examination of an argument I have
explored elsewhere. See generally Bessler, The Death Penalty as
Torture, supra note 26.
United States v. Sogan, 388 F. App’x 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2010).
E.g., Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice v. Levin, No. 03-15-00044-CV, 2007 WL
2302603, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. May 25, 2017).
Prison officials are legally obligated to protect prisoners from harm.
Handbook on Prisons 575 (Yvonne Jewkes ed., 2013) (“[I]t has long
been accepted that the authorities have a duty to protect prisoners against
third parties, such as fellow prisoners who might harm them.”).
Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[A] reasonable jury
could conclude that Clubbs issued the death threats because Santiago had
filed and pursued his excessive force grievance. Thus, Clubbs is not entitled
to qualified immunity regarding the retaliatory death threats.”); Irving
v. Dormire, 519 F.3d 441, 449 (8th Cir. 2008) (“We conclude that, when
viewed in the light of their retaliatory nature, their objectively credible basis,
and their fear-inducing result, the death threats allegedly made by Brigance
form the basis of an injury sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth
Amendment.”); Rodriguez v. Secretary for Dep’t of Corr., 508 F.3d 611,
617 n.12 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e conclude that the gang-related threats
made on Rodriguez’s life, which were explicitly reported to prison officials,
present a substantial enough risk of harm to trigger a prison official’s
Eighth Amendment duty to act; that is, to take some steps to investigate the
likelihood that the reported threat will materialize and to take some steps
aimed at reducing the likelihood of the risk.”); Odom v. S. Carolina Dep’t of
Corr., 349 F.3d 765, 770 (4th Cir. 2003) (inmate-on-inmate assault, preceded
by death threats, was sufficiently substantial for Eighth Amendment
purposes to survive summary judgment); see also Wright v. Fry, No. 1:18-cv00016-KGB/JTK, 2018 WL 5266845 *1 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 22, 2018) (citations
omitted) (“While allegations of verbal threats, taunts, name calling, or the
use of offensive language alone do not support claims for use of excessive
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For example, in Jones v. Carroll,46 a former inmate, Charles Jones,
brought a section 198347 claim for violation of his civil rights against
prison employees, alleging that they failed to protect him from an
attack by another inmate, Anibal Melendez. The federal district
court determined that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether Jones told prison officials about violent threats he received
from Melendez, whom had threatened to kill Jones.48 In that case,
the federal district court ruled that “a reasonable factfinder could
conclude, based on plaintiff ’s evidence,” that the “State defendants
. . . subjectively knew of the substantial risk of harm that Melendez
posed to plaintiff based on Melendez’s death threats.”49
Death threats are illegal and extremely shocking and
outrageous acts,50 and they are frequently used by criminals or

46
47

48
49

50

force, an exception is recognized ‘when the state official engaged in a brutal
and wanton act of cruelty even though no physical harm was suffered.’”);
Irving v. Wells, No. 1:18-CV-47 JMB, 2018 WL 2868927, at *2 (E.D. Mo.
June 11, 2018) (“Although verbal threats are normally insufficient to violate
the Constitution, the Eighth Circuit has concluded that death threats . . .
may form the basis of an injury sufficiently serious to implicate the Eighth
Amendment.”) (citing Irving, 519 F.3d at 448−49); Titus v. Does #10-20, No.
17-cv-1315-MJR, 2018 WL 558532, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 25, 2018) (citations
omitted) (“Courts must apply an objective standard to determine whether a
particular threat, given all the circumstances, may amount to a constitutional
violation. The pertinent inquiry is whether a ‘reasonable’ victim would fear
for his or her life or safety as a result of the threat; not whether this plaintiff
experienced actual fear.”).
Jones v. Carroll, 628 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D. Del. 2009).
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2017) allows prisoners to seek redress for the
deprivation, under color of state law, of rights guaranteed by the U.S.
Constitution or federal laws. Perry v. Garcia, No. 09cv622 LAB (RBB), 2010
WL 3633042, at *12 (S.D. Cal. July 16, 2010); Norton v. Garro, 957 F. Supp.
1067, 1070 (E.D. Wis. 1997); Webb v. Hopkins, No. 88 CV 2501, 1989 WL
15814, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1989).
Jones, 628 F. Supp. 2d at 553−55.
Id. at 560. As that court further ruled: “The court finds that the failure to
protect an inmate from another inmate who had issued continuing death
threats poses an objective risk of excessive harm to the threatened inmate.”
Id. at 560 n.9.
E.g., Neumeyer v. Wawanesa General Ins. Co., No. 14cv181-MMA (RBB),
2015 WL 1924981, at *24 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2015) (“death threats
constitute criminal behavior”); Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1249 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (“Of course death threats are extreme . . . .”); see also Cal. Penal
Code § 422 (2011) (making death threats a crime); U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)
(2)(F) (2016) (providing for the upward adjustment of a defendant’s base
offense level for robbery by two levels “if a threat of death was made”);
United States v. Fontanez, No. 17-13944, 2018 WL 3239249, at *2 n.3
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totalitarian or repressive regimes for illicit purposes.51 Death threats,
it has been held, are completely unjustified and unjustifiable,52
and because of their nature, they can themselves be evidence of
aggressive or murderous intent.53 The seriousness of death threats
is even reflected in the application of evidentiary rules. As the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit emphasized in a recent case:
It is long settled that the admissibility of death threats
made by a defendant is evaluated in accordance with
the ordinary principles of Federal Rule of Evidence
403. At the same time, the potential for unfair
prejudice is so great that Rule 403’s balancing test
permits admission of death threat evidence only if
there is clear need for the evidence and it serves an
important purpose.54
As the Second Circuit ruled in that case: “It is hard to deem harmless
the erroneous admission of death threat evidence. In this instance,
the evidence was toxic.”55

51
52

53

54
55

(11th Cir. June 3, 2018) (noting that the defendant “received a two-level
enhancement for making a threat of death” pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)
(2)(F) (2016)).
Stephen J. Morewitz, Death Threats and Violence: New
Research and Clinical Perspectives 101 (2008) (citation omitted).
See Schanze v. Schanze, No. A15-0231, 2015 WL 8548626, at *3 n.2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2015) (“We categorically reject Daniel’s argument that the
harm threatened was not imminent because it was contingent on Danielle
having an extramarital affair. To adopt this argument could be read to
suggest that an extramarital affair somehow justifies death threats. The
unfortunate occurrence of an extramarital affair does not ever justify death
threats.”).
Hernandez v. Stainer, No. 1:11-cv-00489-AWI-JLT, 2013 WL 5773041, at
*16 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2013) (“[W]here both perpetrators made death
threats against the victims, each assisting the other in what appears to be
a highly coordinated assault, and where the shooting does not appear to
have been either an accident or impulse by Ramirez, but rather part of a
jointly understood and planned strategy of attack, the evidence is certainly
sufficient to support a finding by reasonable jurors that Petitioner shared the
same homicidal mind state as Ramirez.”); People v. Gamble, 899 N.Y.S.2d
207, 209 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (“Defendant’s pattern of aggressive conduct
toward the victims, including specific death threats and menacing with a
handgun, was highly probative of motive and intent . . . .”).
United States v. Morgan, 786 F.3d 227, 229 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation
omitted).
Id. at 234. See also United States v. Tarantino, No. 08-CR-0655 (JS), 2012
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Death threats are not constitutionally protected speech.56
“[T]he First Amendment,” the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled,
“permits a State to ban a ‘true threat.’”57 As the Supreme Court has
explained: “‘[T]rue threats’ encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group
of individuals.”58 “Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable
sense of the word,” the Court emphasized, “is a type of true threat,
where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons with
the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”59
Thus, the constitutional rights of someone making a true threat are
not violated if an adverse action (e.g., a criminal prosecution or the
termination of employment) follows the making of that threat.60

56

57
58
59

60

WL 1458197, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2012) (citations omitted) (“Death
threats, like other evidence, are subject to the usual Rule 403 balancing test.
Nevertheless, courts are mindful that ‘the potential prejudice from death
threats may be great’ and may tend to ‘exclude death threats more frequently
than other evidence.’”).
United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 227 (1st Cir. 2011) (“The law is
crystal clear that threats are not constitutionally protected speech.”). See
Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 992 (8th Cir. 2013) (“[A] reasonable jury
could find that threats of death, issued by a correctional officer tasked with
guarding a prisoner’s segregated cell, would chill a prisoner of ordinary
firmness from engaging in the prison grievance process . . . .”); Van Deelen
v. Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1157 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[A]llegations of physical
and verbal intimidation, including a threat by a deputy sheriff to shoot him if
he brought any more tax appeals, would surely suffice under our precedents
to chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to seek redress for
(allegedly) unfair property tax assessments.”).
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (quoting Watts v. United States,
394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam)).
Id.
Id. at 360; see also Baumgartner v. Eppinger, No. 1:10CV2810, 2013 WL
5563913, at *17 (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 27, 2013) (citations omitted) (“The
Seventh Circuit, in a case involving 18 U.S.C. § 876, stated that, in order
for the government to establish a ‘true threat,’ it must demonstrate that
a reasonable person would foresee that the statement at issue would be
interpreted by the recipient as ‘a serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily harm upon,’ or to kill, that person. The court emphasized the
importance of the context of the statement in determining whether it was a
true threat or merely political hyperbole.”).
See, e.g., Smith v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 109 A.D.3d 701, 702−03 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2013) (holding that disciplinary proceeding and ultimate discipline
imposed against tenured teacher, that is, termination of employment, did
not violate teacher’s right to free speech under the First Amendment,
where teacher’s death threats against initial arbitrator in a prior disciplinary
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That is because it is improper to threaten someone with death.
The Supreme Court, in fact, has made clear that a victim’s fear, if
reasonable or grounded in reality, mandates that threatening speech
lose its First Amendment protection.61
B. Death Threats, Persecution, and the U.S. Constitution’s
Eighth Amendment
The U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment imposes a duty
on prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of

61

proceeding were true threats not entitled to First Amendment protection,
and they did not implicate matters of public concern); Misiak v. Boening,
No. C09-0716-JCC, 2010 WL 55857, at *4−5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2010)
(“The state courts neither misinterpreted nor misapplied Supreme Court
authority in determining that prohibiting inmates from making death threats
is related to the legitimate penological interest of protecting correctional
officers.”). A person subjected to a plausible and imminent threat of serious
injury or death is entitled to the law’s protection—a principle that, as a
general matter, applies equally to inmates. Valdez v. City of New York,
No. 11 Civ. 05194(PAC)(DF), 2013 WL 8642169, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
3, 2013) (“[C]ourts have consistently required plaintiffs in inmate-safety
cases to allege that they either suffered a physical injury or were subject to
an imminent threat of serious physical injury in circumstances making the
threat plausible.”). Of course, an inmate is legally protected from harm only
if the threat is real. See Chalif v. Spitzer, No. 9:05-CV-1355 (LEK/DEP),
2008 WL 1848650, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2008) (finding no substantial
risk of serious harm where plaintiff alleged that he was “subjected to
psychological torture by imminent threat of death” but complaint did not
include “any incident[] whereby he was assaulted by any fellow inmates,
or that such an assault was threatened and imminent”). See also Richardson
v. Castro, No. 97-CV-3772 (SJ), 1998 WL 205414, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,
1998) (citation omitted) (“[V]erbal threats do not violate the constitution
‘unless accompanied by physical force or the present ability to effectuate the
threat.’”).
Joshua Azriel, First Amendment Implications for E-Mail Threats: Are There Any
Free Speech Protections?, 23 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 845,
846 (2005) (citation omitted) (“The U.S. Supreme Court recently decided
a case where the victim’s fear mandates that threatening speech lose its
First Amendment protection. The Court, in a 6-3 decision, ruled that
cross burning is not protected speech when it is used to intimidate an
individual or a group of people. The salient part of the Court’s ruling is
that intimidation is a true threat, and a prohibition on intimidating threats
protects people from a fear of violence. The Court stated that the speaker
does not actually have to carry out the threat for it to be illegal. This follows
the reasoning of several lower court decisions that use a reasonable person
standard to determine the efficacy of a threat.”).
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other prisoners”62 and prison guards.63 The Eighth Amendment, in
fact, has already been found to protect inmates from death threats.64
One federal district court articulated the applicable standard: “Courts
must apply an objective standard to determine whether a particular
threat of death or harm, given all the circumstances, may amount
to a constitutional violation.”65 “The pertinent inquiry,” that court
stressed, “is whether a ‘reasonable’ victim would fear for his or her
life as a result of the threat; not whether this plaintiff experienced
actual fear.”66 In that case, the court observed that “repeated threats
to beat and kill Plaintiff and to have officers at his next prison ‘get’
him” may have “violated Plaintiff ’s constitutional rights.”67 “These
actions,” the court concluded, taking note of how the inmate was
forced to strip and spread his buttocks for an inordinate length of
time, were calculated “to strike fear into Plaintiff, to humiliate him,
and to emphasize that the Defendants had the power to harm and
62
63

64

65
66
67

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (citation omitted).
See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (a correctional officer’s use of
excessive physical force against a prisoner may, in appropriate circumstances,
constitute a cruel and unusual punishment even though the prison does
not suffer either “significant injury” or “serious injury”); McClanahan v.
Butler, No. 16-cv-340-SMY, 2016 WL 4154910, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 5, 2016)
(“The intentional use of excessive force by prison guards against an inmate
without penological justification constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment and is actionable under § 1983.”); see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2012) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by
a prisoner confined in a jail, prison or other correctional facility for mental
or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of
physical injury. . . .”); Johnson v. Bradford, 72 F. App’x 98, 99 (5th Cir. 2003)
(“Johnson’s challenge to the defendants’ alleged death threats does not
present a claim of physical injury and therefore fails to state an excessive
force claim.”).
Dobbey v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 574 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2009) (citations
omitted) (“[A] threat, which is how the plaintiff interpreted the incident,
can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.”); id. (“‘Mental
torture is not an oxymoron, and has been held or assumed in a number of
prisoner cases to be actionable as cruel and unusual punishment,’ . . . —
imagine falsely informing a prisoner that he has been sentenced to death.”);
Lamon v. Brown, No. 12-cv-1176-JPG-DGW, 2013 WL 6508490, at *2 (S.D.
Ill. Dec. 12, 2013) (citation omitted) (“[T]hreats or mental torture can rise
to the level of cruel and unusual punishment.”).
Bardo v. Stolworthy, No. 15-cv-1193-JPG, 2015 WL 7713710, at *8 (S.D. Ill.
Nov. 30, 2015) (citing Dobbey v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 574 F.3d 443, 445 (7th
Cir. 2009)).
Id.
Id.
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kill him.”68
American jurists have long classified verbal threats as
potentially violative of the Eighth Amendment if accompanied by
extreme psychological torment or harm.69 For instance, in Babcock
v. White,70 the Seventh Circuit held that “the Constitution does not
countenance psychological torture merely because it fails to inflict
physical injury.”71 Likewise, in Northington v. Jackson,72 an inmate,
Craig Northington, filed a civil rights action against sheriff ’s deputies,
corrections officers, and a county sheriff ’s department alleging that
law enforcement officers stopped him on his way from the Denver
County Jail to his community placement worksite.73 In that case,
Northington alleged that a captain put a revolver to his head and
threatened to kill him.74 In its analysis, the Tenth Circuit, noting that
Northington “alleged psychological injury as a result of the alleged
death threat,”75 explicitly ruled: “Under these circumstances, if true,
it could be ‘malicious and sadistic’ for a corrections officer to place a
revolver to a prisoner’s head and threaten to pull the trigger.”76 “Mr.
Northington’s allegations, accepted as true, may state a violation of
68
69

70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id.
Cummings v. Harrison, 695 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1272 (N.D. Fla. 2010);
see also id. at 1273 (“[D]espite the general principle that verbal threats
are insufficient to state a claim, some cases have recognized that verbal
threats to kill an inmate do present an Eighth Amendment claim.”). In
Cummings, the court ruled: “The threats as presented in Plaintiff’s affidavit
reveal sufficient psychological harm to survive. This is especially true as
the verbal threats are alleged to have been continuing and combined with
physical assaults.” Id.; see also Gomez v. Birondo, No. 91-15731, 1992 WL
153007, at *2 (9th Cir. July 6, 1992) (“Gomez’s allegations of excessive force
combined with death threats arguably state a[n] [E]ighth [A]mendment
claim.”); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1029−30, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)
(finding that a prisoner stated an Eighth Amendment claim by alleging that
an officer struck him and threatened to kill him), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033
(1973); cf. United States v. Gore, 592 F.3d 489, 491−92 (4th Cir. 2010)
(the government “concedes that some minimal right of self-defense must
be available to inmates charged under 18 U.S.C. § 111 because disabling an
inmate entirely from protecting himself from wanton, unlawful aggression
threatening death or serious bodily injury would violate the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments”).
Babcock v. White, 102 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 273.
Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1520, 1522.
Id. at 1522.
Id. at 1524.
Id.
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the Eighth Amendment,” the Tenth Circuit determined.77
In immigration and asylum cases, prior death threats are
used to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution.78 For instance, in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch,79 the
Fourth Circuit held that a native and citizen of El Salvador, Maydai
77

78

79

Id. at 1525. In its ruling, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Collins v. Cundy, 603
F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1979), in which the Tenth Circuit had previously ruled
that a sheriff ’s “idle threat to hang a prisoner” did not give rise to a section
1983 claim. Northington, 973 F.2d at 1524 (citing Collins, 603 F.2d at 827);
see also Clark v. Ellis, No. 4-11-cv-00135-KGB-JTK, 2012 WL 3595973, at *4
(E.D. Ark. May 24, 2012) (citations omitted) (“[M]ere verbal threats made
by a state-actor do not constitute a § 1983 claim . . . . [T]he constitution
does not protect against all intrusions on one’s peace of mind. Fear of
emotional injury which results solely from verbal harassment or idle threats
is generally not sufficient to constitute an invasion of an identified liberty
interest.”).
Death threats are a frequent staple of persecution claims. E.g., Tairou
v. Whitaker, No. 17-1404, 2018 WL 6252780, at *4 (4th Cir. Nov. 30,
2018) (“Because Tairou received multiple, explicit threats of death both
during and after the village gathering, the BIA’s conclusion as to past harm
contravenes our express and repeated holding that the ‘threat of death’
qualifies as persecution.”); Lomtyeva v. Sessions, 704 F. App’x 677, 681 (9th
Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (“[W]hile ‘death threats alone can constitute
persecution,’ the context in which the threat is made ultimately determines
its persecutory impact[.]”); Godoy v. Holder, 434 F. App’x 634, 635 (9th
Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (“[D]eath threats, when combined with other
factors present here (including the murders of family members and physical
confrontations with persecutors), may constitute persecution.”); RamirezRecinos v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 406 F. App’x 457, 459 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e
upheld a persecution claim where an alien received numerous death threats,
was dragged by her hair out of her car and beaten, had her groundskeeper
tortured and killed by attackers looking for her, and was further kidnapped
and beaten.”); Kumar v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that threats to kill individual if he returned to India “require a
finding that he has met his burden of showing a well-founded fear of future
persecution”); Lim v. INS, 224 F.3d 929, 936 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[M]enacing
death threats can constitute a primary part of a past persecution claim,
particularly where those threats are combined with confrontation or other
mistreatment.”); Sackie v. Ashcroft, 270 F. Supp. 2d 596, 602 (E.D. Pa.
2003) (“Given Mr. Sackie’s undisputed and uncontroverted testimony that
he was threatened with imminent death on numerous occasions, frequently
given mind altering substances and suffered cuts to his back and arms, we
must find that he has met his burden of proving that he was tortured in his
native country.”). Cf. Pabon v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 704 F. App’x 903, 907 (11th
Cir. 2017) (“Being intentionally shot at is sufficiently extreme to establish
persecution, even if the attack is unsuccessful, and there is no strict physical
harm requirement to establish persecution.”).
Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944 (4th Cir. 2015).
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Hernandez-Avalos (“Hernandez”), had sufficiently proven past
persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution based on
a gang’s death threats.80 In 2007, members of the Mara 18 gang
had killed the cousin of Hernandez’s husband for refusing to join
the gang.81 Hernandez had not witnessed the murder, but she later
identified the body and took it home for burial.82 After that burial,
gang members had come to her home and threatened to kill her if
she fingered the gang members responsible for the murder.83 Within
a few months, Hernandez was threatened with death again when
Mara 18 gang members returned to her home and put a gun to her
head after she told them her 12-year-old son would not join the
gang.84 After Hernandez was similarly threatened with death yet a
third time by gang members, she fled to the United States with the
help of a smuggler.85
In Hernandez-Avalos, the Fourth Circuit took note of the death
threats, emphasizing that its jurisprudence made clear that “the threat
of death qualifies as persecution.”86 “Because Hernandez credibly
testified that she received death threats from Mara 18,” the Fourth
Circuit determined, “she has proven that she has a well-founded fear
of future persecution were she to return to El Salvador.”87 “[I]n this
case,” the Fourth Circuit stressed, “Mara 18 threatened Hernandez
in order to recruit her son into their ranks, but they also threatened
Hernandez, rather than another person, because of her family
connection to her son.”88 Acknowledging the corruption and the
power of gangs within Salvadoran prisons and El Salvador’s judicial
system,89 and finding that Hernandez had established her eligibility
for asylum, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Hernandez’s credible
testimony “is legally sufficient under the circumstances present here
to establish that the Salvadoran authorities are unable or unwilling
to protect her from the gang members who threatened her.”90 In

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 946−53.
Id. at 947.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 949.
Id.
Id. at 950.
Id. at 952−53.
Id. at 953.

VOL. 11, NO. 1

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

23

reality, death threats have long been a problem in El Salvador,91 as
they have been in many other countries.92
American courts have wrestled on more than one occasion
with cases involving death threats made against inmates. For
example, in Chandler v. D.C. Department of Corrections,93 a threat was
made against an inmate’s life and the inmate alleged it had caused
him “psychological damage” and that his fear that the threat would
be carried out caused him to suffer “[n]ightmares and [to] wak[e]
up in a frantic sweat.”94 In that case, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia began its analysis by stating: “We note
at the outset that verbal threats, without more, may be sufficient
to state a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment.”95 The
Court of Appeals then concluded that, “[d]epending on the gravity
of the fear,” “the credibility of the threat,” and the targeted person’s
“psychological condition,” a death threat “could have caused more
than de minimis harm and therefore could have been sufficient
to state a claim of excessive use of force.”96 “These issues,” the
Court of Appeals ruled, reversing the district court’s dismissal of
91

92

93
94
95

96

See, e.g., Lawrence Michael Ladutke, Freedom in Expression in
El Salvador: The Struggle for Human Rights and Democracy
58 (2004); Thomas L. Pearcy, The History of Central America 110
(2006).
Human Rights in Developing Countries: Yearbook 1997 196−97
(Hugo Stokke et al. eds.) (discussing death threats in Guatemala); Silvio
Waisbord, Watchdog Journalism in South America: News,
Accountability, and Democracy 60 (2000) (discussing death threats
in South America against journalists).
Chandler v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 145 F.3d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1359.
Id. at 1360. In support of that proposition, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia cited Justice Harry Blackmun’s concurrence
in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992). In that concurrence, Justice
Blackmun observed: “It is not hard to imagine inflictions of psychological
harm—without corresponding physical harm—that might prove to be cruel
and unusual punishment. . . . [T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of ‘pain,’ rather than ‘injury.’ ‘Pain’ in
its ordinary meaning surely includes a notion of psychological harm.” Id.
at 16 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also id. at 17 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(“Psychological pain often may be clinically diagnosed and quantified
through well-established methods, as in the ordinary tort context where
damages for pain and suffering are regularly awarded.”). The U.S. Supreme
Court, in a recent Eighth Amendment case, has itself found that “it is proper
to consider . . . psychiatric and professional studies.” Hall v. Florida, 134 S.
Ct. 1986, 1993 (2014).
Chandler, 145 F.3d at 1361.
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the inmate’s Eighth Amendment claim, “cannot be resolved without
more factual development.”97
Similarly, in Burton v. Livingston,98 an inmate alleged that
an officer pointed a gun at him and threatened to shoot him. The
officer allegedly asked the inmate to “run” so he could “blow” the
inmate’s “Goddamn brains out.”99 In that case, the officer reportedly
used racial epithets and, through his words, tried “to scare” the
inmate into running, potentially allowing the officer to shoot the
inmate in the back and then later falsely claim that the inmate was
trying to escape.100 As the Eighth Circuit described the lawsuit’s
allegations: “The complaint states that Sgt. Livingston pointed a
lethal weapon at the prisoner, cocked it, and threatened him with
instant death. This incident occurred immediately after the prisoner
had given testimony against another guard in a § 1983 action.”101
Faced with those allegations, the Eighth Circuit ruled: “The complaint
describes in plain words a wanton act of cruelty which, if it occurred,
was brutal despite the fact that it resulted in no measurable physical
injury to the prisoner.”102 “The day has passed,” the Eighth Circuit
held, “when an inmate must show a court the scars of torture in
order to make out a complaint under § 1983.”103 As the Eighth
Circuit emphasized: “We hold that a prisoner retains at least the
right to be free from the terror of instant and unexpected death at
the whim of his allegedly bigoted custodians.”104
97

98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843 (1994)). As the Court of
Appeals stressed: “[T]he risk that Corporal Brooks’s threat might be carried
out, if left unaddressed (a matter upon which the district court made no
findings), could amount to ‘a sufficiently substantial “risk of serious damage
to [Chandler’s] future health”’ to be actionable as an unconstitutional
condition of confinement.” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843).
Burton v. Livingston, 791 F.2d 97, 99−100 (8th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 100. “Apparently,” the Eighth Circuit reported, “another guard who
was present took the threat seriously enough to step between the prisoner
and Sgt. Livingston.” Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The Eighth Circuit further ruled: “So far as we can tell at this early
stage of the case, the guard’s conduct was not motivated by the necessity
of correcting a rebellious inmate or by legitimate concerns for institutional
security. Neither is it an instance of rough language which resulted only in
bruised feelings.” Id. “This is rather,” the Eighth Circuit emphasized, “a
complaint that a prison guard, without provocation, and for the apparent
purpose of retaliating against the prisoner’s exercise of his rights in
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The case of Hudspeth v. Figgins105 is also illustrative. In that
case, a prisoner, James Hudspeth, sued two prison guards who
had allegedly impaired his right of access to the courts, with one
correctional officer reportedly threatening to transfer Hudspeth to
a work detail where the inmate, per the threat, would be shot by
“accident.”106 In that case, the Fourth Circuit ruled: “A threat of
physical harm to a prisoner if he persists in his pursuit of judicial relief
is as impermissible as a more direct means of restricting the right of
access to the courts.”107 “It is enough,” the Fourth Circuit explained,
pointing out that the inmate need not have actually succumbed to the
threat, “that the threat was intended to impose a limitation upon the
prisoner’s right of access to the court and was reasonably calculated
to have that effect.”108 If Hudspeth was intentionally placed “in fear
for his life if he pressed his court actions,” the Fourth Circuit added,
“that would inflict such suffering as to amount to unconstitutional
punishment.”109 “The life of a prisoner is a dreary one of suffering,”
it concluded, “but the Constitution prohibits the infliction upon
a prisoner of unnecessary suffering which is inconsistent with
contemporary standards of decency.”110

105
106
107
108
109
110

petitioning a federal court for redress, terrorized him with threats of death.”
Id. at 100−01. “Under the circumstances of this incident,” the Eighth
Circuit concluded, “the guard’s actions, if proved, were a violation of Mr.
Burton’s rights under the First Amendment and under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 101; see also
Shamsud’Diyn v. Moyer, No. ELH-17-3271, 2018 WL 3022660, at *9 (D. Md.
June 18, 2018) (“[A] ‘complaint that a prison guard, without provocation,
and for the apparent purpose of retaliating against the prisoner’s exercise
of his rights in petitioning a federal court for redress, terrorizing him with
threats of death,’ would be sufficient to state a claim.”) (quoting Burton,
791 F.2d at 100−01)); Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1346
(N.D. Ga. 2002) (“Mental torture consists of ‘prolonged mental harm caused
by or resulting from: the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of
severe physical pain or suffering; . . . the threat of imminent death; or the
threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, [or]
severe physical pain or suffering.’ As set out above, plaintiffs noted in their
testimony that they feared that they would be killed by Vuckovic during the
beatings he inflicted or during games of ‘Russian roulette.’ Each plaintiff
continues to suffer long-term psychological harm as a result of the ordeals
they suffered at the hands of defendant and others.”).
Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 1347.
Id. at 1348.
Id.
Id.
Id. The U.S. Supreme Court has been using the “evolving standards of
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A provision of federal law put in place as part of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act111 regulates the ability of inmates to bring
claims for compensatory damages for prison conditions that relate
to an inmate’s mental health. According to the provision of that law
now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e):
No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner
confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility,
for mental or emotional injury suffered while in
custody without a prior showing of physical injury or
the commission of a sexual act (as defined in section
2246 of Title 18).112
But that law plainly does not allow government actors to
psychologically torture prisoners with impunity.113 As the Seventh
Circuit wrote in rejecting the Attorney General’s contention that
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) makes a showing of physical injury a filing
prerequisite for every civil rights lawsuit involving mental or
emotional injury: “This contention if taken to its logical extreme
would give prison officials free reign to maliciously and sadistically
inflict psychological torture on prisoners, so long as they take care
not to inflict any physical injury in the process.”114

111
112
113
114

decency” test since 1958 to gauge what violates the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (determining that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society”).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2013).
Id. § 1997e(e).
Scarver v. Litscher, 371 F. Supp. 2d 986, 997−98 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (citation
omitted) (“A plaintiff who has suffered psychological torture but not physical
injury may still obtain nominal or punitive damages.”).
Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003). As the Seventh
Circuit determined in that case: “As we have observed before and
reemphasize here, ‘[i]t would be a serious mistake to interpret section
1997e(e) to require a showing of physical injury in all prisoner civil rights
suits.’ On several occasions we have explained that § 1997e(e) may limit
the relief available to prisoners who cannot allege a physical injury, but it
does not bar their lawsuits altogether. As its title suggests, § 1997e(e) is a
‘limitation on recovery.’ Accordingly, physical injury is merely a predicate for
an award of damages for mental or emotional injury, not a filing prerequisite
for the federal civil action itself.” Id.; see also id. at 941 (“Although § 1997e(e)
would bar recovery of compensatory damages ‘for’ mental and emotional
injuries suffered, the statute is inapplicable to awards of nominal or punitive
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As a general matter, the Eighth Amendment thus ordinarily
protects inmates from harm, further requiring that they be clothed,
fed, sheltered, and provided with adequate health care.115 “The
Eighth Amendment,” as one federal district court put it, “requires
the government ‘to provide medical care for those whom it is
punishing by incarceration.’”116 And the Eighth Amendment has
long been read to require the provision of mental health services for
inmates117 and to bar torture.118 For example, in Estelle v. Gamble,119
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that “the primary concern of the
drafters” of the Eighth Amendment was “to proscribe ‘torture[s]’
and other ‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment.”120 In that 1976
decision, the Supreme Court went on to declare: “Our more recent
cases, however, have held that Amendment proscribes more than
damages for the Eighth Amendment violation itself.”).
115 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) (“Prisoners are dependent on
the State for food, clothing, and necessary medical care.”); id. at 511 (“If
government fails to fulfill this obligation, the courts have a responsibility
to remedy the resulting Eighth Amendment violation.”); id. at 538
(“Establishing the population at which the State could begin to provide
constitutionally adequate medical and mental health care, and the
appropriate time frame within which to achieve the necessary reduction,
requires a degree a judgment.”); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994) (citations omitted) (“[P]rison officials must ensure that inmates
receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates’ . . . .”).
116 Scarver, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 998 (quoting Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590
(7th Cir. 1996)).
117 Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations
omitted) (“Courts have repeatedly held that treatment of a psychiatric
or psychological condition may present a ‘serious medical need’ under
the Estelle formulation.”); King v. Litscher, No. 17-CV-201-JPS, 2017 WL
4334133, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 28, 2017) (“It is well settled that the Eighth
Amendment protects the mental health of prisoners no less than their
physical health.”); Green v. Grams, No. 10-cv-745-slc, 2011 WL 5151520, at
*3 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 28, 2011) (same).
118 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (noting that “the primary
concern of the drafters” of the Eighth Amendment “was to proscribe
‘torture[s]’ and other ‘barbar[ous]’ methods of punishment”); see also Taylor
v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072, 1082 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The Eighth Amendment
prohibits the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain through torture,
barbarous methods, or methods resulting in a lingering death.”); Snipes
v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 590 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[R]ecent Supreme Court
decisions have held that the Eighth Amendment proscribes more than just
‘physically barbarous punishments.’”).
119 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
120 Id. at 102.
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physically barbarous punishments.”121 “We therefore conclude,” the
Court held, “that deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”122
A failure to provide adequate psychiatric and mental
health care services to inmates is deliberately indifferent to their
serious medical needs and thus constitutes an Eighth Amendment

121 Id. As the Court in Estelle v. Gamble put it: “The Amendment embodies
‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and
decency . . . ,’ Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968), against
which we must evaluate penal measures. Thus, we have held repugnant
to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with ‘the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”
Id. In Jackson v. Bishop, the Eighth Circuit—in an opinion authored by then
- Judge Harry Blackmun—concluded in 1968: “[W]e have no difficulty in
reaching the conclusion that the use of the strap in the penitentiaries of
Arkansas is punishment which, in this last third of the 20th century, runs
afoul of the Eighth Amendment; that the strap’s use, irrespective of any
precautionary conditions which may be imposed, offends contemporary
concepts of decency and human dignity and precepts of civilization which
we profess to possess; and that it also violates those standards of good
conscience and fundamental fairness enunciated by this court . . . .” Jackson,
404 F.2d at 579.
122 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104−05 (citation omitted); see also id. (“This is true
whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to
the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying
access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once
prescribed. Regardless of how evidenced, deliberate indifference to a
prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983.”).
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violation.123 As the Second Circuit put it in Langley v. Coughlin,124
“the basic legal principle is clear and well established . . . that when
incarceration deprives a person of reasonably necessary medical
care (including psychiatric or mental health care) which would be
available to him or her if not incarcerated, the prison authorities
must provide such surrogate care.”125 In 2011, the U.S. Supreme
Court itself considered an Eighth Amendment case involving prison
overcrowding and inadequate provision of services. In that case, the
Supreme Court emphasized: “For years the medical and mental health
care provided by California’s prisons has fallen short of minimum
constitutional requirements and has failed to meet prisoners’ basic
health needs. Needless suffering and death have been the welldocumented result.”126 The Court stressed that California prisoners
“with serious mental illness do not receive minimal, adequate care,”
with suicidal inmates held “for prolonged periods in telephonebooth-sized cages without toilets.”127
123 Rogers v. Evans, 792 F.2d 1052, 1058 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Hoptowit v.
Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982)); see also Kothmann v. Rosario,
558 F. App’x 907, 910 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted) (“A correctional
system’s deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs,
including ‘psychiatric or mental health needs,’ violates the Eighth
Amendment.”); Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Mental
torture is not an oxymoron, and has been held or assumed in a number
of prisoner cases, such as Joseph v. Brierton, 739 F.2d 1244 (7th Cir. 1984);
Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1525−26 (9th Cir. 1993), and Northington
v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir. 1992), to be actionable as cruel
and unusual punishment.”); Green v. Wilson, No. PWG-15-3866, 2018 WL
3629970, at *5 (D. Md. July 31, 2018) (holding that the Eighth Amendment
does not recognize “any distinction between the right to medical care for
physical ills and its psychological and psychiatric counterparts”); Bentz v.
Mulholland, No. 18-cv-1064-DRH, 2018 WL 2735483, at *9 (S.D. Ill. June
7, 2018) (holding that when harassment by prison officials is “accompanied
by actions which suggest that the harassment is persistent or results in pain
(either physical or psychological),” such “verbal harassment may support
an Eighth Amendment claim”); Braggs v. Dunn, 257 F. Supp. 3d 1171,
1256 n.81 (M.D. Ala. 2017) (“ADOC’s failure to provide mental-health
and correctional staffing sufficient to operate a minimally adequate mentalhealth system is in itself an unreasonable response under the deliberateindifference standard.”); Henderson v. S. Carolina Dep’t of Corr., C/A
No.: 4:17-287-BHH-TER, 2017 WL 2199020, at *5 (D. S.C. Apr. 25, 2017)
(citation omitted) (“Claims regarding mental health treatment fall under a
claim for deliberate indifference to medical care.”).
124 Langley v. Coughlin, 888 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1989).
125 Id. at 254.
126 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 501 (2011).
127 Id. at 503.
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Prisoners, like non-incarcerated human beings, have both
physical and psychological needs. “Serious medical needs” in the
prison context encompasses “conditions that are life-threatening or
that carry risks of permanent serious impairment if left untreated,
those that result in needless pain and suffering when treatment
is withheld and those that have been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment.”128 Suicide is but one objectively serious harm
that prison officials must guard against,129 and it has been specifically
held that, in the prison context, “[t]he Eighth Amendment protects
inmates’ mental health as well as their physical health.”130 An inmate
can therefore state a claim for deliberate indifference by alleging that
“his ‘pleas’ for psychological treatment were ‘ignored,’”131 with one
U.S. magistrate judge allowing an inmate’s complaint to proceed
past a motion to dismiss where the inmate alleged a deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs that resulted “in increased
pain, potentially life threatening spikes in blood pressure, dizzy
spells, anxiety, and other psychological trauma.”132
In the immigration context, case law makes clear that
“credible, specific threats can amount to persecution if they are severe
enough.”133 “‘[T]hreats of murder,’” the First Circuit has explained,
“fit squarely within this rubric.”134 Although the Immigration
128 Scarver v. Litscher, 371 F. Supp. 2d 986, 999 (W.D. Wis. 2005).
129 Id.; see also Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857, 860 (8th Cir. 2018)
(“The Eighth Amendment prohibits jail officials from acting with deliberate
indifference towards risks of suicide.”); Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d 140, 158
(3d Cir. 2017) (noting that a “vulnerability-to-suicide claim . . . is simply a
more specific articulation of the Eighth Amendment rule that prison officials
must not be deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs”).
130 Scarver, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 1000 (citing Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936,
940 (7th Cir. 2003); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir.
1987)).
131 Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Harris
v. Billington, No. 12-cv-437-wmc, 2015 WL 1893240, at *14 (W.D. Wis.
Apr. 24, 2015) (holding that a delay in treatment “can, under certain
circumstances, constitute deliberate indifference”).
132 Davis v. Hyden, No. A02-214 CV (JKS), 2005 WL 3116641, at *1, 5 (D.
Alaska Nov. 21, 2005).
133 Javed v. Holder, 715 F.3d 391, 395−96 (1st Cir. 2013); see also Barreto v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 392 F. App’x 689, 691 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e have held that
a minor beating, a detention of 11 hours, and a credible death threat by a
person who had the immediate ability to act on it constituted persecution.”).
134 Javed, 715 F.3d at 396 (quoting López de Hincapié v. Gonzales, 494 F.3d
213, 217 (1st Cir. 2007)); see also Sumschi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 677 F. App’x
579, 581 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting De Santamaria v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
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and Nationality Act (“INA”)135 contains no statutory definition of
“persecution,”136 that term has been interpreted to cover a “threat
of death, torture, or injury to one’s person”137 or—as another court
put it—“severe humanitarian mistreatment, such as ‘death threats,
involuntary confinement, torture, and other severe affronts to the life
or freedom of the applicant.’”138 As the Ninth Circuit ruled in 1996:
“There is no question that persistent death threats and assaults on
one’s life, family, and business rise to the level of persecution.”139
More recently, the Ninth Circuit summarized its prior case law as
follows: “In several cases, we have found that where the applicant
was the target of repeated beatings, death threats, and expressions
of hatred, a finding of persecution is compelled.”140

135

136
137

138
139
140

525 F.3d 999, 1009−10 (11th Cir. 2008)) (“[W]e previously concluded
that the record compelled a finding that an alien was persecuted when
she received repeated death threats over the course of two years and was
dragged from her vehicle by her hair, was traumatized by the torture and
murder of a family groundskeeper who refused to reveal her whereabouts,
and was kidnapped and beaten.”); Sanchez Jimenez v. Att’y Gen., 492 F.3d
1223, 1233 (11th Cir. 2007) (finding that past persecution included death
threats, attempted kidnapping, and armed men shooting at the petitioner
in a moving car); Lobo v. Holder, 684 F.3d 11, 18 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted) (“[C]redible verbal death threats may fall within the meaning
of ‘persecution[]’ . . . only when the threats are so ‘menacing as to cause
significant actual suffering or harm.’”); Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033,
1042 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he warning that the Andriasians would be killed
if they did not leave Azerbaijan immediately—which was made all the
more credible by the fact that the Azeri thugs who issued the threat had
just murdered Mr. Andriasian’s neighbor in cold blood—would by itself be
sufficient to establish past persecution.”).
Under the INA, “the Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to
a noncitizen who is unable or unwilling to return to his home country
‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion.’” née Joseph v. Sessions, No. 17-1403, 2018 WL 3549714,
at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 20, 2018) (citations omitted).
Id. at *3.
Id.; Yan Zhang v. Sessions, 681 F. App’x 554, 559 (8th Cir. 2017) (citations
omitted); but see Jimenez v. Att’y Gen., 737 Fed. Appx. 117, 118 (3d Cir.
2018) (“To meet the legal definition of torture, the threat of harm must be
‘by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.’”) (quoting 8 C.F.R. §
1208.18(a)(1) (2018)).
Huang v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 620 F.3d 372, 380 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Gomez-Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen., 527 F.3d 330, 341 (3d Cir. 2008)).
Singh v. INS, 94 F.3d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1996).
Marzbanian v. Holder, 597 F. App’x 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2015). The U.N.
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While menacing threats can constitute persecution, empty
or unsubstantiated threats unsupported by evidence of danger do
not meet the standard for a persecution claim.141 For example, it
has been held that “mere threats, such as anonymous death threats
through the telephone, without more, do not rise to the level of
persecution.”142 But it is clear, as the Eleventh Circuit has stated, that
“[a] credible death threat by a person who has the immediate ability
to act on it constitutes persecution regardless of whether the threat
is successfully carried out.”143 “We are more likely to conclude,”
the Eleventh Circuit has observed, “that the record compels a
finding of past persecution when an applicant faced imminent and
credible death threats.”144 “We are also more likely to conclude,”
the Eleventh Circuit has stressed, “that the record compels a finding

141

142
143

144

Human Rights Committee has itself determined, in a different context,
that States cannot ignore “known threats to the life of persons under their
jurisdiction, just because he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained.”
International Human Rights Law 270 (Daniel Moeckli et al. eds.,
2d ed. 2014) (citing Delgado Páez v. Columbia, CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985
(12 July 1990), para. 5.5). The Human Rights Committee has thus “found
violations of the right to security where there was a failure to investigate
credible death threats.” Id.
Lemus-Arita v. Sessions, 854 F.3d 476, 481 (8th Cir. 2017) (citations
omitted) (“a threat that is ‘exaggerated, nonspecific, or lacking in immediacy
may be insufficient’”; “[t]hreats alone constitute persecution in only a small
category of cases, and only when the threats are so menacing as to cause
significant actual suffering or harm”); Hernandez-Lima v. Lynch, 836 F.3d
109, 114 (1st Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (“Death threats rise to the
level of persecution only when ‘so menacing as to cause significant actual
suffering or harm.’ Evidence that such threats were entirely empty ‘plainly
supports [a] determination’ that they did not meet that standard.”); Vera v.
Holder, 425 F. App’x 604, 605 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (“Only in
‘extreme cases’ involving ‘repeated and especially menacing death threats’
have we held such threats establish past persecution.”).
Cordero v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 374 F. App’x 882, 887 n.1 (11th Cir. 2010).
Diallo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 596 F.3d 1329, 1333−34 (11th Cir. 2010). Credible
death threats can and do result in criminal prosecutions. E.g., United
States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Polson,
154 F. Supp. 2d 1230, 1231, 1234 (S.D. Ohio 2001). “In general, whether a
communication constitutes a ‘threat’ within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 876
is a question of fact for the jury so long as a reasonable recipient, familiar
with the context of the communication, could interpret it as a threat.” Id.
at 1235; see also State v. January, No. 75170-1-I, 2017 WL 5127889, at *3
(Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2017) (“The nature of a threat depends on all the
facts and circumstances and is not limited to a literal translation of the
words spoken.”).
Gutierrez-Granda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 386 F. App’x 848, 851 (11th Cir. 2010).
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of past persecution when the applicant has suffered physical injury
along with death threats.”145 “A specific threat of harm to an asylum
applicant,” a guide produced by the American Immigration Lawyers
Association observes, “is usually sufficient to demonstrate a wellfounded fear of persecution.”146
C.

The Torturous and Coercive Nature of Threats of Death
Death threats and threats of physical harm not only induce
147
fear and suffice for purposes of inmates setting forth legitimate
section 1983 claims,148 but they can also, in particular circumstances,
terrorize149 and constitute acts of torture, that is, the extreme or
aggravated form of cruelty.150 In Death Threats and Violence: New
145 Id.
146 Regina Germain, AILA’s Asylum Primer: A Practical Guide
to U.S. Asylum Law and Procedure 68 (2005). That standard for
making out a claim of a well-founded fear of persecution has been laid out
in a number of cases. E.g., Dong Ming Wu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 270 F. App’x
211, 214 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) (noting that a well-founded
fear of persecution “encompasses ‘threats to life, confinement, torture,
and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or
freedom,’ including forced sterilization”); accord Yu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 513
F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2008).
147 Fortson v. Eppinger, No.: 1:15 CV 2078, 2017 WL 603086, at *6 (N.D. Ohio
Feb. 15, 2017) (“[T]he jury was well aware that both women were extremely
reluctant to testify. The record reveals that Andee Caver was afraid to testify
because she had received death threats . . . .”); see also Kenneth L. Karst,
Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First Amendment Doctrine, 58 Stan.
L. Rev. 1337, 1341−44 (2006) (“Death threats are particularly harmful, for
they trigger short-term fear and long-term anxiety.”).
148 McKenney v. Farrinton, 2:16-cv-00630-JAW, 2017 WL 825280, at *5 (D. Me.,
Mar. 2, 2017) (citations omitted) (“Several circuit courts of appeals have
held that . . . threats can constitute the necessary adverse action. . . . [A]
verbal insult alone does not constitute adverse action. Death threats and
threats of serious physical harm, however, generally suffice.”); see also Dixon
v. Groeger, 2:16-cv-00178 NT, 2016 WL 4532066, at *2, *4 (D. Me., Aug.
29, 2016) (“[D]eath threats and threats of serious physical harm generally
suffice.”).
149 In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1104 (S.D. Fla. 2016)
(“AUC was a violent terrorist organization which had unleashed a systematic
campaign of terror—death threats, extrajudicial killings, torture, rape,
kidnappings, forced disappearances and looting—against vast swathes of the
Colombian civilian population”).
150 Azadeh v. Government of Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 1:16-cv-1467 (KBJ),
2018 WL 4232913, at *11 (D. D.C. Sept. 5, 2018) (noting that “torture”
is a label “usually reserved for extreme, deliberate and unusually cruel
practices”). See also Michael John Garcia, Cong. Research Serv.,
RL32438, U.N. Convention Against Torture (CAT): Overview
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Research and Clinical Perspectives, Stephen Morewitz, citing a 2006
study and noting the prevalence of death threats varies by context
and the underlying motivations for them, emphasizes: “Death threats
are a prevalent form of psychological torture. Based on a study of 69
refugees who were torture survivors, Olsen et al. (2006) discovered
that death threats were the most prevalent method of torture.”151 As
Morewitz notes: “They are prevalent in domestic violence episodes,
in time of war, and especially during periods of racial and ethnic
conflicts and political instability.”152 Though death threats are often
coupled with physical abuse and beatings,153 threats of death—all
by themselves—can thus be torturous, as the legal classification
of mock executions as acts of psychological torture makes crystal
clear.154

151

152

153

154

and Application to Interrogation Techniques 18 (2009) (“U.S.
courts and administrative bodies have found that severe beatings, maiming,
sexual assault, rape, and (in certain circumstances) death threats may
constitute ‘torture’ for purposes of either CAT or TVPA”); Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons, supra note 22, at art. 1(2) (“Torture constitutes an
aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”). Threats made in interrogation settings have sometimes been
described as constituting “psychological torture.” Crowe v. County of San
Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 432 (9th Cir. 2010).
Stephen J. Morewitz, Death Threats and Violence: New
Research and Clinical Perspectives 5 (2008); see also id. at 99
(“Death threat victims can suffer severe impairment in their occupational
functioning. They are at increased risk of suffering severe anxiety,
depression, and other stress-related health problems and may be at risk for
engaging in suicidal behaviors.”).
Morewitz, supra note 151, at 6. Threats to kill or threats of harm are
prohibited by international human rights law and international humanitarian
law. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights on the Battlefield, 47 Geo. Wash.
Int’l L. Rev. 509, 540−41 (2015) (“[T]he following unlawful interrogation
tactics are absolutely prohibited under both human rights law and the laws
of war: (1) torture that occurs from the use of waterboarding or related
forms of inducement of suffocation, (2) the cold cell and related forms of
inducement of hypothermia, (3) rape and other forms of sexual violence as
an interrogation tactic or other form of conduct during war, (4) threats to
kill the detainee and/or others, and (5) use of snarling dogs against naked
persons in order to induce intense fear or terror.”).
E.g., Abebe-Jiri v. Negewo, No. 1:90-CV-2010-GET, 1993 WL 814304, at *1
(N.D. Ga., Aug. 20, 1993) (describing the “interrogation and torture” of a
woman in the presence of several men, where she was “told to take off her
clothes,” where her “arms and legs were then bound and she was whipped
with a wire on her legs and her back,” and where she was “repeatedly
threatened with death if she did not reveal the location of a gun”).
Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International
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III. The Nature of Capital Prosecutions
A.

Threats of Death in Penal Systems
Threats have long been used in penal systems and by judges,
as the history of capital and corporal punishments demonstrates.155
In colonial times, a common punishment was to make an offender
sit on the gallows with a noose around the neck.156 For example,
in colonial Massachusetts, in an effort to curtail stealing, a 1736
Humanitarian Law in War 668 (2d ed. 2016) (“The U.N. Human
Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights consider mock executions torture.”); see also Torture and Its
Consequences: Current Treatment Approaches 204 (Metin
Başoğlu ed. 1992) (“Sham executions are a well-known and frequently
reported form of torture (e.g., Allodi & Cowgill, 1982; Benfeldt-Zachrisson,
1985; Goldfeld et al., 1988).”). Sometimes the detainee is subject to a
prolonged threat of execution.”); id. at 475 (“Commonly used psychological
methods of torture include . . . threats of torture to self or relatives and
sham executions.”).
155 E.g., John D. Bessler, The Anomaly of Executions: The Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause in the 21st Century, 2 Brit. J. Am. Leg. Studies
297 (2013) (describing the history of capital punishment and corporal
punishments in the United States). Of course, making threats against
judges is a criminal offense. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 115 (2012) (making it a crime
to threaten “to assault, kidnap, or murder . . . a United States judge”);
Judicial Independence in Transition 1248 (Anja Seibert-Fohr ed.,
2012) (“Violence or threats made to judges or those close to them is a
criminal offence.”); Life Under Death Threats: Dangers Faced by Judges, Prosecutors,
NPR, (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.npr.org/2013/04/01/175938445/thedangers-facing-judges-and-prosecutors (“In 2012, 1,370 threats were made
against federal judges.”).
156 Jeannine Marie DeLombard, In the Shadow of the Gallows:
Race, Crime, and American Civil Identity 341 n.31 (2012)
(noting that a man was found guilty of attempted rape and sentenced “to
sit on gallows”); Daniel Allen Hearn, Legal Executions in New
England: A Comprehensive Reference, 1623−1960, at 117 (1999).
As one source notes, citing a newspaper story from 1752: “At the Court of
Assize, at Springfield, the 2d Tuesday of September last, Daniel Bailey and
Mary Rainer, of a Place adjoining to Sheffield in that county, were convicted
of Adultery, and were sentenced to suffer the Penalty of the Law therefor,
viz. to sit on the Gallows with a Rope about their Necks, for the Space of
an Hour; to be whipt forty Stripes each, and to wear for ever after a Capital
A, two Inches long, and proportionable in bigness, cut out in Cloth of a
contrary Colour to their Cloaths, and sewed upon their upper Garments,
either upon the outside of the arm, or on the back.” George Francis
Dow, Every Day Life in the Massachusetts Bay Colony 214 n.*
(1988) (citing Boston Evening-Post, Oct. 9, 1752).
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law subjected thieves to increasing penalties—and escalating
threats of death—for each offense.157 A first-time offender was
to be fined or whipped; a second offense required the thief to pay
tremble damages, sit upon the gallows platform for an hour with
a rope around his neck, and then to receive up to thirty stripes at
the whipping post; and, finally, to be hanged for a third offense.158
“The colonists’ rationale,” one historian notes, “was clear: anyone
impervious to the fine and the whip, who did not mend his ways after
an hour with a noose about him, was uncontrollable and therefore
had to be executed.”159 The punishment of sitting on the gallows
continued to exist in Massachusetts after the Revolutionary War,160
though it eventually passed from the scene along with the corporal
punishments of branding, whipping, ear cropping, and standing in
the pillory.161
Living under a threat of death, the evidence shows, is a
deeply depressing experience, especially when one is confined in
prison—and particularly when one is confined in isolation on death
row with all that entails.162 “Most significantly for the offender,”
157 The Charters and General Laws of the Colony and Province
of Massachusetts Bay 509 (1814).
158 Id. at 509−10.
159 David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order
and Disorder in the New Republic 52 (rev. ed. 2017).
160 1 The Perpetual Laws of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, from the Establishment of Its Constitution,
in the Year 1780, to the End of the Year 1800, at 351 (Boston, I.
Thomas & E.T. Andrews 1801) (reprinting a 1786 law that provided for the
following punishment: “to sit on the gallows with a rope round his neck
for the space of one hour”); 1 The General Laws of Massachusetts,
from the Adoption of the Constitution, to February,
1822, at 65, 183, 185 (Boston, Wells & Lily and Cummings & Hillard
1823) (referencing 1782 and 1785 Massachusetts laws providing for the
punishment of “sitting on the gallows, with a rope about the neck,” “sitting
on the gallows with a rope about his neck,” and “sitting on the gallows
the space of one hour, with a rope about his neck”); Andrew Dunlap, A
Speech Delivered Before the Municipal Court of the City of
Boston, in Defence of Abner Kneeland, on an Indictment for
Blasphemy 2, 44 (Boston, 1834) (referencing the punishment of “sitting
on the gallows, with a rope about the neck”).
161 Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, at the
Semi-Annual Meeting, Held in Boston, April 28, 1875, at 69−70
(Worcester, Charles Hamilton, Paladium Office 1875).
162 Handbook of Correctional Mental Health 467 (Charles L. Scott
2d ed., 2010) (“Treating psychiatrists may encounter death row inmates
experiencing overwhelming fear, helplessness, recurrent depression, and
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Carol and Jordan Steiker write in Courting Death: The Supreme Court
and Capital Punishment, “extended death row incarceration presents
special problems of cruelty, especially given the prevailing harsh
conditions of death row confinement.” “Condemned inmates,” they
explain, “now face multiple punishments: lengthy incarceration in
solitary-style conditions; the anguish of perpetually living under a
sentence of death; and actual execution.”163 It is a dreary existence,
with death row inmates using the phrase “Dead Man Walking”—
the expression popularized by Sister Helen Prejean’s book of the
same name164 —to refer to the condemned before execution.165 In
the late-nineteenth-century case of In re Medley,166 the U.S. Supreme
Court itself emphasized that “when a prisoner sentenced by a court
to death is confined in the penitentiary awaiting the execution of
the sentence, one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be
subjected during that time is the uncertainty during the whole of
it.”167
The process of state-sanctioned killing begins with a
prosecutor’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty. Under
federal law, the prosecutor advises the defendant and the court “a
reasonable time before trial,” or before the acceptance of a plea,
of the government’s intention to seek the death penalty.168 The

163
164
165
166
167
168

self-mutilation.”); id. (“Another phenomenon not uncommonly seen on
death row is an inmate who voluntarily waives appeals in an effort to hasten
the execution. The motivations of these so-called volunteers may be rooted
in depression, resentment, or simple demoralization.”); see also Smith v.
Mahoney, 611 F.3d 978, 999 (9th Cir. 2010) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (“At the
time of the arraignment, he was deeply depressed because he had been in
solitary confinement for some time and subjected to harsh living conditions.
He had received death threats from Native American inmates and believed
that he would be killed in prison.”). The issue of “volunteers” has been
discussed at length elsewhere. E.g., John H. Blume, Killing the Willing:
“Volunteers,” Suicide and Competency, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 939 (2005); C. Lee
Harrington, A Community Divided: Defense Attorneys and the Ethics of Death Row
Volunteering, 25 Law & Soc. Inquiry 849 (2000).
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Courting Death: The
Supreme Court and Capital Punishment 207 (2016).
Helen Prejean, Dead Man Walking: An Eyewitness Account of
the Death Penalty in the United States (1993).
David W. Neubauer & Henry F. Fradella, America’s Courts and
the Criminal Justice System 386 (10th ed. 2011).
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
Id. at 172.
Charles Doyle Sr., The Death Penalty: Capital Punishment Legislation in the 110th
Congress, in Capital Punishment Update 8 (Lorraine V. Coyne ed.,
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U.S. Department of Justice has a death penalty protocol whereby
a local U.S. attorney cannot seek the death penalty without prior
authorization from the Attorney General of the United States. Per
that protocol, U.S. attorneys are required to submit to the Department
of Justice’s Capital Case Unit of the Criminal Division all cases
involving a charge for which the death penalty is a legally authorized
sanction, regardless of whether the U.S. attorney recommends
seeking the death penalty. After the Capital Case Unit reviews
the case and prepares an initial analysis and recommendation, the
Attorney General’s Capital Case Review Committee, composed of
senior Justice Department lawyers, meets with the U.S. attorney and
defense counsel, reviews all documents submitted by the parties, and
makes its recommendation to the Attorney General. The Attorney
General then makes the final decision regarding whether to seek the
death penalty.169
Part and parcel of torture is instilling the fear of death
or bodily harm,170 and capital charges backed by the resources
of federal, state, or local prosecutors—ones designed to take a
person’s life—certainly cannot be taken lightly by those facing such
charges.171 In fact, threats of bodily harm or death, the U.N. Human
2007).
169 Samuel Walker et al., The Color of Justice: Race, Ethnicity,
and Crime in America 388 (6th ed. 2016).
170 On the practice of torture in prior centuries, one commentator writes:
“Often, the intent was to instill the fear of death, as in the use of water
torture.” The Torture Debate in America 4 (Karen J. Greenberg ed.,
2006). Instilling intense fear remains the goal of modern torture techniques.
Kerim Yildiz & Juliet McDermott, Torture in Turkey: The
Ongoing Practice of Torture and Ill-Treatment 105 (2004); see
also id. at 39 (“[T]orture terrorizes. The body in pain winces; it trembles.
The muscles themselves register fear. This, too, is rooted in pain’s biological
function of impelling us in the most urgent way possible to escape from
the source of pain—for that impulse is indistinguishable from panic. U.S.
interrogators have used the technique of “waterboarding” to break the will
of detainees. They are strapped to a board and immersed repeatedly in
water, just short of drowning. As anyone knows who has ever come close to
drowning or suffocating, the oxygen-starved brain sends panic-signals that
overwhelm everything else.”).
171 Neuroscientists have noted that psychological torture—sometimes called
“no-touch” torture—releases stress hormones by creating intense fear.
Armin Krishnan, Military Neuroscience and the Coming Age
of Neurowarfare 200 (2017); see also Diarmuid Cunniffe, The Worst Scars
Are in the Mind: Deconstructing Psychological Torture, 7 ICL J. 1, 14−16 (2013)
(discussing how threats induce fear, can weaken resistance and “break the
will of detainees,” “are a particularly cruel form of psychological suffering,”
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Rights Committee has determined, can constitute psychological
torture. For instance, in Estrella v. Uruguay, a concert pianist—an
Argentine national, Miguel Angel Estrella, then living in France—
filed a communication with the Human Rights Committee about
his detention in a Uruguayan prison. Estrella’s communication
asserted that, in December 1977, he was subjected to torture after
armed individuals in civilian clothes broke into his house, threatened
him with death, and he was punched and kicked, had his feet and
hands bound, and was blindfolded and hooded.172 The alleged
psychological torture he was subjected to was said to consist “chiefly
in threats of torture or violence to relatives or friends, or of dispatch
to Argentina to be executed,” and “in threats of making us witness
the torture of friends.” “For hours upon end,” Estrella asserted of
his tormentors, “they put me through a mock amputation with an
electric saw, telling me: ‘we are going to do the same to you as Victor
Jara’”—a reference to a well-known Chilean singer and guitarist
who was found dead, with his hands completely smashed, at the
end of September 1973 in a stadium in Santiago, Chile. On March
25, 1982, the Human Rights Committee decided that Estrella “was
subjected to severe physical and psychological torture, including the
threat that the author’s hands would be cut off by an electric saw, in
an effort to force him to admit subversive activity.”173
and how “[t]he sensation of fear or exposure to life-threatening situations
and fear of death is, in psychological and psychiatric terms, described as a
major ‘stressor’”).
172 Estrella v. Uruguay, Communication No. 74/1980, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
OP/2 at 93 (1990), http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/newscans/74-1980.
html. “The alleged physical torture consisted of electric shocks, beatings
with rubber truncheons, kicks and punches, hanging him up with his hands
tied behind his back, pushing him into water until he nearly drowned, and
making him stand with his legs apart and arms raised for up to 20 hours.”
Id.
173 Id.; see also Nigel Rodley (Special Rapporteur for the Commission on Human
Rights), Question of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, at 3, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/56/156 (July 3, 2001) (“As stated by
the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 20 (10 April
1992), on article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the Special Rapporteur would like to remind Governments that the
prohibition of torture relates not only to acts that cause physical pain but
also to acts that cause mental suffering to the victim, such as intimidation
and other forms of threats.”); id., at 3, para. 4 (“A number of decisions by
human rights monitoring mechanisms have accordingly referred to the
notion of mental pain or suffering, including suffering through intimidation
and threats, as a violation of the prohibition of torture and other forms
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The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has itself
repeatedly concluded that fear and terror are sufficient to establish
mental torture. If a person is threatened with bodily harm, it is
characterized as psychological torture. Thus, in Maritza Urrutia
v. Guatemala, the Inter-American Court concluded in 2003: “An
international juridical regime of absolute prohibition of all forms
of torture, both physical and psychological, has been developed
and, with regard to the latter, it has been recognized that the threat
or real danger of subjecting a person to physical harm produces,
under determined circumstances, such a degree of moral anguish
that it may be considered ‘psychological torture.’”174 Likewise,
in Baldeón García v. Peru, the Inter-American Court found in 2006
that “threats and real danger of physical harm causes, in certain
circumstances, such a degree of moral anguish that it may be
considered psychological torture.”175 And in Tibi v. Ecuador,176 the
Inter-American Court found that the victim “was threatened” during
his detention in violation of Article 5 of the American Convention177
and that such conduct, which “made him feel panic and fear for his
life, . . . is a form of torture.”178 That decision made clear that the
American Convention’s prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman,
or degrading punishment or treatment extends to not only physical

174
175
176
177

178

of ill-treatment. In particular, the Special Rapporteur would like to draw
Governments’ attention to the views expressed by the Human Rights
Committee in the case of Estrella v. Uruguay.”); id., at 4, para. 8 (“It is the
Special Rapporteur’s opinion that serious and credible threats, including
death threats, to the physical integrity of the victim or a third person can
amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or even to torture,
especially when the victim remains in the hands of law enforcement
officials.”).
Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 147, para. 92 (Nov. 27, 2003), http://www.
corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_103_ing.pdf.
Baldeón García v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 147, para. 119 (Apr. 6, 2006), http://www.corteidh.
or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_147_ing.pdf.
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No.
147, para. 147 (Sept. 7, 2004).
Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights provides in part:
“Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity
respected.” Organization of American States, American Convention on
Human Rights art. 5(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
“No one,” that article further provides, “shall be subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment.” Id. at art. 5(2).
Tibi v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. C) No. 114, para. 149.
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suffering but also psychic and moral anguish.179 “[T]hreats and the
real danger of subjecting a person to physical injury,” that court
emphasized, “may be considered psychological torture.”180
A recent report of the Human Rights Clinic of the University
of Texas School of Law, “Designed to Break You: Human Rights
Violations on Texas’ Death Row,” specifically documents the torture
and inhumanity associated with life on death row.181 In that report,
its authors note that every individual on Texas’ death row “spends
approximately 23 hours a day in complete isolation for the entire
duration of their sentence, which, on average, lasts more than a
decade.”182 As the report then emphasizes: “This prolonged solitary
confinement has overwhelmingly negative effects on inmates’ mental
health, exacerbating existing mental health conditions and causing
many prisoners to develop mental illness for the first time.”183 “In
addition to the detrimental effects of isolation,” the report notes,
“the practice of setting multiple execution dates means that many
prisoners are subjected to the psychological stress of preparing to
die several times during their sentence.”184 “The right to be free
179 Id. at para. 147 (“The Court has also recognized that threats and the real
danger of subjecting a person to physical injury, under certain circumstances,
cause such a moral anguish that they may be considered psychological
torture.”).
180 Id.
181 Jacey Fortin, Report Compares Texas’ Solitary Confinement Policies to Torture, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 26, 2017 (citing Human Rights Clinic, The University
of Texas School of Law, Designed to Break You: Human Rights
Violations on Texas’ Death Row (2017)); see also A Death Before
Dying: Solitary Confinement on Death Row, Am. Civ. Liberties Union (July
2013), www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/deathbeforedyingreport.pdf; Corinna Barrett Lain, Following Finality: Why Capital Punishment
Is Collapsing Under Its Own Weight, in Final Judgments: The Death
Penalty in American Law and Culture 30, 40 (Austin Sarat ed.,
2017) (“On death row, each condemned prisoner spends at least 22 hours
a day, typically 23, within the confines of a windowless cell the size of a
standard parking lot space. . . . Most are not allowed contact visits from
family or friends. Death row inmates are typically allowed an hour or less of
exercise each day, and typically that takes place in caged exercise pens akin
to dog runs.”).
182 Human Rights Clinic, The Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, supra note
181, at 5; see also Lain, supra note 181, at 40.
183 Human Rights Clinic, The Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law, supra note
181, at 5.
184 Id.; see also Robert M. Bohm, DeathQuest: An Introduction to
the Theory and Practice of Capital Punishment in the United
States 225 (5th ed. 2017) (“In all death penalty jurisdictions, a death or
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from torture is an absolute human right, and it is submitted that the
current conditions of confinement on Texas’ death row, including
mandatory indefinite isolation, amount to a severe and relentless
act of torture,” the report concludes.185 “Inmates held in solitary
confinement,” the report assesses, “are effectively subject to a severe
form of psychological torture every day of their lives.”186
The uncertainty and unknowns associated with capital cases
only serve to amplify the torturous nature of death penalty regimes.
“Another particularly stressful experience is the anticipation of
torture,” Metin Başoğlu and Susan Mineka emphasize in Torture and
Its Consequences. As they write in that book: “This vulnerability is
often exploited by the torturers who make verbal threats of torture.
Many survivors report that having to wait to be taken from their
cell to the torture chamber can be even more distressing than
torture itself.”187 “The anticipatory distress,” they explain, “seems
to be greater if the intervals between sessions are variable and/or if
there is an uncertainty about the nature of the next torture session;
both of these factors obviously maximize unpredictability.”188
“Such observations,” they point out, “are corroborated by research
in animals showing that shocks delivered at variable intervals (as
opposed to fixed intervals) produce greater heart rate elevations and
more ulceration.”189 Death row inmates clearly endure enormous

185
186
187

188
189

execution warrant instigates the execution process. A death warrant, which
typically sets the date and place for a prisoner’s execution, usually is issued
by a state’s governor, or the president of the United States in federal death
penalty cases, and authorizes a warden or other prison officials to carry
out a death sentence. In Texas, a district court judge sets the execution
date. . . . The length of time before a death warrant expires and has to be
reissued varies from a few days to several months.”).
Human Rights Clinic, The Univ. Tex. Sch. Law, supra note 181, at 7.
Id. at 21. One former death row inmate described life on death row as a
“slow mental, physical and spiritual torture.” Id. at 22.
Metin Başoğlu & Susan Mineka, The Role of Uncontrollable and Unpredictable
Stress in Post-Traumatic Stress Responses in Torture Survivors, in Torture and Its
Consequences: Current Treatment Approaches 182, 206 (Metin
Başoğlu ed., 1992).
Id.
Id. In that source, Metin Başoğlu and Susan Mineka further emphasize:
“Certain forms of torture seem to have a much greater impact than others in
inducing loss of control and feelings of helplessness in the detainee. Those
that involve a perceived risk of death during the process appear to be more
traumatic than the ones that merely involve physical pain but no real threat
to life. Submersion of the head under water until near-asphyxiation or sham
executions are examples of such methods.” Id.
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uncertainty and mental anguish, vacillating between hope and
intense fear and despair while coping with severe depression and
psychological trauma and, often, suicidal thoughts or ideation.190
B. Capital Charges, Death Sentences, and Execution
Protocols
Capital charges—or threats of death by police or prosecutors—
are themselves extremely problematic when analyzed through the
lens of the legal prohibition against torture. It is well known that
confessions can be obtained through coercion or torture,191 and
those facing death threats can be compelled to make choices—often
as a result of duress—they might not have made had the prospect
of death been removed from the equation.192 False or coerced
190 John D. Bessler, Cruel and Unusual: The American Death
Penalty and the Founders’ Eighth Amendment 225 (2012)
(“Condemned inmates, suffering from bouts of depression, often take their
own lives . . . . One Florida study showed that 35 percent of death row
inmates in that state attempted suicide and that 42 percent considered
suicide.”).
191 George Ryley Scott, The History of Torture Throughout the
Ages 276 (2009) (“Terror induced by threats is frequently tried to induce
admission of guilt. A police officer may threaten to shoot the accused,
and has been known to go so far as to press a revolver, loaded with blank
cartridges, against the head or stomach and pull the trigger.”); see also
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 155 (1944) (“The Constitution of the
United States stands as a bar against the conviction of any individual in an
American court by means of a coerced confession. There have been, and
are now, certain foreign nations with governments dedicated to an opposite
policy: governments which convict individuals with testimony obtained by
police organizations possessed of an unrestrained power to seize persons
suspected of crimes against the state, hold them in secret custody, and
wring from them confessions by physical or mental torture. So long as the
Constitution remains the basic law of our Republic, America will not have
that kind of government.”); Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
237−38 (1940) (referring to “physical and mental torture and coercion” in
the context of “secret inquisitorial processes”).
192 Bessler, The Death Penalty as Torture, supra note 26, at 83 (“[I]n
1994, an Illinois federal district court emphasized that duress is a valid
defense where there is ‘(1) an immediate threat of death or serious bodily
harm; (2) a well-grounded fear that the threat will be carried out; and (3)
no reasonable opportunity to escape the threatened harm.’ And in the early
twentieth century, American marriages were invalidated where the consent
of grooms was not freely given, but were obtained through threats of death
by the fathers of the brides. . . . In a New Jersey case from the 1950s,
‘threats of gangster violence’ and ‘arsenic poisoning’ against a husband
were themselves found to raise important questions of fact as to whether
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confessions occur with some frequency,193 and the risk of miscarriages
of justice is heightened significantly in situations involving threats
of death.194 As one law review article reports: “The threat of a death
conveyances to the wife of property were procured by means of duress. In
that case, Rubenstein v. Rubenstein, the husband’s allegations of threats of
arsenic poisoning were given weight because the wife’s father was then
serving a life sentence in a Pennsylvania prison for murder committed when
he was associated with an ‘arsenic ring’ engaged in killings to defraud life
insurers. Because the threat of arsenic poisoning was credible, the court
gave significance to it.”).
193 E.g., Daniel Reisberg, The Science of Perception and Memory:
A Pragmatic Guide for the Justice System 193 (2014) (providing
estimates on the number of false confessions); Wrightsman’s
Psychology and the Legal System 158 (Edie Greene & Kirk Heilbrun
eds., 7th ed. 2011) (“It is undisputed that false confessions led to the
wrongful conviction and imprisonment of five people in Beatrice, Nebraska
in a case known as the Beatrice Six . . . .”); id. at 159 (“The Beatrice Six—five
people who falsely confessed and one who was wrongfully convicted of the
1985 rape and murder of 68-year-old Helen Wilson in Beatrice, Nebraska—
set the record for the most people exonerated by DNA evidence in one
case. Their exonerations and pardons in 2008 shed light on the way that
interrogators were able to get detailed statements from the suspects about
a crime they did not commit.”); id. (“Suspect Joann Taylor confessed after
interrogators told her they wanted her to be the first female on Nebraska’s
death row. In fact, five of the six suspects, easily influenced and probably
confused, falsely confessed to escape the threat of a death penalty.”);
Mordecai Specktor, Minneapolis Attorney Steve Kaplan Helps to Free Death Row
Inmate Damon Thibodeaux, Who Had Been Wrongly Convicted of Rape and Murder,
American Jewish World (Feb. 1, 2013), https://www.tcdailyplanet.net/
minneapolis-attorney-steve-kaplan-helps-free-death-row-inmate-damonthibodeaux-who-h/ (“After nine hours of police grilling, and going without
sleep for more than 30 hours, Thibodeaux cracked and falsely confessed to
committing rape and murder.”).
194 E.g., McHenry v. United States, 308 F.2d 700, 703 (10th Cir. 1962) (citations
omitted) (“An involuntary confession or one obtained by means of threats
and promises which subject the mind of the accused to the torture or fear
of flattery of hope is inadmissible in a criminal trial.”). As one court put
it, in a situation where a man in police custody was threatened with the
electric chair should he remain silent, thereby causing him to lose his
capacity for rational calculation: “When a confession is forced from the
mind by the flattery of hope or by the torture of fear, it is unreliable and
no credit ought to be given to it. Promises or suggestions of leniency
in exchange for waiving the Fifth Amendment privilege create a flattery
of hope, which is made even more powerful by the torture of fear that
accompanying threats of punishment induce in the mind of the accused.”
State v. Petitjean, 748 N.E.2d 133, 141, 145 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) (italics in
original); accord David V. Baker, Women and Capital Punishment
in the United States: An Analytical History 183 (2016) (“Police
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sentence causes many defendants to plead guilty in exchange for
a life sentence, rather than risk the outcome of a trial.”195 Just as
death threats by prison guards can chill inmates’ exercise of their
First Amendment rights,196 the prospect of being sentenced to death
in a court of law is also likely to influence the decision-making of
investigators and state prosecutors used the threat of the death penalty
to coerce false confessions from Ada JoAnn Taylor, Debra Shelden, and
Kathy Gonzales.”); Joe Duggan, Beatrice 6 Member Says Threat of Death Penalty
Persuaded Her to Confess to a Slaying She Didn’t Commit, World-Herald
Bureau (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.omaha.com/news/crime/beatricemember-says-threat-of-death-penalty-persuaded-her-to/article_51ebcf4f7299-5d08-8dfa-ebae55f0f5c2.html (“[W]hen the prosecutor agreed to
take the death penalty off the table in exchange for a guilty plea and her
cooperation, Taylor and her court-appointed attorney decided it was the
best option. . . . Taylor said the decision to give a false confession may
have saved her life, but it cost her more than 19½ years of freedom.”);
see also Statement of Robert Dunham, Executive Director of the Death
Penalty Information Center, on the release of the National Registry of
Exonerations’ reports Exonerations in 2016 and Race and Wrongful Convictions
in the United States (Mar. 7, 2017), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
DPICStatementOnNationalRegistryReports.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2018)
(“Our review of the 2016 data [from the National Registry of Exonerations]
reveals that the death penalty played a role in nearly a quarter of the 54
homicide exonerations last year. In at least six of the wrongful homicide
convictions, prosecutors had sought the death penalty at trial; in another, an
innocent defendant had pled guilty to avoid the death penalty; and at least
six additional exonerations were the product of witnesses having falsely
implicated innocent defendants after police had threatened the witness or
a loved one with the death penalty unless the witness cooperated with the
investigation . . . .”).
195 Rachel King, No Due Process: How the Death Penalty Violates the Constitutional
Rights of the Family Members of Death Row Prisoners, 16 Pub. Int. L.J. 195, 214
(2007).
196 Schleig v. Borough of Nazareth, No. 16-3499, 2017 WL 2591408, at *4 (3d
Cir. June 15, 2017) (“In the few cases in which government officials have
made death threats in response to constitutionally protected activity, no one
has tried to claim that the offending official’s behavior is something other
than unlawful retaliation.”); Knecht v. Collins, Nos. 96-3682, 96-3735,
96-4114, 1999 WL 427173, at *3 (6th Cir. June 15, 1999) (per curiam)
(a reasonable jury could conclude that prison guards’ acts of filing false
disciplinary charges and issuing death threats were sufficient to deter a
prisoner of ordinary firmness from exercising First Amendment rights);
Walker v. Firman, No. 16-cv-02221-RBJ-MEH, 2017 WL 4652015, at *10
(D. Colo. Oct. 17, 2017) (“It is also clearly established that making death
threats in retaliation for protected conduct violates the First Amendment.”);
Silverburg v. Seeley, No. 3:09CV-P493-R, 2009 WL 5197870, at *3 (W.D. Ky.
Dec. 23, 2009) (“[T]he Court will allow the individual-capacity claims for
damages for retaliation based on alleged threats of death . . . .”).
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those facing capital prosecution or capital charges.197 In the lead up
to actual executions, the mental torment death row inmates face is,
no doubt, off the charts.
In states that still put people to death, due process and
fairness considerations inevitably yield to finality.
“Today’s
executions,” Robert Johnson writes in Death Work: A Study of the
Modern Execution Process, “are highly bureaucratic jobs with clearly
delineated roles, responsibilities, and procedures articulated in
execution protocols.”198 These protocols are often laden with minutia
about how the executions will be carried out, yet the protocols
put condemned inmates on notice, in no uncertain terms, that the
197 E.g., Bussey v. State, 184 So. 3d 1138, 1141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)
(detectives’ repeated threats of the death penalty amounted to coercion
that rendered a murder defendant’s confession involuntary); id. at 1145−46
(“The purpose of the detectives’ comments regarding the death penalty
. . . was not to inform [Bussey] of the penalties he faced. Rather, the
purpose of the comments was to instill fear in Bussey that he would face
the death penalty with the hope that his fear would cause him to confess
to the robbery and murder.”); cf. Galenski v. Commonwealth, No. 2012-SC000407-MR, 2013 WL 6730018, at *2 n.9 (Ky. Dec. 19, 2013) (citation
omitted) (“The Beatrice Six is the colloquial name given to a group of six
youths that were wrongfully convicted of murder in Beatrice, Nebraska, as a
result of confessions induced by the threat of the death penalty.”); People v.
Sanders, 976 N.Y.S.2d 205, 213 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (Hall, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (“The defendant was threatened, by the FBI agent, with
the possibility of death. This threat was used to overcome the defendant’s
will, which is so ‘fundamentally unfair as to deny due process.’”); State v.
Knight, No. 04-CA-35, 2008 WL 4369764, at *8−13 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept.
26, 2008) (Donovan, J., dissenting) (asserting that a murder confession was
involuntary and “improperly induced” because “threats of the electric chair”
introduced a “torture of fear” in order to “overbear” the suspect’s will). It
has long been understood that torturous practices, which can include the use
of death threats, can lead to false confessions. As one judge on the Supreme
Court of Washington stressed in 2009: “We have reason to believe that,
even in our own country and even in our own time, men have gone to prison
and even death row on the strength of confessions wrought by torture.”
State v. Riofta, 209 P.3d 467, 477 (Wash. 2009) (en banc) (Chambers, J.,
concurring in dissent). The threat of death may also influence the decisionmaking of lawyers representing those facing the prospect of capital charges
or death sentences. E.g., Sherod Thaxton, Leveraging Death, 103 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 475, 482−84 (2013) (finding that the threat of the death
penalty increases the probability of a plea agreement by approximately 20
percent, and noting that capital charges enable prosecutors to empanel
“death-qualified” juries and that “the use of the death penalty as leverage in
plea negotiations raises important legal and ethical issues”).
198 Robert Johnson, Death Work: A Study of the Modern
Execution Process 42 (1998).

VOL. 11, NO. 1

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47

government aims to kill them. In a 2001 news story, The New York
Times reported about the 56-page “Execution Protocol” to be used by
the staff of the federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.199 While
professing to allow executions to be carried out “in an efficient and
humane manner,” it provided a “systemic countdown to execution”
that includes several pre-execution checklists.200 “As soon as
practical after establishment of the execution date,” one section of
the protocol read, “the warden at U.S.P. Terre Haute or designee,
will personally brief the condemned individual regarding relevant
aspects of the execution process.”201 “A briefing sheet outlining these
aspects of the execution will be given to the individual,” the protocol
continued.202 In other words, not only is a death row inmate already
fully aware that a death sentence has been imposed, but a prison
official describes to the inmate the process by which that inmate’s
life will be extinguished by the state.
Under that Execution Protocol, the warden’s briefing with
the condemned inmate was to take place “By 30 Days Before the
Execution,” as was a conference with the condemned inmate
pertaining to the selection of execution witnesses, to include “one
spiritual adviser, two defense attorneys and three adult friends or
relatives (at least 18 years old).”203 In addition, the condemned
inmate was to be asked about “Disposition of Body” and “Disposition
of Personal Property and Accounts,” with the inmate “to provide
instructions concerning the disposition of his/her body no later
than 14 days prior to the execution.”204 Throughout the process, the
condemned inmate would be continually reminded, in ways big and
small, that the execution was approaching. “At least seven days prior
to the execution, the warden or designee will contact the condemned
individual to arrange for his/her last meal,” the protocol read.205
“Between 24 and 12 Hours Prior,” it continued, “[t]he warden will
contact the condemned individual to finalize arrangements for his/
her final meal and ensure that it is properly prepared and served by
199 See Jane Fritsch, Word for Word/Execution Protocol; Please Order Your Last Meal
Seven Days in Advance, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2001, http://www.nytimes.
com/2001/04/22/weekinreview/word-for-word-execution-protocol-pleaseorder-your-last-meal-seven-days-advance.html.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
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staff.”206 After the termination of the condemned inmate’s telephone
privileges “24 hours prior to the execution,” the condemned inmate’s
final meal was to be served “Between 12 and 3 Hours Prior” to the
execution.207 The death row inmate would, of course, also be aware
of an attorney’s final efforts to save the inmate’s life as well as the
submission of any clemency petition, all of which the inmate would
be helpless to predetermine the outcome.208
According to the Execution Protocol,209 the warden, during
the period “Between 3 Hours and 30 Minutes Prior” to the execution,
was to “designate a recorder who will begin logging execution
activities in the official execution log book.”210 And in “The Final
30 Minutes,” several items were listed to be accomplished by
prison authorities.211 In particular, the Execution Protocol’s section
for “Bringing the Condemned Individual to the Execution Room”
required the condemned individual to be removed from an inmate
holding cell, strip-searched, and then “dressed in khaki pants, shirt
and slip-on shoes,” “secured with restraints, if deemed appropriate by
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 The chances of a clemency petition being granted are quite small. David
R. Dow, Executed on a Technicality: Lethal Injustice on
America’s Death Row 86 (2005) (“Death penalty lawyers file clemency
petitions on behalf of their clients because when someone’s life is at stake,
lawyers tend to leave nothing on the cutting room floor, but when they are
writing the petitions, they know it is a mere formality.”); see also id. (italics
in original) (noting that “hope is too strong a word to describe the clemency
process in Texas”; “[d]eath row inmates do not receive clemency in Texas”).
209 This execution protocol is one of many throughout the United States that
methodically detail how executions are to be carried out. The texts of
various execution protocols can be found on the Death Penalty Information
Center’s website. State by State Lethal Injection, Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-lethal-injection (last visited Sept. 28,
2018) (containing links to available protocols). But see Evan J. Mandery,
Capital Punishment in America: A Balanced Examination
492 (2d ed. 2012) (“[M]any states do not make their procedures known.
Professor Deborah Denno of Fordham Law School has tirelessly detailed the
failings of states in this regard, offering many examples of states that have
vague and even secret execution protocols.”); see also Daniel LaChance,
Executing Freedom: The Cultural Life of Capital Punishment
in the United States 91 (2016) (“[A]nthropological studies of
executions in the modern era have drawn a connection between execution
protocols and a loss of agency of both the condemned and the state actors
engaged in ‘death work.’”).
210 Fritsch, supra note 199.
211 Id.
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the warden,” and “escorted to the Execution Room by the Restraint
Team.”212 “In the Execution Room,” the protocol continued, “the
ambulatory restraints, if any, will be removed, and the condemned
individual will be restrained to the Execution Table.”213 “Once the
condemned individual has been secured to the table,” the protocol
read for the execution’s final stage, “at the direction of the warden,
staff inside the Execution Room will open the drapes covering the
windows of the witness rooms.”214 “The warden,” the protocol
then read, “will ask the condemned individual if he/she has any
last words or wishes to make a statement.”215 Because executions
extinguish life and many executions are botched, a fact that death
row inmates are no doubt well aware of, the psychological torment
as an execution approaches is especially heightened.216
IV.

The Torturous Nature of State-Sanctioned Killing

A. Mental vs. Physical Pain or Suffering
Cruelty and torture—the aggravated form of cruelty—are
prohibited by law.217 The U.N. Human Rights Committee, back in
1993, held that “the death penalty must be carried out in such a
212
213
214
215

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Robert M. Bohm, DeathQuest: An Introduction to the
Theory and Practice of Capital Punishment in the United
States 202 (5th ed. 2017) (“When the first jolt of 2,000-volt electricity hit
Tafero, the sponge in the headpiece gave off a combustible gas, which shot
smoke and flames from the top of the leather hood hiding Tafero’s face. The
flames—described as 3 inches to a foot long—horrified witnesses. Tafero’s
attorney described the flawed execution as torture.”).
216 Austin Sarat, Gruesome Spectacles: Botched Executions
and America’s Death Penalty 5 (2014). In some cases, death row
inmates have been forced to spend an extended amount of time on the
lethal injection gurney or to endure excruciating pain during the execution
itself. Rev. Carroll Pickett & Carlton Stowers, Within These
Walls: Memoirs of a Death House Chaplain 79−98 (2017); Ziva
Branstetter & Cary Aspinwall, Inmate Clayton Lockett Dies of Heart Attack
After Botched Execution; Second Execution Postponed, Tulsa World (Apr. 30,
2014), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/state/inmate-clayton-lockett-diesof-heart-attack-after-botched-execution/article_80cc060a-cff2-11e3-967c0017a43b2370.html.
217 Greenberg, supra note 170, at 366 (noting that the Convention Against
Torture treats torture as an extreme form of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment).
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way as to cause the least possible physical and mental suffering.”218
Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court, while upholding the death
penalty’s constitutionality in cases like Wilkerson v. Utah,219 In re
Kemmler,220 Gregg v. Georgia,221 Baze v. Rees222 and Glossip v. Gross,223 has
held that torture—as well as any barbaric method of execution224
(or one causing a “lingering death”)—is prohibited by the U.S.
Constitution’s Eighth Amendment.225 For instance, the Supreme
218 Committee on Civil and Political Rights, NG v. Canada, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (Nov. 5, 1993). The Human Rights Committee
expressed the view that there would be a real risk of cruel and inhumane
treatment were gas asphyxiation to be used to carry out an execution. Id.;
see also Committee on Civil and Political Rights, Kindler v. Canada, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 (July 30, 1993).
219 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879) (upholding the constitutionality of
the public firing squad).
220 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (upholding the constitutionality of New
York’s electric chair).
221 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding the constitutionality of
Georgia’s death penalty). At the same time as the Gregg ruling, the U.S.
Supreme Court also upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty in
Florida and Texas. Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas,
428 U.S. 262 (1976).
222 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (upholding the constitutionality of
Kentucky’s three-drug lethal injection protocol).
223 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (upholding the constitutionality of
Oklahoma’s three-drug lethal injection protocol). Although the Supreme
Court struck down the death penalty as unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972), it reversed course four years later and upheld the death
penalty’s constitutionality in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
224 Wilkerson, 99 U.S. at 135−36 (noting in dicta that “burning alive” and other
“punishments of torture . . . in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are
forbidden” by the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment).
225 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447. Dissents have asserted that particular
methods of executions are unconstitutional. E.g., Gomez v. U.S. Dist.
Ct. for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U.S. 653, 658 (1992) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted) (“More than a century ago, we declared that
‘[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death.’ In
light of our contemporary understanding of the methods of execution and
in light of less cruel alternatives presently available, I believe that execution
by cyanide gas is ‘incompatible with ‘the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.’”); Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S.
1080, 1086 (1985) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment
requires that, as much as humanly possible, a chosen method of execution
minimize the risk of unnecessary pain, violence, and mutilation. If a
method of execution does not satisfy these criteria—if it causes ‘torture or a
lingering death’ in a significant number of cases—then unnecessary cruelty
inheres in that method of execution and the method violates the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause.”).
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Court—staking out its position—held more than a century ago,
in its 1890 decision In re Kemmler: “Punishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of
death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the
[C]onstitution.”226 The American founders’ use of cruel in the Eighth
Amendment, the Court ruled, “implies . . . something inhuman
and barbarous,—something more than the mere extinguishment
of life.”227 But the In re Kemmler pronouncement about the death
penalty’s constitutionality came decades before the U.S. ratification
of the Convention Against Torture and its clear prohibition of
“mental torture.”228
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has, over the years, upheld
the constitutionality of the electric chair, the firing squad, and lethal
injection,229 the Court has yet to take up—has yet to even consider
on the merits—the death penalty’s adverse psychological impact.
For example, while a few Justices have urged the full Court to take
up the issue of the “death row phenomenon,” the Court has yet to
accept for review a case dealing with prolonged stays on death row.230
226 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
227 Id.
228 America Needs Human Rights 207 (Anuradha Mittal & Peter Rosset
eds., 1999) (noting that the United States signed the Convention Against
Torture on April 18, 1988, ratified it on October 21, 1994, and that the
convention entered into force in the United States on November 20, 1994).
229 In such cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has focused on whether the particular
method of execution would produce a lingering death and whether there
would be excruciating, physical pain at the time of the inmate’s death.
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of lethal
injection, the most common method of execution today, Supreme Court
Justices have sometimes dissented from the Court’s decisions. E.g., Arthur
v. Dunn, 137 U.S. 725, 725 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that
petitioner Thomas Arthur had “amassed significant evidence that Alabama’s
current lethal-injection protocol will result in intolerable and needless
agony”); John D. Bessler, Introduction to Stephen Breyer, Against
the Death Penalty 1−70 (John D. Bessler ed., 2016) (discussing the
dissents in Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015)).
230 See William A. Schabas, The Death Penalty as Cruel Treatment
and Torture: Capital Punishment Challenged in the World’s
Courts 124−25 (1996) (discussing the death row phenomenon); Patrick
Hudson, Does the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner’s Human Rights under
International Law? 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 833 (2000) (same); Kara Sharkey, Delay
in Considering the Constitutionality of Inordinate Delay: The Death Row Phenomenon
and the Eighth Amendment, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 861, 863 (2013) (“The Supreme
Court has repeatedly declined to address the validity of the unconstitutional
delay claim raised by Valle and other death row inmates before him. The
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Meanwhile, the Court has struck down multiple non-lethal corporal
punishments that operate on the body231 as well as death sentences
for assorted categories of offenders seen to have diminished capacity
or responsibility.232
Since the prohibition against torture is absolute and nonderogable,233 and because credible death threats and threats of
serious bodily harm are, even now, properly considered to be acts of
torture,234 the death penalty must be outlawed post-haste. Already, a

231

232

233

234

issue first came to the Court’s attention over fifteen years ago, in Lackey v.
Texas.” (citing Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2011); Lackey v. Texas, 514
U.S. 1045, 1045 (1995) (memorandum of Stevens, J., respecting the denial
of certiorari)).
E.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 733−35 & n.2, 738, 745 (2002) (alleging
that prison officials handcuffed a shirtless inmate to a hitching post for seven
hours, leading to “a substantial risk of physical harm” and unnecessary
exposure to heat and sun, the Supreme Court held that such conduct
constituted an “obvious” Eighth Amendment violation); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) (striking down as unconstitutional a
sentence of cadena temporal that entailed a minimum twelve-year sentence
of imprisonment, chained day and night at the wrists and ankles, while
performing hard and painful labor while so chained).
E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (finding that the Eighth
Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause prohibits the death
penalty for the non-homicidal rape of a child); Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551 (2005) (declaring the unconstitutionality of the death penalty for
juvenile offenders); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (declaring the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty for the intellectually disabled); Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (barring the execution of the insane);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (setting aside the death penalty for
the driver of a getaway car in a robbery-murder); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584 (1977) (finding the death penalty to be disproportionate punishment for
the non-homicidal rape of an adult woman).
Jordan J. Paust, The Absolute Prohibition of Torture and Necessary and Appropriate
Sanctions, 43 Val. U. L. Rev. 1535, 1535 (2009) (“Torture is a form of
treatment of human beings that is absolutely prohibited under various forms
of customary and treaty-based international law in all social contexts.”).
John Alan Cohan, Torture and the Necessity Doctrine, Val. U. L. Rev. 1587,
1596 (2007) (“[I]n addition to physical torture there can be psychological
torture, such as threatening to execute the suspect, putting a gun to his head
and saying you will shoot, threatening to castrate him, telling him that you
are going to kill his family members if he does not tell you the information
you are seeking, and similar tactics that, while not physically painful, inflict
mental pain or suffering, even when there is no intent to carry out such
threats.”); see also The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib 179
(Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (citations omitted) (“In
criminal law, courts generally determine whether an individual’s words or
actions constitute a threat by examining whether a reasonable person in the
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number of American judges—many of whom have publicly expressed
aversion for death sentences and executions235 —have concluded
that capital punishment should be declared unconstitutional.236 “I
yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antipathy, and, indeed,
abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical
distress and fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds,”
Justice Harry Blackmun wrote in 1972 while dissenting from the
Supreme Court’s landmark, 5–4 decision in Furman v. Georgia, which
found then-existing death penalty laws to be unconstitutional.237
Although he originally thought legislators, not judges, should decide
the matter, Blackmun later changed his mind. “From this day forward,
I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death,” he concluded
in 1994, this time taking the view that capital punishment should
be declared unconstitutional after seeing the reality of death penalty
cases.238 “I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply to concede
that the death penalty experiment has failed,” he emphasized.239
It is, in fact, simply impossible for the death penalty to be used
or administered without resorting to credible threats of death, the
very kind of threats that, when made by prison guards or non-state

235

236
237
238
239

same circumstances would conclude that a threat had been made.”).
Many U.S. Supreme Court Justices, while on the Court or after retiring
from it, have expressed moral or legal objections to capital punishment.
Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun: Harry
Blackmun’s Supreme Court Journey 113, 176−79 (2005); Michael
Mello, Against the Death Penalty: The Relentless Dissents
of Justices Brennan and Marshall (1996); John C. Jeffries,
Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.: A Biography 451−52 (2001).
Through the years, trial court and appellate judges have expressed regret
about imposing death sentences or described them as cruel and unusual
punishments. E.g., 80 The Friend: A Religious and Literary
Journal 99−100 (1907) (noting that Bird Wilson, the son of American
Founding Father James Wilson and a judge on Pennsylvania’s Court of
Common Pleas, expressed regret for the rest of his life after imposing a
death sentence as part of his judicial duties; he was once heard to exclaim
of the condemned man: “He was launched into eternity unprepared; but,
O God Impute it not to me ”); Kevin M. Barry, The Law of Abolition, 107 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 521 (2017) (discussing American judges who
have expressed their objections to capital punishment).
Barry, supra note 235, at 535 (“In all, at least thirty-five federal and state
judges have concluded that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se.”).
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 405−06 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of cert.).
Id.
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actors, are already properly classified as acts of torture.240 Capital
charges and death sentences are plainly credible threats of death
because they are enforced by tremendous state power. Not only
do threats of death inflict severe mental anguish and psychological
torture on their targets,241 but they inflict severe mental trauma on
capital jurors,242 lawyers,243 and members of execution teams.244
240 Threats against prison guards by an inmate have themselves been found to
be highly credible where the guards “were placed in fear” because of the
inmate’s “ability to obtain weapons” and his gang connections within the
prison. People v. Mosley, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
241 11 Handbook of Psychology: Forensic Psychology 431 (Alan
M. Goldstein & Irving B. Weiner eds., 2003) (“Some [death row] inmates
may find the sustained isolation and chronic deprivation of years of solitary
confinement to be so psychologically painful that the escape of death appears
preferable.”); Michael L. Perlin et al., Competence in the Law:
From Legal Theory to Clinical Application 94 n.536 (2008) (“It
has been estimated that ‘as many as fifty percent of Florida’s death row
inmates become intermittently insane.’”); see also Lynda G. Adamson,
Thematic Guide to Popular Nonfiction 206 (2006) (noting that
San Quentin, California, guards yelled “dead man walking” when death row
inmates were out of their cells).
242 Michael E. Antonio, “I didn’t know it’d Be so Hard”: Jurors’ Emotional
Reactions to Serving on a Capital Trial, 89 Judicature 282, 283−84 (2006)
(“[R]eseachers studying criminal cases have identified ‘one or more physical
and/or psychological symptoms that could be related to jury duty.’ These
included reoccurring thoughts about the trial that would keep the jurors
awake at night or nightmares about the crime and the defendant, stomach
pains, nervousness, tension, shaking, headaches, heart palpitations, sexual
inhibitions, depression, anorexia, faintness, numbness, chest pain, and hives.
. . . Findings showed ‘jurors whose jury panel rendered a death penalty did
sustain greater PTSD [Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder] symptoms than did
jurors whose jury panel rendered a life sentence.’”).
243 See generally Susannah Sheffer, Fighting for Their Lives: Inside
the Experience of Capital Defense Attorneys (2013); see also 1
Appeals and Writs in Criminal Cases §6.2 (3d ed. 2017) (“The job of
appellate counsel in a capital case is complicated by the wide-ranging scope
and fast-changing nature of capital jurisprudence, as well as the length of
the time over which the litigation will continue. In addition, the magnitude
of the undertaking, including the severity of the consequences of losing the
case, create a unique set of pressures.”); Sara Mayeux, Review of Fighting for
Their Lives: Inside the Experience of Capital Defense Attorneys by Susannah Sheffer,
H-Net (Nov. 2013), http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=40132
(noting that capital defenders “cycle through rage, fear, anxiety, guilt,
helplessness, and numbness; they fall into ruts of depression; they work all
night, drink too much, and flail through nightmares”).
244 John D. Bessler, Death in the Dark: Midnight Executions
in America 147 (1997) (noting that Utah and other states have stress
inoculation programs to try to prevent prison staff members from suffering
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In addition, executions inflict extreme mental pain or suffering
on the condemned’s family and friends,245 and emotional trauma
on execution eyewitnesses.246 Family members have experienced
serious adverse health consequences in close proximity to the
imposition or carrying out of death sentences,247 with one death row
from post-traumatic stress disorder after executions); Annmarie Timmins,
Former Warden ‘Haunted’ by Executions, Concord Monitor (Aug. 13,
2010), https://www.concordmonitor.com/Archive/2010/08/999787691999787691-1008-CM (quoting former warden Ron McAndrew, who oversaw
Florida executions, as saying, “Many colleagues turned to drugs and alcohol
from the pain of knowing a man had died at their hands. And I’ve been
haunted by the men I was asked to execute in the name of the state of
Florida.”).
245 Sandra Joy, Grief, Loss, and Treatment for Death Row
Families: Forgotten No More 212 (2014) (“There are some surviving
execution witnesses who strongly regret their decision to witness, thus feel
led to advise other families against witnessing subsequent executions.”);
Rachel King, No Due Process: How the Death Penalty Violates the Constitutional
Rights of the Family Members of Death Row Inmates, 16 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J.
195, 197−99, 209, 211−17 (2007) (describing the emotional and physical
impacts of the death penalty on death row inmates’ family members, and
listing migraine headaches, skyrocketing blood pressure, nightmares and
sleeplessness, grief and uncontrollable crying, drug and alcohol abuse,
recurring health problems, severe depression, heart attacks, and attempted
suicide).
246 Robert L. Baldwin, Life and Death Matters: Seeking the Truth
about Capital Punishment 205 (2009) (“Those whose jobs are part of
the process of execution also suffer from long-term effects similar to posttraumatic stress disorder. Because executions are so grim, most states that
allow capital punishment offer counseling to all execution witnesses (except
those related to the condemned).”); Broken Images, Broken Selves:
Dissociative Narratives in Clinical Practice 68, 84 (Stanley
Krippner & Susan Marie Powers eds., 1997) (citing Freinkel, A. et al.,
Dissociative Symptoms in Media Execution Witnesses, 151 Am. J. of Psychiatry
1335, 1335−39 (1994)) (“Freinkel et al. (1994) described that the witnessing
of the execution of a convicted killer produced significant depersonalization
among journalists observing the event.”); see also Scott Christianson,
The Last Gasp: The Rise and Fall of the American Gas Chamber
182 (2010) (“San Quentin’s prison personnel became accustomed to two
or three witnesses fainting during each execution, and others vomiting or
otherwise breaking down under the stress.”).
247 Helen Kearney, Children of Parents Sentenced to Death, in Capital
Punishment: New Perspectives 162 (Peter Hodgkinson ed., 2016)
(citations omitted) (describing examples that “illustrate the extraordinary
levels of stress and trauma that the children and family” of death row
inmates undergo, including a father in Belarus who suffered a heart attack
shortly after learning of his son’s execution and the mother of an Indiana
death row inmate who overdosed after joining her son for his last meal); id.
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inmate’s mother suffering a heart attack and a stroke after a state
governor signed a death warrant.248
B. The Torturous Effects of Death Sentences and Executions
Just as it is considered an act of torture to force someone to
watch the rape, sexual assault, or torture of a loved one,249 it should
be considered an act of torture to permit the imposition of a death
sentence or the use of an execution. Capital sentences and executions
inflict severe psychological harm on those closest to the condemned
as well as those associated with the process of state-sanctioned
killing, from inmates and their family members to prison chaplains,
lawyers, and executioners.250 The powerlessness of a loved one to
at 145 (“Recent studies document the serious emotional and psychological
distress experienced by the children and families of death row inmates,
characterized by symptoms corresponding with post-traumatic stress
disorder, ambiguous loss, and complicated and disenfranchised grief.”).
248 Shirley Dicks, Six Accounts of Wrongly Convicted Prisoners on Death Row, in
Congregation of the Condemned: Voices Against the Death
Penalty 146, 153−54 (Shirley Dicks ed., 1995).
249 Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgement, ¶ 149 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001) (“[T]he Furund’ija Trial
Chamber found that being forced to watch serious sexual attacks inflicted
on a female acquaintance was torture for the forced observer. The presence
of onlookers, particularly family members, also inflicts severe mental
harm amounting to torture on the person being raped.”) (citing Furund’ija
judgment); see also Prosecutor v. Fofana, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T, Judgment,
¶ 153 (Special Court for Sierra Leone Aug. 2, 2007) (“[A] third party could
suffer serious mental harm by witnessing acts committed against others,
particularly against family or friends.”).
250 E.g., Walter C. Long, The Constitutionality and Ethics of Execution-Day Prison
Chaplaincy, 21 Tex. J. C.L. & C.R. 1, 3 (2015) (“Execution-day chaplains
work for the State, but there should be no question that they also form quick
and strong emotional bonds with the men and women they are assigned
to counsel and accompany to their deaths.”); Seema Kandelia & Peter
Hodgkinson, The Greater Stigma? Family Visits to the Condemned, in Capital
Punishment: New Perspectives 127 (Peter Hodgkinson ed., 2013)
(“In Texas, at the instance of being sentenced to death, the condemned’s
family become the untouchables—literally—and by implication, the entire
constituency of the families of the condemned are marginalized and
stigmatized. In a world where there are so many examples of cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment and punishment, Texas’s treatment of the mothers,
fathers, husbands, wives, children and grandchildren of its condemned must
rank high.”); Louis J. Palmer, Jr., The Death Penalty in the United
States: A Complete Guide to Federal and State Laws 240 (2d
ed. 2014) (noting that John Hurlbert, the executioner at New York’s Sing
Sing Prison during the 1920s, executed over 120 prisoners in Sing Sing’s
electric chair, but resigned in 1926 and, deeply depressed, committed suicide
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prevent harm to a close relative is—and long has been—an aspect of
torturous conduct,251 and the only way to eliminate such torture is to
eliminate executions altogether. Just as it is an act of torture to kill
a helpless or defenseless victim in the non-state actor context,252 it
should be considered an act of torture to deliberately kill an inmate
who is tied down on a gurney at the moment of his or her death.253
in the basement of his home three years later). American laws typically
allow condemned inmates’ family members, along with a small number
of “reputable” or “respectable citizens,” to attend executions. Bessler,
Death in the Dark, supra note 244, at 44, 46, 72−73. And death row
inmates’ family members—who, themselves, are not responsible for the
particular crimes committed by the condemned inmates—suffer severe
pain and suffering as a result of executions. Even if they do not actually
attend an execution in person, they know when it will occur and yet will
be utterly helpless to stop it. This means that death row inmates’ family
members experience “anticipatory grief ”—a particularly bizarre form of
loss. E.g., Robert M. Bohm, DeathQuest III: An Introduction to
the Theory and Practice of Capital Punishment in the United
States 351 (3d ed. 2007).
251 E.g., United States v. Juvenile (I.H., Jr.), 1 F. Supp. 2d 509, 520 (D.V.I. 1998)
(noting that the defendant participated “in the brutal violation” of a man’s
wife “while the husband was only some few feet away, powerless to spare
her from such torture”).
252 E.g., Van Tran v. Colson, 764 F.3d 594, 622−23 (6th Cir. 2014) (emphasizing
that a victim’s helplessness or defenselessness, including in an “executionstyle murder,” “evinces torture or depravity of mind”); Lawlor v.
Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 887 (Va. 2013) (“The psychological aspect
of torture may be established, for example, ‘where the victim is in intense
fear and is aware of, but helpless to prevent, impending death . . . for an
appreciable lapse of time.’” (quoting Ex parte Key, 891 So. 2d 384, 390 (Ala.
2004)); State v. Davis, 318 S.W.3d 618, 643 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (finding
evidence to support jury determination “that the murder was committed
with depravity of mind because the crime involved binding Ms. Spicer,
subjecting her to repeated acts of gruesome physical and sexual torture
with the purpose of promoting her death, and that Mr. Davis killed or aided
in killing Ms. Spicer while she was bound helplessly, thereby exhibiting a
callous disregard for human life”); State v. Frye, 461 S.E.2d 664, 680 (N.C.
1995) (finding the defendant’s crime involved “psychological torture”).
253 Clive Stafford Smith, Injustice: Life and Death in the
Courtrooms of America 29−40 (2012) (“Over the years I have watched
six of my clients die: two in the electric chair, two in the gas chamber and
two on the lethal injection gurney.”); id. (“It always happens at night, in
darkness. I have never been able to decide whether it matters how they
do it, since the prisoner ends up dead anyway. In one sense the gurney is
most surreal, since the scene is meant to emulate a clinical setting, yet the
prisoner is strapped down in the shape of a cross, his arms wide to give
room for the needle. Sometimes the prison staff take ten minutes, twenty
minutes, three-quarters of an hour probing the prisoner’s arm, trying to find
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The Convention Against Torture specifically prohibits both
physical and psychological torture, so the U.S. Supreme Court
should no longer focus only on the risk of maladministration of
lethal-injection drugs and the potential for excruciating physical
pain at the very moment of an inmate’s execution, as it did in Baze v.
Rees254 and Glossip v. Gross.255 Instead, the Supreme Court should use
the modern definition of torture and broaden its focus to examine
the psychological terror and self-evident mental torture associated
with death sentences and executions.256 Mental torture is just as
bad as physical torture, and both mental and physical torture are
prohibited in the Convention Against Torture and similar human
rights instruments.257 There is simply no legitimate justification
to condemn one form of torture (i.e. the physical) while tolerating
another (i.e. the psychological).
A person experiences severe psychological suffering when
that person is incapacitated and helpless to prevent his or her
death,258 and that is true for any person, regardless of what that
person may have done—or not done—in the past. Already, threats
of violence and death threats can form the basis of an intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) claim259 because they inflict
254
255
256

257

258

259

a vein.”).
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008).
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th
Cir. 2005) (“When courts seek to define torture in international law, they
often look to the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment . . . . Accordingly, we, for ATA
[Alien Tort Act] purposes, too look to the Convention when deciding what
constitutes torture according to the law of nations.”).
See supra text accompanying notes 4−5; see also Elizabeth A. Sheehy,
Defending Battered Women on Trial: Lessons from the
Transcripts 259 (2014) (“Psychological torture causes as much mental
and traumatic stress as physical torture, and it amplifies brain injuries,
making it more difficult to treat for depression and anxiety those who have
experienced both.”).
Smith v. State, 122 So. 3d 224, 242 (Ala. 2011) (“After the initial
gunshots rendered Smith helpless to prevent her death she suffered great
psychological torture as she listened to her abductors discuss how they
were going to kill her and dispose of her body while she begged for medical
attention.”).
Harris v. Cellco Partnership, No. 5:15-cv-529-Oc-30PRL, 2016 WL
232235, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 15, 2016) (“In cases where Florida courts
have permitted a plaintiff to move forward with an IIED claim, they often
involve threats of death, rape, or severe bodily harm to the plaintiff or family
members of the plaintiff.”); Allam v. Meyers, No. 09-cv-10580 (KMW), 2011
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severe emotional distress and are considered to be “outside the
bounds of decency.”260 And such threats can also be torturous when
those threats are credible ones—as death threats made in the death
penalty context naturally and inevitably are when one considers
their immutable characteristics. In American jurisprudence, “forms
of torture” already include “mock executions by placing a gun” in
someone’s mouth “and pulling the trigger.”261 Likewise, the use
of Russian roulette during interrogation has been found to be a
WL 721648, at *10−11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011) (allowing IIED claim based
on a “five month-long, deliberate and malicious campaign of harassment
and intimidation” that included “threats of violence” and death threats,
as well as “relentless humiliation and emotional abuse”); Eves v. Ray, 840
N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (App. Div. 2007) (sustaining verdict for defendant on
IIED counterclaim where, “on several occasions,” plaintiff “threatened
the defendant both physically and financially, and stalked him”); Nims v.
Harrison, 768 So. 2d 1198, 1201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding “as a
matter of law” that “Nims’ complaints state a cause of action for intentional
infliction of mental distress”; high school teacher stated cause of action
against students for IIED where students participated in production and
distribution of newsletter that threatened to kill teacher and to rape her and
all of her children); Household Credit Servs., Inc. v. Driscol, 989 S.W.2d 72,
81−82 (Tex. App. 1998) (general pattern of harassing behavior, including
bomb and death threats, constituted extreme and outrageous behavior that
could give rise to IIED claim); Behringer v. Behringer, 884 S.W.2d 839, 842,
844−45 (Tex. App. 1994) (allowing IIED claim where evidence of death
threats included talk of hiring a hit man, and where there were threats that
a husband would be beaten up and, as a result of the death threats and the
wife’s actions, the husband “was in fear of his life every day, all the time”).
260 E.g., Barrios v. Elmore, No. 3:18-cv-132-DJH-RSE, 2018 WL 3636576, at *4
(W.D. Ky. Ct. App. July 31, 2018) (denying motion to dismiss IIED claim,
with the court finding threats to someone’s life “to be sufficiently outside
the bounds of decency to be considered outrageous”); see also Tania Tetlow,
Criminalizing “Private” Torture, 58 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 183, 233−34 (2016)
(“‘Psychological torture’ should be defined, with reference to the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, as ‘the use of extreme and
outrageous conduct to intentionally cause severe emotional distress.’”); id.
at 238 (“IIED allows civil damages for ‘outrageous’ behavior resulting in
‘extreme emotional distress.’”).
261 Cannon v. Burge, No. 05 C 2192, 2006 WL 273544, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2,
2006); see also Massie v. Gov’t of North Kor., 592 F. Supp. 2d 57, 64, 66 (D.
D.C. 2008) (describing a mock execution and men held in captivity who
“endured individual threats of death, threats to kill others, severe beatings,
torture, both physical and mental, and other means of coercion”). Compare
Zalewski v. City of New York, No. 1:13-CV-7015 (ARR) (PK), 2018 WL
5113137, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2018) (“Courts in this circuit have found
that ‘verbal threats, combined with the brandishing of [a] weapon, could be
unreasonable and therefore constitute excessive force.’”) (citations omitted).
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form of torture,262 as have “threats to kill” and “the anticipation of
physical harm to one’s self or a loved one.”263 If a threat to kill an
inmate in one context (i.e. where a prison guard makes the threat)
is torturous, then a threat to kill an inmate in another context (i.e.
where the judicial system makes the threat) should also be classified
as torturous. In the twenty-first century, the universal rights to
human dignity and life and to be free from cruelty and torture should
take center stage in the modern death penalty debate.
C. The Importance of Human Dignity
Not only are death threats torturous in nature, but they are
unnecessary264 and utterly inconsistent with the right to life265 and
262 In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1463 (D.
Haw. 1995). This case also found “[s]olitary confinement while handcuffed
or tied to a bed” to be a form of torture. Id.
263 State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 601 (Tenn. 1999) (“This Court has repeatedly
held that the anticipation of physical harm to one’s self or a loved one
constitutes mental torture. The evidence here clearly supports a finding of
mental torture.”) (citations omitted).
264 A core principle of the Enlightenment—one articulated by Cesare Beccaria,
Montesquieu and others centuries ago—was that any punishment that
goes beyond “absolute necessity” is “tyrannical.” Bessler, The Death
Penalty as Torture, supra note 26, at 37, 255; see also John D. Bessler,
The Celebrated Marquis: An Italian Noble and the Making of
the Modern World 7, 217−18 (2018) (discussing Montesquieu’s and
Beccaria’s views of necessity as the justification for punishment); John D.
Bessler, The Baron and the Marquis: Liberty, Tyranny, and the
Enlightenment Maxim that Can Remake American Criminal
Justice (2019) (discussing the history and modern-day implications of
the maxim penned by Montesquieu—and then publicized by Beccaria—that
any punishment not grounded in necessity is “tyrannical”). In a world of
maximum-security prisons, and in which life-without-possibility-of-parole
sentences are authorized by law, it cannot be said that death sentences or
executions are necessary, let alone absolutely necessary. John D. Bessler,
The Birth of American Law: An Italian Philosopher and the
American Revolution 439 (2014).
265 Capital Punishment: Global Issues and Prospects 18−19
(Peter Hodgkinson & Andrew Rutherford eds., 1996) (“The original draft
of the Universal Declaration, prepared by John P. Humphrey in early 1947,
recognized a right to life that ‘can be denied only to persons who have been
convicted under general law of some crime to which the death penalty is
attached’. But Eleanor Roosevelt, who chaired the Drafting Committee,
cited movement underway in some states to abolish the death penalty, and
suggested that it might be better not to make any explicit mention of the
matter. René Cassin reworked Humphrey’s draft and removed any reference
to the death penalty. Cassin’s proposal found its way, virtually unchanged,
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the notion of human dignity.266 Human dignity has long been called
the “touchstone” of the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment,267
and dignity is also a central value of international law. As the U.N.
Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected
to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment puts it:

into the final version of the Declaration, despite some subsequent attempts to
return to the original proposal. It is clear from the travaux préparatoires that
the death penalty was considered to be incompatible with the right to life,
and that its abolition, although not immediately realizable, should be the
goal of Member states. Subsequent interpretations, by General Assembly
and Economic and Social Council resolutions, support this conclusion.”)
(italics in original).
266 Juan E. Méndez, The Death Penalty and the Absolute Prohibition of Torture and
Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 20 Hum. Rts. Brief
2, 5 (2012) (“I believe it is necessary for the international community to
discuss this issue further and for states to reconsider whether the death
penalty per se fails to respect the inherent dignity of the human person and
violates the prohibition of torture or CIDT.”); see also Identoba v. Georgia,
App. No. 73235/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 69−71 (2015) (citations omitted)
(where, during a march conducted to mark the International Day Against
Homophobia, LGBT people in Georgia were subjected to death threats,
the European Court of Human Rights wrote of the target of those threats:
“Given that they were surrounded by an angry mob that outnumbered them
and was uttering death threats and randomly resorting to physical assaults,
demonstrating the reality of the threats, . . . the situation was already one
of intense fear and anxiety. . . . [T]he Court concludes that the treatment
of the applicants must necessarily have aroused in them feelings of fear,
anguish and insecurity, which were not compatible with respect for their
human dignity and reached the threshold of severity within the meaning of
Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.”).
267 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (“The basic concept underlying
the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While
the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that
this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”); see also
Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017) (quoting Hall, 134 S. Ct. at
1992) (“The Eighth Amendment prohibits ‘cruel and unusual punishments,’
and ‘reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all
persons.’”)); Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (quoting Weems
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) & Trop, 356 U.S. at 101) (“The
Eighth Amendment ‘is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning
as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.’ To enforce the
Constitution’s protection of human dignity, this Court looks to the ‘evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.’”));
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (referring to “the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment”).
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Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment is an offence to
human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of
the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and
as a violation of the human rights and fundamental
freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.268

In Brown v. Plata,269 the U.S. Supreme Court itself made clear
that offenders do not lose their right to human dignity by virtue
of their incarceration. As Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the
Supreme Court in that case: “To incarcerate, society takes from
prisoners the means to provide for their own needs. Prisoners are
dependent on the State for food, clothing, and necessary medical
care. A prison’s failure to provide sustenance for inmates ‘may
actually produce physical ‘torture or a lingering death.’”270 “A prison
that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate
medical care,” Justice Kennedy emphasized, “is incompatible with
the concept of human dignity and has no place in civilized society.”271
In a world of universal human rights, inmates and even heinous
offenders, just like everyone else, have a right to be free from torture
and from cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.272
268 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons, supra note 22, at 91. The
preamble to the U.N. Charter, signed in 1945, the year World War II came
to a close, explicitly recites that one of its purposes is “to reaffirm faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person,
in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.” U.N.
Charter pmbl.
269 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
270 Id. at 510 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447)); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103 (citation omitted)
(“An inmate must rely on prison authorities to treat his medical needs;
if the authorities fail to do so, those needs will not be met. In the worst
cases, such a failure may actually produce physical ‘torture or a lingering
death,’ the evils of most immediate concern to the drafters of the [Eighth]
Amendment.”).
271 Brown, 563 U.S. at 511.
272 John D. Bessler, The Inequality of America’s Death Penalty: A Crossroads for
Capital Punishment at the Intersection of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments,
73 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. Online 487, 555 (2017); Liesel J. Danjczek, The
Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act and Its Inappropriate NonViolent Offer Limitation, 24 J. Contemp. Health L. Pol’y 69, 97 (2007);
see also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook
for Prison Leaders: A Basic Training Tool and Curriculum

VOL. 11, NO. 1

NORTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

63

Death sentences and execution protocols, like other acts
of torture, dehumanize individuals and strip offenders of their
humanity, however tarnished by whatever crimes they have
committed in the past.273 The Convention Against Torture plainly
requires that nations prevent and criminalize torture,274 envisioning
the elimination of torturous punishments in accordance with
the dictates of that convention and the humanitarian impulses

for Prison Managers Based on International Standards and
Norms 27 (2010) (noting that certain rights “are non-derogable, meaning
that they must be fully respected at all times and in all circumstances” and
listing “the right to life, the right to be free from torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment” as among those rights; “[p]rison officials
are responsible for ensuring that they do not violate any of these rights”).
273 David Rose, Executions Dehumanize Everyone, Pitt. Post-Gazette (Sept. 27,
2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2015/09/27/Havingworked-in-corrections-for-decades-I-hope-Pennsylvania-abolishes-the-deathpenalty/stories/201509270109.
274 Nigel Rodley & Matt Pollard, Criminalisation of Torture: State Obligations
Under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 115 (2006).
Various provisions of law around the world punish torturous acts, though
laws proscribing torture vary widely in the actual punishments they impose.
See generally Daniel O’Donnell, The Obligation to Establish Sentences for Torture
that Are Commensurate with the Gravity of the Offense, 22 Buff. Hum. Rts.
L. Rev. 95 (2016) (describing legal provisions in various countries that
criminalize and punish torture); see also 18 U.S.C. § 114 (1996) (“Whoever,
within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,
and with intent to torture (as defined in section 2340), maim, or disfigure,
cuts, bites, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, or cuts out or disables the tongue, or
puts out or destroys an eye, or cuts off or disables a limb or any member of
another person; or[,] Whoever, within the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, and with like intent, throws or pours upon
another person, any scalding water, corrosive acid, or caustic substance—
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both.”).

64

Bessler

behind it.275 In Kennedy v. Louisiana,276 the U.S. Supreme Court, in
considering an Eighth Amendment case, forthrightly proclaimed:
“Evolving standards of decency must embrace and express respect
for the dignity of the person, and the punishment of criminals must
conform to that rule.”277 “When the law punishes by death,” Justice
Anthony Kennedy wrote for the Court, “it risks its own sudden
descent into brutality.”278 In declaring the use of the electric chair
to be unconstitutional, the Nebraska Supreme Court said something
quite similar, with that court writing in 2008: “We recognize the
temptation to make the prisoner suffer, just as the prisoner made an
innocent victim suffer. But it is the hallmark of a civilized society
that we punish cruelty without practicing it. Condemned prisoners
must not be tortured to death, regardless of their crimes.”279
D. The Coercive Nature (and Distorting Effects) of Death
Threats
The use of any death threat, whether by a state actor or a
non-state actor, should raise an immediate red flag because credible
death threats, as shown, are already classified as torturous acts.280
In fact, threats of death are serious enough that, in civil cases and
the application of the criminal law, they can be the basis of a duress
defense.281 For example, where threats of death were made in the
275 Not surprisingly, American law already expressly states that the purpose of
the Convention Against Torture is to prohibit torture. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)
(3) (2018) (noting that the “object and purpose” of the Convention Against
Torture is “to prohibit torture”); see also Ashika Singh, The United States, the
Torture Convention, and Lex Specialis: The Quest for a Coherent Approach to the CAT
in Armed Conflict, 47 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 134, 151 (2016) (noting
a Swiss cable emphasizing that “the Convention Against Torture . . . has as
its sole purpose the protection against torture”). As criminologist Robert
Johnson, of American University, writes of the importance of human dignity
in punishment practices: “Punishment that dehumanizes is itself a crime;
punishment that respects the human dignity of the criminal is justice. In
the matter of crime and just punishment, criminals dehumanize their
victims but, ideally, the punishments meted out in society’s name do not
dehumanize the criminals.” Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty:
Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the Death House, 13
Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 583, 587 (2014).
276 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
277 Id. at 420.
278 Id.
279 State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 279 (Neb. 2008).
280 See Paust et al., supra note 40.
281 See Bacigalupo v. Santoro, No. 94-cv-02761-BLF, 2018 WL 6272238, at *12
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context of a divorce decree, the defense of duress was found to be
“an issue of fact to be disposed of at the trial.”282 Death threats

(N.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2018) (“Central to a defense of duress is the immediacy
of the threat or menace on which the defense is premised.”); In re Chiquita
Brands Int’l, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2018) (holding that
the duress defense “is narrowly construed, and viable only if defendant can
show that he or she acted under an immediate threat of death or serious
bodily injury at the time the conduct occurred; that he or she had a wellgrounded fear that the threat would be carried out, and that he or she
had no reasonable opportunity to escape or inform the police”); Cormier
v. State, 540 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Tex. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Tex. Penal
Code § 8.05(a) (1994)) (“Duress is an affirmative defense that applies if
the defendant ‘engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was compelled
to do so by threat of imminent death or serious bodily injury to himself or
another.’”); Oliver v. Ameriquest Mortg., No. 301444, 2012 WL 284618, at
*3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 2012) (“[D]eath threats could potentially support
a finding of duress . . . .”); Kristen Cherry, Comment, Marriage and Divorce
Law in Pakistan and Iran: The Problem of Recognition, 9 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l
L. 319, 330 (2001) (“If consent needed for the khul is obtained by duress,
the divorce is void. Such duress must be of a serious nature such as threats
of death, bodily harm, or captivity.”); see also People v. Speer, 255 P.3d 1115,
1119 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (discussing statutory defense of duress based
on conduct resulting from “the use or threatened use of unlawful force” and
applying “an objective standard of reasonableness,” said to exculpate “only
for threats that a reasonable person would not have been able to resist”);
People ex rel. Rusch v. Rivlin, 277 Ill. App. 183, 186 (1934) (citation omitted)
(“‘The compulsion which will excuse a criminal act . . . must be present,
imminent, and impending, and of such a nature as to induce a well grounded
apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A
threat of future injury is not enough.’”). Compare People v. Anderson, 50
P.3d 368, 376 (Cal. 2002) (“The reasons a person acted in a certain way,
including threats of death, are highly relevant to whether the person acted
with a conscious or wanton disregard for human life.”), with State v. Davis,
No. A07-0331, 2008 WL 2020402, at *5 n.1 (Minn. Ct. App. May 13, 2008)
(noting that, in Minnesota, duress is a statutory defense that applies when a
person “commits a crime because his will has been overborne by threats of
death from another participant in the crime”), and Geert-Jan Alexander
Knoops, Defenses in Contemporary International Criminal
Law 98 (2d ed. 2008) (“Psychological threats, which amount to imminent
death or serious bodily harm, may trigger the defense of necessity.”).
282 In re Kittinger’s Estate, 101 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (Sur. Ct., N.Y. County, N.Y.
1950). Accord McIntosh v. McIntosh, 26 Cal. Rptr. 26, 27−28 (Cal. App.
1962) (“[W]e are satisfied that the trial court was justified in finding that
plaintiff was coerced into writing the waiver by fear of personal injury or
death at the hands of defendant; that said fear was induced by the beating of
November 13, 1959, coupled with the subsequent threats of defendant; that
the waiver was not the voluntary act of plaintiff and was invalid.”).
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have been used to set aside a state court judgment,283 and threats
of death—in both the civil and the criminal contexts—can be highly
pertinent to a duress defense’s viability and legitimacy.284
Death threats are inherently coercive. They have been
recognized as such since time immemorial, and that is so because
death threats remove a person’s ability to make voluntary decisions
based on free will. Thus, in Avco Financial Services, Inc. v. Johnson,285
the Supreme Court of Utah, citing an earlier precedent, put it this
way: “In Fox v. Piercey,286 this Court reviewed the development of
the law of duress since the time of Lord Coke, when only threats of
death, dismemberment, mayhem or imprisonment were recognized
as coercive actions constituting duress.”287 “In that case,” Utah’s
highest court observed, “we followed the modern trend, and adopted
the ‘subjective’ test, holding that ‘any wrongful act or threat which
actually puts the victim in such fear as to compel him to act against
his will constitutes duress.’”288 Death threats made to someone in
police custody, it is important to remember, can easily produce false
confessions, with such threats—whether made by police officers or
prosecutors—leading individuals to make incriminating statements
or plead guilty to crimes they have not committed.289
283 In re Slater, 200 B.R. 491, 496 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[T]he Debtor’s
allegations that her brother physically assaulted her and threatened her life
before and during the trial . . . does constitute extrinsic fraud sufficient to
attack the state court judgment.”).
284 Rowley v. Rowley, 290 P. 181, 184 (Okla. 1930) (“Certainly, a threat to the
effect that her husband would kill her and her baby would be sufficient
to justify execution of an instrument, if she honestly believed the threat
would be carried into execution did she not sign it. The fact that she soon
thereafter secured a divorce from her husband, on grounds of extreme
cruelty and threats to kill, corroborates her statements and justifies her
belief that in all probability his threats would be executed.”); cf. Hoffman
v. Hoffman, 30 Pa. 417, 420 (Pa. 1858) (“There were no threats of death or
bodily harm, which constitutes duress per minas in the case.”).
285 Avco Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Johnson, 596 P.2d 658 (Utah 1979).
286 Fox v. Piercey, 227 P.2d 763 (Utah 1951).
287 Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 596 P.2d at 660 (citing Fox, 227 P.2d at 766).
288 Id. (quoting Fox, 227 P.2d at 766).
289 Examples of false confessions in the death penalty context are not hard to
find. The Witness Stand and Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Jr. 60
(Cynthia Willis-Esqueda & Brian H. Bornstein eds., 2016) (citation omitted)
(“[M]ore than 300 people in the United States have been exonerated by
DNA, including several who served time on death row. To everyone’s
astonishment, false confessions have been a contributing factor in over
25% of these wrongful convictions.”); Rob Warden, Illinois Death Penalty
Reform: How It Happened, What It Promises, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
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E. Death Row, “Mock” Executions, and Threats to Life or
Bodily Integrity
Death row inmates endure prolonged periods of confinement
in harsh conditions. They confront the prospect of death on a daily
basis, inevitably experiencing extreme uncertainty and anxiety as
the days and months and years go by and as all the capital litigation
and pleas for mercy occur. They are confined in small, spartan cells,
and they often wait for death for years, even multiple decades, as
their attorneys press their legal claims. The waiting and anxiety
can be torturous, especially as it is so prolonged,290 though threats
of death—all by themselves—meet the torture threshold because
of their inherent features. As one recent study put it: “Common
methods of psychological torture involve threats to the victim or
the victim’s loved ones, isolation or solitary confinement, sleep and
sensory deprivation, exposure to loud noise, or forcing a victim to
watch or participate in the torture of others.”291 “A typical example,”
381, 382−83 (2005) (noting that false confessions and snitch testimony
were the two most common causes of error in Illinois exoneration cases);
see also True Stories of False Confessions vii, 147 (Rob Warden &
Steven A. Drizin eds., 2009) (“false confessions are amazingly common”;
“the death penalty can be misused to intimidate an innocent person into
making a false confession”); Dale S. Recinella, The Biblical Truth
about America’s Death Penalty 133 (2004) (“False confessions can
also be easily obtained from the mentally ill.”); David V. Baker, Women
and Capital Punishment in the United States: An Analytical
History 181 (2016) (“False confessions are a significant factor in female
wrongful convictions; slightly more than one-fifth of female wrongful
convictions involve false confessions.”).
290 Robert Johnson, Death Work: A Study of the Modern
Execution Process 196 (1998) (“It is his confinement, culminating in
the deathwatch and ending with his execution, that epitomizes death row
confinement. This confinement-unto-death, I will argue, is a clear and
complete case of torture.”); cf. Habtemicael v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 774, 782
(8th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted) (“An unlawful or extrajudicial threat of
imminent death comes within the definition of torture if it is specifically
intended to bring about prolonged mental pain or suffering. This intent
requirement is satisfied if prolonged mental pain or suffering either is
purposefully inflicted or is the foreseeable consequence of a deliberate act.”).
291 Ashley McCulley, The Physical and Psychological Sequelae
in Adult Refugees or Asylum Seekers Who Have Survived
Torture 8 (2013), https://ethnomed.org/clinical/torture/tortureliterature-review/AshleyMcCulley_Dec2013_final.pdf (“The most common
types of psychological torture . . . were threats, witnessing torture, mock
execution, humiliation, and sensory, hygiene, or sleep deprivation.”); id.
(“Psychological sequelae are also a result of physical torture methods.
For example, waterboarding is a physical torture method that simulates
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Dr. Hernán Reyes, of the International Committee of the Red Cross,
writes of psychological torture, “is the ‘sham execution,’ a method
known to be extremely traumatic in which prisoners are led out to
what they believe is their summary execution.”292 “Verbal threats of
death or mutilation” and “[t]hreats involving others (family etc.)”
have elsewhere been labeled as forms of psychological torture,293
along with “[t]hreats of being killed or infliction of serious injury”
and “[t]hreats of separation from, torture of or killing of family
members.”294
Mock executions, as a matter of fact, have been shown
by researchers to be as severe as various physically torturous
acts.295 In a study of torture conducted by Metin Başoğlu of King’s
College London, Başoğlu and his colleagues surveyed 279 torture
survivors—both soldiers and civilians—from the once war-torn
former Yugoslavia.296 Between 2000 and 2002, those survivors
answered questions about the types of torture that they endured.297

292
293

294

295

296
297

drowning, but the sheer terror of feeling like you are going to die
produces psychological sequelae. Merging both physical and psychological
torture methods leaves survivors with relentless long-term psychological
sequelae.”).
Hernán Reyes, The Worst Scars Are in the Mind: Psychological Torture, 89 Int’l
Rev. of the Red Cross 591, 600, 611−12 (2007).
Caroline Gorst-Unsworth & Eva Goldenberg, Psychological Sequelae of
Torture and Organised Violence Suffered by Refugees from Iraq, 172 British J.
Psychiatry 90, 92 (1998), https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aopcambridge-core/content/view/8772F08B130FC04BC6A2E29D407DA3C2/
S0007125000149244a.pdf/psychological_sequelae_of_torture_and_
organised_violence_suffered_by_refugees_from_iraq.pdf.
Engelke Randers, Torture; Mental Sequelae and Treatment Approaches—Are These
Applicable in Low-Income Countries?, Universitetet i Oslo 8, https://
www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/29693/ProsjektxRanders.
pdf?sequence=2 (last visited Oct. 25, 2018).
E.g., Linda Piwowarczyk, Seeking Asylum: A Mental Health Perspective, 16 Geo.
Immigr. L.J. 155, 162 (2001) (footnote omitted) (“Partly in response
to more aggressive human rights monitoring, methods of torture have
evolved to become more psychological in nature, thereby leaving fewer
physical signs. This shift is alarming in view of the experience from the
Center for Victims of Torture in Minneapolis that indicated that greater
psychological damage is inflicted by methods such as sham executions,
sexual torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, especially with sensory
deprivation, disappearance of a loved one, threats against family members,
and witnessing the torture of others.”).
Roxanne Khamsi, Psychological Torture ‘as Bad as Physical Torture’, New
Scientist (Mar. 5, 2007), https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11313psychological-torture-as-bad-as-physical-torture/.
Id.
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In particular, they were asked to rate the distress they felt on a scale
of zero (no distress) to four (maximum distress). About 20 of the
survivors experienced purely psychological torture, including sham
executions, the torture of family members, or threats of rape, and the
researchers collected medical data on whether the survivors showed
signs of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).298 The study
found that psychological manipulations—threats and witnessing
the torture of others—were ranked very high on the scale.299 Sham
executions (3.7), witnessing torture of close ones (3.6), threats of
rape (3.6), threats against family (3.4), witnessing torture of others
(3.4), threats of death (3.3), and threats of further torture (3.2) were
rated in an essentially equivalent manner on the distress scale to
these forms of physical torture: hanging by the wrists tied at the back
(3.8),300 suffocation/asphyxiation (3.8), electric torture (3.7), falaga
(3.6),301 burning parts of the body (3.6), forced extraction of teeth
(3.6), stretching of the body (3.5), beating (3.5), hanging by hands
or feet (3.5), needles under toenails or fingernails (3.4), beating over
the ears with cupped hands (3.4), and pulling/dragging/lifting by
hair (3.2).302 It is now clear that those who endure physical threats
298 Id. In 2013, the American Psychiatric Association revised the diagnostic
criteria for PTSD in the fifth edition of its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (“DSM-5”), a professional manual cited by the U.S. Supreme
Court in a recent case dealing with the issue of intellectual disability. Moore
v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1045 (2017). In the DSM-5, PTSD is included in
a new category titled “Trauma- and Stressor-Related Disorders.” One of
the criteria for a PTSD classification includes exposure to death, threatened
death, actual or threatened serious injury, or actual or threatened sexual
violence in any of the following ways: direct exposure, witnessing the
trauma, learning that a relative or close friend was exposed to a trauma,
or indirect exposure to aversive details of the trauma in the course of
professional duties (e.g., first responders, medics). PTSD: National Center
for PTSD, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, https://www.ptsd.va.gov/
professional/PTSD-overview/dsm5_criteria_ptsd.asp (last updated Feb. 22,
2018).
299 Khamsi, supra note 296.
300 Cullen Murphy, God’s Jury: The Inquisition and the Making of
teh Modern World 91 (2012) (hanging by the wrists tied at the back is
also known, among other things, as “reverse hanging”).
301 Falaga involves beating the soles of the feet. Darius Rejali, Torture
and Democracy 274 (2007).
302 Khamsi, supra note 296. In speaking about the results of the study’s findings,
Dr. Basoglu—a psychiatrist and specialist in trauma studies—made clear
that the distinction between physical and psychological torture was artificial.
“Until now, both sides of the debate have expressed opinions based on
personal impressions,” Basoglu emphasized. “But these data,” he added,
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and psychological torture experience severe pain and suffering,
commonly developing major depressive disorder and PTSD.303
V. Taking Psychological Torture Seriously
A. Death Threats as a Form of Psychological Torture
Psychological torture is just as abhorrent as physical
torture.304 It is, however, sometimes more difficult to identify
because the signs of it may not be discernible with the human
“clearly suggest that you cannot make a distinction between physical forms
of torture and something else called ‘cruel and degrading treatment.’”
Nicholas Bakalar, The Line Between Torture and Cruelty, N.Y. Times (Mar. 6,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/06/health/psychology/06tort.
html.
303 Kabba v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 2008). Psychological
torture is itself a common feature of domestic violence and rape, which may
or may not involve the loss of life. E.g., Sneed v. Johnson, No. 1:04CV588,
2007 WL 709778, at *59 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2007) (quoting report of
Dr. Smalldon) (“Psychological torture often accompanied the rapes. For
example, David recalls the man threatening that his dog ‘would eat [David]
up’ if he refused to do what he was told.”); People v. Coffman, 96 P.3d 30, 54
(Cal. 2004) (“Certain features of defendants’ relationship fit the profile of a
battering relationship: a pattern of escalating violence, sexual abuse within
the relationship, jealously, psychological torture, threats to kill . . . .”); State
v. Anthony, 555 S.E.2d 557, 597 (N.C. 2001) (“[T]he evidence showed
that Semantha had an ex parte domestic violence order served on defendant
shortly before her murder and made statements to several witnesses
that defendant had threatened and followed her and that she feared him.
Semantha even saw defendant slowly driving past the hair salon she was
patronizing just hours before her murder. This evidence supports the
inference that Semantha experienced psychological unease and fear before
her murder.”).
304 In the U.S., emotional and psychological harms are not currently treated as
seriously as physical harms within prisons. E.g., Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of
Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 807 (10th Cir. 1999); Brooks v. Humphrey, No. 5:12-CV281 (CAR), 2012 WL 5866293, at *3 n.11 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 19, 2012) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (1996)) (“Plaintiff could not recover compensatory
or punitive damages for the ‘mental, emotional, and psychological’ harm
caused by his placement within range of Watson’s ‘daily and constant
barrage of death threats.’ An inmate in prison who files a federal civil action
cannot recover damages on the basis of mental or emotional injury suffered
while in custody without demonstrating a related physical injury.”). The
Prison Litigation Reform Act, enacted in 1996, has made it more difficult
for prisoners to recover compensatory damages for psychological suffering.
John Boston & Daniel E. Manville, Prisoners’ Self-Help
Litigation Manual 528 (4th ed. 2010). That federal law, however, does
not change the well-settled definition of torture.
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eye. In Psychological Torture: Definition, Evaluation and Measurement,
one expert, Pau Pérez-Sales, begins that scholarly monograph by
labeling “the concept of torture (especially psychological torture)”
as “elusive and blurred.”305 “There is not an official definition of
or consensus on the meaning of psychological torture,” Pérez-Sales
emphasizes.306 But that source nonetheless relays how various types
of threats—from threats of death to threats against family members,
and from threats of inflicting pain to threats to rape loved ones—have
previously been classified as methods of torture.307 The New Yorkbased Center for Constitutional Rights, in a report on Guantánamo,
has itself classified the following techniques as psychological torture:
“Solitary confinement, light and sound manipulation, exposure to
the elements and to extreme temperature, . . . sleep deprivation, and
threats of transfer for torture in another country.”308
Courts have not always found death threats sufficient to
constitute torture, with not every threat of death found to be credible
or specific enough to qualify as such.309 One of the horrifying features
of death threats, though, is the sheer uncertainty of knowing if, or
when, they will be carried out.310 For example, as one California
305 Pau Pérez-Sales, Psychological Torture: Definition,
Evaluation and Measurement 2 (2017).
306 Id. at 7.
307 Id. at 120.
308 Id. at 7. Pérez-Sales considers “psychological torture to be the use of techniques
of cognitive, emotional or sensory attacks that target the conscious mind and cause
psychological suffering, damage and/or identity breakdown in most subjects subjected
to them; such techniques may be used alone or together with other techniques to produce
a cumulative effect.” Id. at 8; see also Edward Domovitch et al., Human Torture:
Description and Sequelae of 104 Cases, 30 Can. Fam. Physician 827 (1984)
(conducting a study of 104 torture victims and noting that common methods
of torture included threats of death and sham executions); Katherine J. Eder,
The Importance of Medical Testimony in Removal Hearings for Torture Victims, 7
DePaul J. Health Care L. 281, 283 (2004) (footnote omitted) (“Common
threats of psychological torture include isolation, threats, humiliation, sham
executions, and witnessing the torture of others. Rape and sexual assault
are also forms of torture commonly practiced during arrest or imprisonment
or during conflicts.”).
309 United States v. Rodriguez-Vasquez, 4 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1154 (N.D.
Cal. 2013) (“The Court is aware of no case—and the defendant cites
none—holding that death threats alone constitute torture under the CAT
standard. The receipt of these threats after he returned to Honduras, while
undoubtedly disturbing, does not support the defendant’s claim that he
could have established a plausible claim of torture prior to removal.”).
310 People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213, 263 (Cal. 1997) (“The crime undoubtedly
inflicted mental torture as well as physical violence on the victim who
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appellate court has written: “While a victim of domestic violence
and continuing death threats might well suspect she will be attacked
sometime in the future, she has no way of knowing exactly when
or where that attack will occur.”311 Threats of death are thus often
closely associated with—indeed, equivalent to and part and parcel
of—torturous conduct.312 “Death threats are patently material to the
grave risk analysis,” another California appellate decision determined
in another case involving allegations of domestic violence.313 As
that court wrote: “Due process required the trial court to decide the
material issue of father’s alleged death threats and to afford mother
the opportunity to offer relevant and competent evidence on that
issue.”314 As another court, in Michigan, put it in the context of
yet another domestic violence case: “The prior acts presented by
the prosecution at trial also qualify as acts of domestic violence,
since defendant ‘caus[ed] physical harm’ to the victim and made
death threats toward her ‘that would make a reasonable person
feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, or
molested.’”315
B. The Definition of Psychological Torture
Of critical importance, psychological torture has been
defined in criminal cases as an awareness of, but a helplessness

311
312

313
314
315

was forced to accompany defendant to the bedroom, submit to his sexual
assault, and lie apprehensively on the floor awaiting her uncertain fate as he
ransacked her belongings while she suffered oxygen deprivation.”); Neill v.
State, 896 P.2d 537, 556−57 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (citations omitted)
(“Mental anguish includes the victim’s uncertainty as to his ultimate fate.
Our finding of torture is supported by the mental torment of Mr. Zeller prior
to the shooting, rather than the events which took place afterwards. In
the present case, the evidence clearly supports a finding of mental anguish
beyond that which necessarily accompanies a killing. Accordingly, the
evidence was sufficient to support the ‘especially heinous, atrocious or cruel’
aggravating circumstance.”).
People v. Arellano, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 172, 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
Hekmati v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 278 F. Supp. 3d 145, 160 (D. D.C. 2017)
(“[I]n Moradi, this Court held that a detainee in Iranian prison experienced
torture when his interrogators subjected him to ‘severe physical and mental
pain, including threatening him with death and dismemberment . . . .’”
(citing Moradi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 77 F. Supp. 3d 57, 68−69 (D. D.C.
2015)).
Noergaard v. Noergaard, 197 Cal. Rptr. 3d 546, 553 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015).
Id. at 554.
People v. Phillips, No. 323333, 2016 WL 232324, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan.
19, 2016).
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to prevent, one’s impending death.316 “Psychological torture,” the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama has held, “can be inflicted
where the victim is in intense fear and is aware of, but helpless to prevent,
impending death.”317 “Such torture,” that court has ruled, “must have
been present for an appreciable lapse of time, sufficient enough
to cause prolonged or appreciable suffering.”318 Although courts
have not established a particular length of time that is necessary
for a premeditated murder to be transformed into a torture-murder,
and in reality there is no specific time requirement for a finding
of torture to be made,319 it is clear that a few hours or even a few
minutes can suffice.320 In fact, a murder victim’s awareness of, but
316 Scott v. State, 937 So. 2d 1065, 1083 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).
317 Shanklin v. State, 187 So. 3d 734, 808 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (italics in
original) (quoting Ex parte Key, 891 So. 2d 384, 390 (Ala. 2004)); accord
Shaw v. State, 207 So. 3d 79, 122 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014); Boyle v. State,
154 So. 3d 171, 234 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013); Albarran v. State, 96 So. 3d
131, 208, 214 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011). The court in Ex parte Key found that,
in that case, “the victim suffered psychological torture for an appreciable
period.” Ex parte Key, 891 So. 2d at 390.
318 Shanklin v. State, 187 So. 3d 734, 808 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting
Ex parte Key, 891 So. 2d at 390); accord Shaw v. State, 207 So. 3d 79, 122
(Ala. Crim. App. 2014); Boyle v. State, 154 So. 3d 171, 234 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2013); Baker v. State, 87 So. 3d 587, 604 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009); Ex
parte Deardorff, 6 So. 3d 1235, 1240 (Ala. 2008). As the Court of Criminal
Appeals of Alabama, explaining the operation of the standard in that death
penalty jurisdiction, has put it: “‘[T]he factor of psychological torture must
have been present for an appreciable lapse of time, sufficient enough to
have caused prolonged or appreciable suffering, i.e., the period of suffering
must be prolonged enough to separate the crime from ‘ordinary’ murders
for which the death penalty is not appropriate.’” Mitchell v. State, 84 So.
3d 968, 986 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Norris v. State, 793 So. 2d
847, 861 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)). See Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1317
(N.D. Cal. 2004) (“In order to establish mental (in contrast to physical
torture), the TVPA [Torture Victims Protection Act] requires a showing of
‘prolonged’ mental harm that is caused by the threat that either the victim
or another will be imminently subjected to death or severe physical pain or
suffering. The TVPA does not define the length of time required for a finding
of ‘prolonged’ mental harm.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note § 3(b)(2)).
319 E.g., State v. Gailey, No. 08-0628, 2009 WL 778772, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.
Mar. 26, 2009) (“There is no requirement that torture be inflicted for any
minimum period of time. . . . We conclude there is substantial evidence
to support the jury’s finding that Gailey intentionally subjected his wife
and daughter to mental torture to support a conviction for first-degree
kidnapping.”).
320 E.g., State v. Walters, 588 S.E.2d 344, 363 (N.C. 2003) (“The victims were
subjected to at least an hour and a half of psychological torture by being
trapped in the trunk of a car while pleading for their lives. The victims
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helplessness to prevent, impending death for an appreciable period
of time, is a defining feature of “especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel” homicides.321 That aggravating circumstance—and a finding of
torture—has been made, for example, where a perpetrator discussed
whether or not to kill a victim in the presence of that victim or where
were also abducted at gunpoint and robbed of jewelry. Furthermore, Susan
Moore was forced to witness Tracy Lambert being shot in the head. We
thus conclude that the evidence more than warranted the trial court’s
submission of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance to the jury for both
murders.”); State v. Carter, 114 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tenn. 2003) (finding that
photographs, including one of “Mrs. Jackson’s partially nude body” and one
of “Mr. Jackson’s body in the closet,” aided “in establishing that the victims
suffered torture in the form of severe mental anguish” because “[t]he jury
could infer from these photographs that both victims anticipated physical
harm,” with the court further emphasizing that “[m]ental torture” occurs
“when a victim hears or anticipates the harm or killing of a spouse and is
helpless to assist”); State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 886−87 (Tenn. 1998)
(“the jurors were capable of evaluating the proof and determining whether
the victim suffered severe mental pain when, over the course of a six hour
time period, her body was burned and beaten in her own home, with four
of her young children present”; “[t]he sufficiency of the evidence to support
a jury’s finding of torture does not depend upon whether an expert witness
utters the magical words ‘severe physical or mental pain’” but “whether,
after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any
rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt”; “we conclude that the proof is
sufficient to support a jury finding that both severe physical and mental pain
was inflicted upon the victim while she remained alive and conscious”).
321 E.g., Floyd v. State, No. CR-13-0623, 2017 WL 2889566, at *70 (Ala. Crim.
App. July 7, 2017) (containing jury instruction to that effect); see also State v.
McNeill, 624 S.E.2d 329, 339 (N.C. 2006) (noting that killings that involve
the infliction of psychological torture leave the victim “in her last moments
aware of, but helpless to prevent, impending death”); State v. Alston, 461
S.E.2d 687, 718−19 (N.C. 1995) (finding a murder was “especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel” because of “evidence of psychological terror” that
included defendant’s prior threats “to ‘smash in’ the victim’s face and kill
the victim”; “[i]t is reasonable to infer that the victim suffered psychological
torture and anxiety as her fears were realized and the defendant carried
out his threats,” with the court citing prior cases where psychological
terror was found before determining: “In the last minutes of the victim’s
life, as her face was forced into the pillow and she struggled to breathe,
she undoubtedly was left aware of, but unable to prevent, her impending
death.”); accord State v. Bell, 603 S.E.2d 93, 121 (N.C. 2004); State v. Tirado,
599 S.E.2d 515, 544 (N.C. 2004); State v. Barden, 572 S.E.2d 108, 142 (N.C.
2002); State v. Mann, 560 S.E.2d 776, 788 (N.C. 2002); State v. Anthony,
555 S.E.2d 557, 596−97 (N.C. 2001); State v. Spruill, 360 S.E.2d 667, 670,
674 (N.C. 1987); State v. Gladden, 340 S.E.2d 673, 694 (N.C. 1986); State v.
Hamlet, 321 S.E.2d 837, 846 (N.C. 1984).
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the victim pleaded for his or her life.322
As the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama has written of
that aggravating circumstance: “In determining the application of this
aggravating circumstance ‘we must consider whether the violence
involved in achieving the killing went beyond what was necessary to
cause death, whether the victims experienced appreciable suffering
after a swift assault, and whether there was psychological torture.’”323
In determining if an offense is especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,
Alabama courts examine these three factors: “(1) the infliction on
the victim of physical violence beyond that necessary or sufficient
to cause death; (2) appreciable suffering by the victim after the
assault that ultimately resulted in death; and (3) the infliction of
psychological torture on the victim.”324 As regards the last factor, the
Alabama courts have stated: “Thus, mental suffering may be found
where a victim witnesses the murder of another (particularly a family
member) and then realizes that soon he or she will also be killed, as
well as where the victim is expressly taunted with the prospect of his
or her own death.”325 The consideration of the existing definition of
psychological torture in death penalty states such as Alabama has
important—and unmistakable—collateral consequences for capital
punishment.
The Alabama case of Ex parte Deardorff326 is noteworthy.
In that case, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered the
case of Donald Deardorff, a man convicted of capital murder. In
determining that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or
322 State v. Hodges, 944 S.W.2d 346, 357−58 (Tenn. 1997).
323 Smith v. State, 122 So. 3d 224, 241 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting
Brownfield v. State, 44 So. 3d 1, 41 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007)).
324 Saunders v. State, 10 So. 3d 53, 108 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Brooks v.
State, 973 So. 2d 380, 417−18 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007)).
325 Id. at 108−09; accord Brooks v. State, 973 So. 2d 380, 418−19 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2007); Norris v. State, 793 So. 2d 847, 859−60 (Ala. Crim. App.
1999). Psychological torture has been found in multiple Alabama cases.
E.g., Brown v. State, 982 So. 2d 565, 607 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (“The
evidence establishes that the victim suffered for an appreciable amount
of time following the assault and clearly endured extensive psychological
torture.”). But it has not been found where the victims were shot in rapid
succession. Norris v. State, 793 So. 2d 847, 862 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999)
(“[B]ecause the three victims were shot in rapid, uninterrupted succession,
any momentary fear or anxiety of impending death did not last sufficiently
long as to constitute the unnecessary torture required to elevate the offense
to an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel offense . . . .”).
326 Ex parte Deardorff, 6 So. 3d 1235 (Ala. 2008).
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cruel when compared to other capital offenses, Alabama’s highest
court set forth a detailed description of the murder—one involving
binding the victim’s hands with duct tape, keeping the victim in a
closet, driving him to a remote spot while his hands and mouth
were taped, and then shooting him in the head four times while his
head was covered with a pillowcase.327 Deardorff was sentenced to
death for the execution-style murder,328 with the Court of Criminal
Appeals finding sufficient evidence to support the determination
that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.329 As
the court pointed out, the victim feared for his life, “[t]he terror
he experienced must have escalated tremendously when his mouth
was taped and his hands were bound,” and “he had to know that his
death was imminent.”330 In affirming Deardorff ’s death sentence,
the Supreme Court of Alabama specifically highlighted that the
victim was “threatened with death” and “held in captivity and
confined in a closet” while hooded and with his hands taped.331
Those circumstances, the court observed, constituted “psychological
torture so as to meet the standard for a murder that is ‘especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel.’”332
Other courts in American death penalty states have also
found the presence of psychological torture where the victim had
an awareness of impending death but an inability to prevent it. For
example, in State v. Sloan,333 the Supreme Court of Missouri ruled:
327 Id. at 1237−40.
328 That various “execution-style” murders have been described as torturous in
nature is itself telling about the torturous nature of actual executions. E.g.,
Michael J. Boyle, Violence After War: Explaining Instability
in Post-Conflict States 296 (2014) (quoting U.N. Assistance Mission
for Iraq (UNAMI), Human Rights Report (2006)) (“‘Dozens of bodies
bearing signs of torture and showing execution style killings have continued
to appear daily in and around Baghdad, as well as other parts of the
country.’”); Clint Richmond, Fetch the Devil: The Sierra Diablo
Murders and Nazi Espionage in America 60 (2014) (“The mother
and daughter had been methodically tortured over a period of time and then
carefully and deliberately put to death—execution style. The prolonged
torture of the victims and execution-style killings were the most heinous
crimes either of the veteran criminologists had seen in their long careers.”).
Both execution-style killings and state-sanctioned killings involve the
infliction of severe pain or suffering.
329 Ex parte Deardorff, 6 So. 3d at 1238.
330 Id. (quoting Deardorff v. State, 6 So. 3d 1205 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004)).
331 Id. at 1240.
332 Id.
333 State v. Sloan, 756 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
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Here, the evidence shows that Jason was the last
member of the Sloan family to be shot. The jury
could have reasonably believed that Jason had heard
the previous gunshots and was therefore hiding under
a blanket, his arms covering his head, in a hopeless
effort to conceal himself from appellant’s aim. This
is sufficient evidence of psychological torture, as it
indicates that Jason had the opportunity to anticipate
and reflect upon his impending death while his
parents and brother were shot.334
In another case, State v. Oliver,335 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina similarly found especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
murders included those “calculated to leave the victim in his last
moments as a sentient being, aware but helpless to prevent impending
death, focusing on the deliberate, intentional and senseless aspect
of a conscienceless and pitiless murder inflicting psychological
torture.”336 In that case, the court found that the victim had pleaded
“please don’t shoot me” before death, concluding that “the evidence
was sufficient to support the submission to the jury of the factor
that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.”337 Of
course, death row inmates in their final days and hours, if not so
depressed that they simply abandon their appeals altogether, are
also forced to beg for their lives, if only through their lawyers.
In the context of criminal responsibility, findings of
psychological torture have frequently been made where a murder
victim begged for his or her own life.338 The fact that there is a
334
335
336
337
338

Id. at 511.
State v. Oliver, 307 S.E.2d 304 (N.C. 1983).
Id. at 318.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 318−19 (defendant’s boasting to fellow inmates that he had enjoyed
killing victim, who had begged for his life, was evidence of “conscienceless
and pitiless murder inflicting psychological torture”); see also State v. Rhines,
548 N.W.2d 415, 452 (S.D. 1996) (“The evidence also shows that Rhines
possessed the necessary intent for a finding of torture. When Schaeffer
pleaded with Rhines for his life, Rhines did not tell officers of his desire to
quickly end his victim’s life. Instead, Rhines described his own sarcastic and
scornful attitude toward Schaeffer’s suffering. Rhines also stated that when
he believed Schaeffer had survived the third stab wound, he tied his victim’s
hands and left him to die. This evidence supports a finding that Rhines
intended to cause unnecessary pain to his victim.”).
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short time lapse between a victim’s abduction or incapacitation and
the victim’s death—as one Tennessee court has put it—“does not
alone support a finding that the victim was mentally tortured.”339
As that court stressed: “[P]roof that the victim begged for his life
in the last few seconds of his life is, by itself, insufficient to support
a finding of mental torture that would distinguish this murder
from any other murder.”340 “The fact that the victim begged for his
life or that there were multiple gunshots,” the Supreme Court of
Florida similarly emphasized, “is an inadequate basis to find this
aggravating factor absent evidence that [the perpetrator] intended
to cause the victim unnecessary and prolonged suffering.”341 But
where the victim begged for life and was made to suffer for more
than a fleeting amount of time (i.e. an appreciable amount of time),
a finding of psychological torture has been made.342 Defendants
in capital cases and those sentenced to death plainly suffer for an
appreciable amount of time, with the prospect of an untimely death
via a state-sanctioned killing hanging over their heads like the Sword
of Damocles.343
Extreme mental anguish, it has been held, occurs where a
person realizes that he or she is about to be killed but is unable to
do anything to stop it.344 Indeed, torture techniques are specifically
339 State v. Beckman, No. 02C01-9406-CR-00107, 1995 WL 568471, at *17
(Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 1995).
340 Id.
341 Bonifay v. State, 626 So. 2d 1310, 1313 (Fla. 1993); see also id. (“The record
fails to demonstrate any intent by Bonifay to inflict a high degree of pain or
to otherwise torture the victim.”).
342 E.g., Fowler v. State, 779 P.2d 580, 588 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (“Mr.
Barrier attempted to fight off the attack and begged for his life before he
died. Such evidence clearly demonstrated torture and serious physical
abuse, thereby supporting the jury’s finding that the death of John Barrier
was heinous, atrocious or cruel.”). Whether any particular murder qualifies
as a torture-murder can be a factual issue for a jury to determine. Talamantez
v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 629, 638 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
343 Valeri R. Helterbran, Why Flamingos Are Pink: . . . and 250
Other Things You Should Know 102 (2007) (italics in original) (“The
phrase sword of Damocles is defined as a threat, peril, or imminent danger.”).
344 Neill v. State, 896 P.2d 537, 556 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (“There is ample
evidence of the extreme mental anguish suffered by these three (3) women
prior to their deaths. This evidence illustrates the realization by these
women that they were going to be harmed and even killed by Appellant.
Two (2) of the women suffered the additional mental anguish of hearing
their co-workers being savagely murdered and realizing they could be
next. The cause of this extreme mental torture was Appellant’s intentional
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designed to strip the object of the torture from any control or agency
and to create a “state of total helplessness.”345 It is for that reason
that threats of various kinds, subjecting their targets to an uncertain
fate, have long been considered to be torturous in nature.346 In
that regard, Almerindo Ojeda, the Director at University of
California, Davis’s Center for the Study of Human Rights in the
Americas, has specifically classified the following as acts of torture:
threats “to self or to others”; “threats of death, physical torture, or
rendition”; “mock executions”; and “forced witnessing of torture
(visually or aurally).”347 “Mock” executions, of course, are simply
credible threats of death, and thus considered classic examples
of psychological torture because of their inherent characteristics.348
Ironically, although a simulated or fake execution currently qualifies
as an act of torture, state-sanctioned executions, which result in
actual deaths, have yet to be categorized as acts of torture by modern
jurists.349 If a mock execution or a mock amputation qualifies as an
actions.”).
345 Mohammed v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1, 27 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Metin
Başoğlu et al., Torture vs Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment: Is the
Distinction Real or Apparent?, 64 Archives Gen. Psychiatry 277, 283
(2007)) (“Torture and ‘enhanced interrogation techniques’ employed by the
Government during the War on Terror have been shown to be ‘geared toward
creating anxiety or fear in the detainee while at the same time removing any
form of control from the person to create a state of total helplessness.’”).
346 Andrea Montavon-McKillip, CAT Among Pigeons: The Convention Against
Torture, A Precarious Intersection Between International Human Rights Law and U.S.
Immigration Law, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 247, 253−54 (2002) (“Mental torture
can be inflicted by direct or implied threats that cause fear, including death
threats or threats of serious injury against an individual or her family, or by
forcing an individual to watch the abuse or murder of loved ones.”).
347 David Luban & Henry Shue, Mental Torture: A Critique of Erasures in U.S. Law,
100 Geo. L.J. 823, 836−37 (2012).
348 Luban, supra note 1, at 166; see also Pérez-Sales, Psychological
Torture, supra note 305, at 308, 333 (noting that “[t]hreats of death” and
“mock executions,” along with “[p]sychological techniques to break down
the individual,” are classified as torture under the Istanbul Protocol (1985),
and listing mock executions as a form of psychological torture).
349 The debate about how to classify executions—and whether they are
legitimate or illegitimate exercises of state power—has led to heated
debate over the years. Compare Hans Göran Franck, The Barbaric
Punishment: Abolishing the Death Penalty 35 (William Schabas
ed., 2003) (“The conditions surrounding the execution itself and the
period between the sentence and the carrying out of the sentence, which
is frequently quite long, make it possible to compare the death penalty to
torture.”), with Ernest van den Haag, Introduction: Death but Not Torture, in
The Death Penalty: A Debate 13 (1983) (containing Ernest van den
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act of torture (as it should),350 then a real execution—logically and
rationally—must also qualify.
C. The Torturous Nature of Non-Lethal Acts
Many acts short of death can qualify as torture under existing
351
law.
“Rape can constitute torture,” the Third Circuit explicitly
ruled in Zubeda v. Ashcroft,352 for example. As the Third Circuit stated:
“Rape is a form of aggression constituting an egregious violation of
humanity. The scarring effects of rape compare with ‘psychological
sequelae of . . . survivors of abuse constituting torture under
international law . . . .’”353 Indeed, “rape” and “threats to rape” have
been listed among common “torture techniques.”354 If acts short of
death, including threats of non-homicidal rape or bodily harm, can
qualify as torture, then (once again) it is only logical that credible
threats of death—threats designed to put individuals in fear for their
lives—should also qualify under that legal rubric.355 In short, just

350

351

352
353
354

355

Haag’s views on the death penalty in a “Pro”/“Con” debate between Ernest
van den Haag and John P. Conrad).
Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against NonState Actors 180 (2010) (“In addition to the ‘classic’ examples of torture
such as electric shocks, examples of acts which have been determined as
torture or other prohibited ill-treatment, include methods such as severe
beatings; mock executions and mock amputations; sensory manipulation and
deprivation, and forced positions causing severe pain; rape and other sexual
violence.”).
Such non-lethal acts include rape, forced impregnation, branding, beating,
electric shocks administered to the genitals, pulling out fingernails, burning
with hot irons, suspension from ceiling fans, and threats to inflict bodily
harm. E.g., Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001); see also
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995) (referring to allegations
of “murder, rape, forced impregnation, and other forms of torture”); In
re Extradition of Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 676, 682 (N.D. Cal. 1988)
(“shock sessions were interspersed with rapes and other forms of torture”).
Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 472 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id. (citations omitted); see also id. (“courts have equated rape with conduct
recognized under the law of nations as torture”).
Al-Saher, 268 F.3d at 1147; see also Anne-Marie L.M. de Brouwer,
Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence:
The ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR 211 (2005)
(“[T]he case law of the ICTY has recognised that rape and other forms of
sexual violence can rise to the level of torture . . . . [O]ther forms of sexual
violence qualifying as torture are threats to sexually mutilate a person,
threats to rape someone . . . .”).
Whether someone intends his words “to be taken as a threat,” and whether
those words are “sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and
specific” to convey to the target of them “an immediacy of purpose and
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as prison officials are not allowed to threaten inmates with death or
bodily harm during their confinement in prison, state actors should
not be allowed to threaten inmates with death in connection with
interrogations or during plea bargaining or as part of the criminal
justice system more broadly. A death threat is a death threat,356
and the fact that an inmate has done something heinous in the past
does not justify a government official in making a torturous threat of
death that is backed by the enormous power of the state.357
That mock executions, non-judicial threats of death, and
threats of severe pain or suffering are already classified as acts of
torture makes clear that real executions should also be so classified.
Tellingly, the U.S. Department of State has previously recognized
mock executions to be a form of torture,358 as have federal courts in
the United States.359 The United States Code itself defines “torture”

356

357

358

359

immediate prospect of execution of the threat,” is to be based on “all the
surrounding circumstances and not just on the words alone.” People v.
Mosley, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007); cf. Nifadev v. Holder,
577 F. App’x 481, 487 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Nifadev was subjected to credible
threats to his life and subjected to a period of suffocation at the hands of
the police when handcuffed and helpless in a police vehicle on account
of a protected ground. This treatment bears a striking resemblance to
torture . . . .”).
As Shakespeare put it in a much different context: “A rose by any other name
would smell as sweet.” Or, as Gertrude Stein once emphasized, playing off of
Shakespeare’s line: “A rose is a rose is a rose is a rose.” Sunil Sethi, The
Big Bookshelf: Sunil Sethi in Conversation with 30 Famous
Writers 83 (2011).
And this is to say nothing of the horror that must be experienced by
innocent people who are mistakenly sentenced to death. Miscarriages of
justice are relatively common, especially in death penalty cases. Innocence
and the Death Penalty, Death Penalty Information Center, https://
deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-and-death-penalty (last visited Sept. 24,
2018); see also The National Registry of Exonerations, https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (last visited
Sept. 24, 2018). The stories of just some of the exonerees are highlighted in
a series of short documentary films produced in 2013 and available online.
See One for Ten, http://oneforten.com (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
U.S. Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1993, S. Prt. 103-7 (Joint Comm. Print 1994) (recognizing
mock executions as a form of torture in Chad, Columbia, Liberia, Moldova
and Sudan).
Orantes-Hernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488, 1492 (C.D. Cal. 1988)
(“The form of the persecution includes the following: arbitrary arrest,
short term detention, torture including use of electric shock, capucha,
beatings, rape, ‘disappearance’, extra-judicial executions, abductions,
threats against family members, intimidation, forced ingestion of food,
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to mean “an act committed by a person acting under the color of
law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions)
upon another person within his custody or physical control.”360 Not
only are “mock” executions already treated as acts of torture,361
they are, under existing law put in place by U.S. Congress and the
executive branch, banned by the U.S. Code362 and the U.S. Army
false imprisonment, mock-executions, sleep deprivation, mass killings, and
forced relocations.”); Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 271 F. Supp. 2d 179, 185
(D. D.C. 2003) (“[T]he pilot POWs were tortured more severely than other
POWs. The torture inflicted included severe beatings, mock executions,
threatened castration, and threatened dismemberment.”), vacated on other
grounds, Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (2004); Acree, 271 F. Supp. 2d
at 210, 218 (describing “mock executions” and “several death threats” by
the Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Intelligence Service that caused “great distress”
and “psychological torture,” and referring to Iraq’s “all-encompassing
environment of physical and mental torture through extreme physical
brutality and physical injury, mock executions, threats of death, intense
fear”).
360 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2004). The phrase “severe mental pain or suffering” in
that federal statute is defined as follows: “[T]he prolonged mental harm caused
by or resulting from—(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of
severe physical pain or suffering; (B) the administration or application, or
threatened administration or application, of mind-altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or (D) the threat that another person will
imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the
administration or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality . . . .” Id. § 2340(2)
(A)−(D) (italics added).
361 Tshitenge Muteba v. Zaire, Communication 124/1982, Human Rights
Committee [U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/39/40)] at 182, ¶ 10.2 (Mar. 25, 1983),
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/undocs/session39/124-1982.htm (“During the first
nine days of detention he was interrogated and subjected to various forms
of torture including beatings, electric shocks and mock executions.”). The
Human Rights Committee lists “beatings, electric shocks, mock executions,
deprivation of food and water and thumb presses” under the torture rubric.
Sarah Joseph et al., Seeking Remedies for Torture Victims: A Handbook on
the Individual Complaints Procedures of the UN Treaty Bodies 159 (2006).
In 1999, the Clinton Administration—in a report to the U.N. Committee
Against Torture—itself described “[t]he intentional infliction of ‘mental’
pain and suffering” to include “various psychological forms of torture and illtreatment,” including “mock executions.” Bessler, The Death Penalty as
Torture, supra note 26, at 324 n.18.
362 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(C) (2004); see also David R. Dow et al., The Extraordinary
Execution of Billy Vickers, the Banality of Death, and the Demise of Post-Conviction
Review, 13 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 521, 550 n.150 (2004) (“Mock
executions and other threats of imminent death are widely recognized to be
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Field Manual.363 “Sham executions,” a book on trauma notes of
simulated executions, are “a widely practiced form of torture.”364
If threats of death or threats to inflict severe pain or suffering
a form of unconscionable torture. Legislation passed by the United States
Congress on April 30, 1994, implementing the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, identifies ‘the threat of imminent death’ as a form of torture.
This provision was designed to bring ‘mock executions’ within the ambit of
the legislation.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(C) (2004); David P. Stewart,
The Torture Convention and the Reception of International Criminal Law Within the
United States, 15 Nova L. Rev. 449, 455−56 (1991)).
363 Dep’t of the Army, Field Manual 34−52: Intelligence
Interrogation 1-8 (Washington, D.C., Sept. 28, 1992) (listing “Mock
executions” as an example of “mental torture,” and listing the following
as “[e]xamples of coercion”: “Threatening or implying physical or mental
torture to the subject, his family, or others to whom he owes loyalty”);
see also David P. Gushee, In the Fray: Contesting Christian
Public Ethics, 1994−2013, 121 (2014) (noting that the U.S. Army Field
Manual prohibits military personnel from beating prisoners, waterboarding
them, sexually humiliating them, threatening them with dogs, depriving
them of food and water, performing mock executions, shocking them with
electricity, burning them, or causing other types of pain); David E. Graham,
The Treatment and Interrogation of Prisoners of War and Detainees, 37 Geo. J.
Int’l L. 61, 89−90 (2005) (noting that Army Field Manual 34-52 prohibits
“[p]hysical or mental torture and coercion” and lists “Mock executions” as
an example of mental torture); Matthew Lippman, Law and Society
495 (2015) (“In 2005, Congress amended the Detainee Treatment Act to
prohibit the use of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment by government
personnel and to prohibit military interrogators from employing
interrogation techniques not authorized under the Army Field Manual. The
manual, for example, prohibits the use of dogs, hooding, forced nakedness,
hypothermia, mock executions, electric shocks, and waterboarding.”).
364 Metin Başoğlu & Ebru Şalcioğlu, A Mental Healthcare Model
for Mass Trauma Survivors: Control-Focused Behavioral
Treatment of Earthquake, War, and Torture Trauma 41 (2011).
As that source observes: “Sometimes the detainee is subjected to a prolonged
threat of execution.” For instance, detainees are told that “they are going to
be shot the next morning.” As that source continues of how such torturous
acts unfold: “The next day they are taken from their cell, blindfolded and taken
to another room where someone holds an unloaded gun at their head and
pulls the trigger. The same procedure may be repeated for days or weeks on
end.” Id. Studies of torture have revealed that “[p]otentially life-threatening
(e.g. deprivation of basic needs), fear-inducing treatments (e.g. threats of
harm to self and close ones, sham executions, asphyxiation), and humiliating
treatments were the major determinants of perceived severity of the torture
experience.” Id. at 52; see also id. at 61 (noting “various stressor events that are
said not to involve intense physical pain” (e.g., “sham executions”) “can be as
distressing as physical torture”).
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already are classed as acts of torture,365 then plainly such credible
threats, when coupled with a clear intention that those threats be
actualized, must also be classified as torture.366 It has sometimes
365 E.g., James P. Terry, Torture and the Interrogation of Detainees, 32 Campbell L.
Rev. 595, 612−13 (2010) (“The cases brought under the TVPA [Torture
Victims Protection Act] reference seven distinct forms of severe abuse
that would constitute torture: (1) severe beatings using weapons such
as truncheons and clubs; (2) threats of imminent death, to include mock
executions; (3) threats of removing body parts and[/]or extremities; (4)
burning, especially burning with cigarettes; (5) electric shocks to genital
areas, or threats to do so; (6) rape or sexual assault, to include injury to
sexual organs, or threats of the same; and (7) forcing the detainee to watch
the extreme physical or mental torture of others. The severity of these
examples of treatment found in civil proceedings suggests that similar
severity would have to be found to warrant conviction under the criminal
provisions in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A.”).
366 Torture has been described as a specific intent crime. Michael
Otterman, American Torture: From the Cold War to Abu
Ghraib and Beyond 109 (2007); Commentary on the First
Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field 2971 (2016). But in the case of capital punishment, even if
a particular judge has no specific intent to inflict severe pain or suffering,
the result—in every case—is that severe pain and suffering is inflicted.
Moreover, capital punishment is a torturous punishment that society
imposes collectively. The Death Penalty Today 115 (Robert M. Bohm
ed., 2008) (“Vengeance is a human emotion experienced by individual
people. Retribution is a collective response to wrongdoing from society
rather than individual family members.”). Research shows that some like to
see bad people suffer. Malcolm Ritter, Men Enjoy Seeing Bad People Suffer, USA
Today (Jan. 18, 2006). To date, courts have yet to find executions, even
botched executions, to be torturous acts. E.g., Estate of Lockett v. Fallin,
841 F.3d 1098, 1113 (10th Cir. 2016) (italics in original) (citation omitted)
(“The Supreme Court has determined that, in the execution context,
‘torture’ and ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ require that executing officials
mean to choose an execution method that will cause extra pain beyond
that necessary to carry out the death sentence.”). The legal prohibitions
against torture and cruelty, however, are designed to insulate ourselves
from our baser instincts. As Justice Thurgood Marshall once wrote: “The
Eighth Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves.” Charles L.
Zelden, Thurgood Marshall: Race, Rights, and the Struggle
for a More Perfect Union 149 (2013). This helps explain why the
prohibition against torture is—and should be—absolute. The Routledge
Handbook of Global Ethics 123 (Darrel Moellendorf & Heather
Widdows eds., 2015) (“The function of the absolute moral prohibition
against torture as an archetype of the fact that there are some activities in
which civilized people do not engage is too important to allow a breach
of the prohibition even if the degree of the wrongfulness of torturing
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been suggested, including in the infamous Torture Memo prepared
during the Bush Administration after 9/11, that a threat must be
“imminent” in order for the threat to constitute torture.367 But
when a capital charge is brought or a death sentence is imposed,
the consequences of that capital charge or death sentence are clearly
known by government officials at the very moment that it is brought
or imposed. An execution might not occur for years, or even decades,
down the road.368 But it is readily apparent to all concerned that the
threat of death for the offender will be real, immediate, and dire. As
the execution date approaches, the seriousness of the threat of death
(already highly credible) will only be magnified.369 And all of this is
the person in question were not reason enough in itself.”); Richard
Matthews, The Absolute Violation: Why Torture Must Be
Prohibited 220 (2008) (“[T]he absolute prohibition against torture,
including the nonderogability clause of the United Nations Convention
against Torture, is morally sound. Hence torture must be absolutely
forbidden, no matter what.”).
367 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Alberto R.
Gonzales, Counsel to the President 12 (Aug. 1, 2002) (on file with the U.S.
Dep’t of Justice) (emphasis in original) (“The third predicate act listed in
Section 2340(2) is threatening a prisoner with ‘imminent death.’ 18 U.S.C.
§ 2340(2)(C). The plain text makes clear that a threat of death alone is
insufficient; the threat must indicate that death is ‘imminent.’ . . . Common
law cases and legislation generally define imminence as requiring that the
threat be almost immediately forthcoming. 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin
W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 5.7, at 655 (1986). By contrast,
threats referring vaguely to things that might happen in the future do not
satisfy this immediacy requirement. See United States v. Fiore, 178 F.3d 917,
923 (7th Cir. 1999). Such a threat fails to satisfy this requirement not
because it is too remote in time but because there is a lack of certainly
that it will occur. Indeed, timing is an indicator of certainty that the harm
will befall the defendant. Thus, a vague threat that someday the prisoner
might be killed would not suffice. Instead, subjecting a prisoner to mock
executions or playing Russian roulette with him would have sufficient
immediacy to constitute a threat of imminent death. Additionally, as
discussed earlier, we believe that the existence of a threat must be assessed
from the perspective of a reasonable person in the same circumstances.”).
368 The average time that an American death row inmate spends on death row
between sentencing and execution is now more than fifteen years. Michael
Johnson, Fifteen Years and Death: Double Jeopardy, Multiple Punishments, and
Extended Stays on Death Row, 23 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 85, 86,103−12 (2014).
Death row inmates in other countries, including Pakistan and Japan,
also spend many years on death row before execution. Roger Hood &
Carolyn Hoyle, The Death Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective
ch. 5 (5th ed. 2015).
369 Cf. Volloldo v. Ruz, No. 1:14-MC-25 (LEK/CFH), 2017 WL 4838780 at
*6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2017) (“Were Plaintiffs to provide evidence that
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known well in advance by every actor in the criminal justice system,
from prosecutors and defense lawyers to trial and appellate judges.
It is also known by everyone involved that the inmate
will suffer tremendous psychological torment while that inmate
is under a constant threat of death, whether or not the threat
is carried out. A mock execution may not actually inflict any
observable physical harm, though someone who goes through a
sham execution obviously experiences extreme psychological terror
during and after the ordeal.370 Just as the victim of a mock execution
is tortured (and is considered a torture victim) despite the lack
of any observable physical indicators that torture has occurred, a
person capitally charged and sentenced to death suffers severe
psychological torment371 even if an execution is physically painless
Defendants made ‘imminent death threats,’ they may be able to establish
torture under the TVPA [Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991].”). In the
non-state actor context, the line between a murder and a torture-murder often
boils down to how long the victim was aware that his or her death would
occur. Compare Mitchell v. State, 84 So. 3d 968, 987 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010)
(“The record establishes that at least one victim suffered psychological
torture. . . . ‘These murders were not accomplished in a rapid-fire manner;
there was sufficient time between the . . . murders for the next victim to
be placed in significant fear for his or her life . . . .’ Therefore, the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that at least one of the victims
suffered psychological torture.”) (quoting Taylor v. State, 808 So. 2d 1148,
1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000)), with Norris v. State, 793 So. 2d 847, 861
(Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that the murder of three individuals was
not psychologically torturous because the three victims were shot in rapid
succession; the “first three shots were sudden, without any warning or
precipitating event”; “[t]here was nothing preceding the first murder that
would have evoked in the victims intense apprehension, fear, or anticipation
of their deaths”). In the death penalty context, a death row inmate is fully
aware of his or her impending death—and is helpless to prevent that death—
for substantially longer than a typical victim of torture-murder. The heinous
actions of torture-murderers are inexcusable, but those actions do not justify
the use of torture against already-incarcerated inmates. Acts of torture
should be prohibited in all circumstances.
370 John Conroy, Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People: The
Dynamics of Torture 180 (2001) (“Dr. Rasmussen’s survey of two
hundred victims (examined three days to twelve years after their torture)
found that the incidence of mental symptoms at the time of examination
was significantly higher among those who had been subjected to a mock
execution. Rasmussen’s Danish Medical Bulletin article noted that 83 percent
of those who experienced mock executions exhibited mental symptoms,
about 20 percent more than those who had not been subjected to that
particular torture.”).
371 E.g., Amanda K. Eklund, The Death Penalty in Montana: A Violation of the
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or averted altogether through an appeal or executive clemency.372
Just as prison officials are not allowed to use correctional practices
or techniques that exacerbate serious mental illnesses or that inflict
psychological torture,373 government actors should not be allowed
to use punishment practices that do just that.374 In allowing death
Constitutional Right to Individual Dignity, 65 Mont. L. Rev. 135, 142−43
(2004) (noting that “[t]here are numerous accounts of mental anguish
suffered by death row inmates” and discussing the case of one inmate,
Henry Arsenault, who was on death row for two years, “during which
time he became obsessed with his impending death”; Arsenault’s
“psychosis manifested itself in uncontrollable sweating, frequent inability
to sleep or eat, unbearable nightmares, uncontrollable urination, and
constant fidgeting”; when Arsenault’s execution was called off after the
administration of last rites and less than half an hour before the execution
was scheduled to take place, Arsenault “was so distraught that he was
unable to walk, and guards had to carry him back to his cell”; a judge later
described Arsenault’s condition of “raw terror and unabating stress” as
“torture”).
372 During a mock execution and in lead up to an actual execution, the object
of the mock execution or the actual execution also experiences physical
symptoms such as an increased heart rate or urinating on oneself. E.g.,
Jeffrey D. Simon, The Terrorist Trap: America’s Experience
with Terrorism 144 (2d ed. 2001) (describing a mock execution);
Conroy, supra note 370, at 35−36 (same). Prison officials themselves
go through their own “mock” executions (of a different sort) as they test
execution equipment or prepare for executions. Louis J. Palmer, Jr.,
Encyclopedia of Capital Punishment in the United States 427
(2d ed. 2008) (“testing of the execution equipment” in Florida “is performed
a minimum of eight times each year”).
373 Walker v. State, 68 P.3d 872, 884 (Mont. 2003) (“[I]f the particular
conditions of confinement cause serious mental illness to be greatly
exacerbated or if it deprives inmates of their sanity, then prison officials
have deprived inmates of the basic necessity for human existence and have
crossed into the realm of psychological torture.”).
374 James L. Knoll IV & Gary E. Beven, Supermax Units and Death Row, in
Handbook of Correctional Mental Health 435, 467 (Charles L.
Scott ed., 2d ed. 2010) (citations omitted) (“[E]xtended stays on death row
have been associated with psychiatric decompensation. Prisoners on death
row have been found to demonstrate aberrant behavior and paranoia.”); id.
(“Treating psychiatrists should also be aware that the suicide rate of male
death row inmates was found to be approximately five times higher than
the rate among men in the community.”); Kenneth Williams, Most
Deserving of Death? An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s
Death Penalty Jurisprudence 103 (2012) (“It is not surprising that
the conditions on death row often create or exacerbate inmates’ mental
problems. For example, death row inmates in Texas are housed alone in
small cells measuring 6½ feet by 10 feet, containing a bed and a toilet,
for 23 hours a day. They are allowed to leave their cells for one hour a day
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sentences and executions, government actors are engaged in, or
acquiescing to, deliberate and intentional conduct that runs afoul of
the absolute prohibition against torture.375
D. The “Lawful Sanctions” Issue
Death penalty proponents will assert that death sentences
and executions are, and traditionally have been, classified as “lawful
sanctions” that constitute an exception to the definition of torture.
But death sentences and executions are no longer lawful or in use in
many places throughout the world,376 and given the absolute, nonof recreation, which is also done alone.”). See also 1 Encyclopedia of
Gender and Society 187 (Jodi O’Brien ed., 2009) (“Because 75 percent
of all women who are on death row are mothers, the failure to be able to
connect with their children further fosters their isolation. The isolation
that women experience on death row is a risk factor for developing a mental
illness or further exacerbating an existing mental condition.”).
375 Compare Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014)
(citations omitted) (“Public officials acquiesce in torture if, ‘prior to the
activity constituting torture,’ the officials: (1) have awareness of the
activity (or consciously close their eyes to the fact [that] it is going on);
and (2) breach their legal responsibility to intervene to prevent the activity
because they are unable or unwilling to oppose it.”), and Sanchez-Ponce v.
Whitaker, No. 17-579, 2018 WL 6266311, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 30, 2018) (“A
government’s inability to prevent torture—even when some state actors
take ‘preventative efforts’—may be adequate to state a CAT claim.”), with
Mouawad v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 405, 413 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted)
(“A government does not acquiesce in the torture of its citizens merely
because it ‘is aware of torture but powerless to stop it,’ but it does cross the
line into acquiescence when it shows ‘willful blindness toward the torture
of citizens by third parties.’”), and Ticas-Guillen v. Whitaker, No. 16-72981,
2018 WL 6266766, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 30, 2018) (citations omitted)
(“[T]he government ‘does not acquiesce in the torture of its citizens merely
because it is aware of torture but powerless to stop it.’”). Acquiescence
“requires that the public official, prior to the activity constituting torture,
have awareness of such activity and thereafter breach his or her legal
responsibility to intervene to prevent such activity.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)
(7) (2018). See also Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 916 (9th Cir. 2018)
(“[T]he acquiescence standard is met where the record demonstrates that
public officials at any level—even if not at the federal level—would acquiesce
in torture the petitioner is likely to suffer.”).
376 Bessler, Cruel and Unusual, supra note 190, at 64 (noting that a
growing number of countries have outlawed executions either in law or in
practice); see also Federico Mayor Zaragoza, The Abolition of the Death Penalty:
A Question of Respect for Human Rights, in Death Penalty: A Cruel and
Inhuman Punishment 11, 13 (L. Arroyo Zapatero et al. eds., 2013)
(discussing the work of the International Commission against the Death
Penalty, which seeks the universal abolition of capital punishment).
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derogable prohibition against torture,377 it seems self-evident that
to genuinely be a “lawful sanction” the sanction itself should not
constitute an otherwise torturous act. There is already a jus cogens
norm prohibiting torture,378 and a reservation to a human rights
treaty such as the Convention Against Torture cannot violate the
“object and purpose” of that treaty.379 The clear object and purpose
of the Convention Against Torture is, manifestly, to combat, prevent,
and outlaw acts of cruelty and torture.380 And a nation that publicly
377 E.g., The Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights
Law 545 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2013) (noting that the prohibition of torture is
non-derogable).
378 Sarah Joseph et al., Seeking Remedies for Torture Victims: A
Handbook on the Individual Complaints Procedures of the
UN Treaty Bodies 488 (Boris Wijkström ed., 2006) (“The absolute nature
of the prohibition of torture under treaty law is reinforced by its higher, jus
cogens status under customary international law. Jus cogens status connotes
the fundamental, peremptory character of the obligation, which is, in the
words of the International Court of Justice, “intransgressible.” There is
ample international authority recognising the prohibition of torture as
having jus cogens status. The prohibition of torture also imposed obligations
erga omnes, and every State has a legal interest in the performance of such
obligations which are owed to the international community as a whole.”).
379 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that “[a] State
may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
formulate a reservation unless: (a) [T]he reservation is prohibited by the
treaty; (b) [T]he treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do
not include the reservation in question, may be made; or (c) [I]n cases not
falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty.” Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Although the United
States has not ratified the Vienna Convention, it is considered to be the
authoritative statement of the customary law of treaties. Meyer, Customary
International Law in the 21st Century, in Progress in International Law
197, 210 (Russell A. Miller & Rebecca M. Bratspies eds., 2008) (“[D]espite
the fact that the United States has not ratified the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, other states view the United States as being bound by
the customary law of treaties. Insofar as the Vienna Convention is the most
authoritative statement of what the customary law of treaties is, the United
States is bound by the terms of the treaty.”). Moreover, U.S. law already
provides that a State Party to the Convention Against Torture cannot use the
“lawful sanctions” exception in Article 1 to “defeat the object and purpose of
the Convention to prohibit torture.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(3) (2018).
380 Chris Ingelse, The UN Committee against Torture: An
Assessment 391 (2001) (“In view of the object and purpose of the
Convention against Torture, the objective of the Committee is to combat
torture.”); United Nations Convention Against Torture art. 2(1), Feb. 4,
1985, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“Each State Party shall take effective legislative,
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renounces torture should not, logically, then be allowed to turn
around and engage in acts that bear all the indicia of torture. As
one commentator, writing about the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, has aptly pointed out: “[A] reservation going against a
treaty’s object and purpose would be one whereby a State ratifying
the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984 seeks to exclude
torture from it.”381
A U.S. understanding of the Convention Against Torture—
part of the U.S. reservations, understandings, and declarations
(“RUDs”) to the convention—specifically reflects the U.S. Senate’s
concern that the “lawful sanctions” language may be too expansive.382
Indeed, case law already makes clear that even a “lawful sanction”
in a country must not defeat the “object and purpose” of the
Convention Against Torture.383 For example, in Nuru v. Gonzales,
administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any
territory under its jurisdiction.”).
381 Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties 272 (2009).
382 See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 341, 341−48 (1995) (noting the U.S.
ratification of the Convention Against Torture in 1994 along with a package
of RUDs); Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 120 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]he
United States understands that a State Party could not through its domestic
sanctions defeat the object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit
torture.” (quoting 136 Cong. Rec. S17,486-01, S17,491)); Tun v. INS, 445
F.3d 554, 566, 571 (2d Cir. 2006) (citations omitted) (“‘lawful sanctions’ ‘do
not include sanctions that defeat the object and purpose of the Convention
Against Torture to prohibit torture’”; “the Senate’s understanding that ‘a
State Party could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the object and
purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture,’ 136 Cong. Rec. S17491,
¶ II (c), has been incorporated into this country’s refugee law.”); see also
Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1221 (9th Cir. 2005) (italics in original)
(“[T]he Attorney General promulgated implementing regulations defining
‘lawful sanctions’ as ‘judicially imposed sanctions and other enforcement
actions authorized by law, including the death penalty,’ but only so long as
those sanctions do not ‘defeat the object and purpose of [CAT] to prohibit
torture.’” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(3) (2018))).
383 Garcia-Miller v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1033 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nuru,
404 F.3d at 1221) (“Torture is ‘an extreme form of cruel and inhuman
treatment,’ 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2), ‘that either (1) is not lawfully
sanctioned by that country or (2) is lawfully sanctioned by that country, but
defeats the object and purpose of CAT[.]’”); Zhang v. Gonzales, 214 F. App’x
3, 5 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (“To the extent that the agency found
that Zhang’s prior treatment did not qualify because the harm he identified
was the result of a lawful sanction, we find that the beating and dousing
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the Ninth Circuit put it this way: “[T]orture cannot be ‘inherent
in or incidental to lawful sanction’ and is never a lawful means of
punishment. The official sanctioning of torture necessarily defeats
the object and purpose of the Convention. CAT outlaws torture
absolutely . . . .”384 In that same vein, it is clear that the protection
provided by the Convention Against Torture extends to anyone
accused of a crime385 or imprisoned for one.386
There are existing U.S. regulations that purport to include
in water were sanctions that defeated the object and purpose of CAT and
therefore could qualify if that mistreatment otherwise meets the definition
of torture under the regulations and BIA and court decisions.”); see also
Pendrak v. Holder, 375 Fed. App’x 439, 443 (6th Cir. 2010) (emphasis
added) (“‘[L]awful sanctions’ that do not defeat the object and purpose of the CAT
are excluded from the definition of torture.”).
384 Nuru, 404 F.3d at 1222.
385 Lian v. Gonzales, 201 Fed. App’x 808, 810 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Khouzam
v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2004)) (“[I]n Khouzam, we interpreted
this provision to mean that CAT ‘extend[s] to situations where the victim
has been accused of a crime,’”). As the Second Circuit emphasized in
Khouzam: “When the Senate considered the CAT, its concern over the
CAT’s reference to ‘lawful sanctions’ led it to qualify its ratification with
the understanding that a state ‘could not through its domestic sanctions
defeat the object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture.’ In
directing the Attorney General to implement the CAT subject to the Senate’s
understandings, it was Congress’ aim for the CAT’s protections to extend to
situations where the victim has been accused of a crime.” Khouzam, 361 F.3d
at 169.
386 E.g., J. Herman Burgers & Hans Danelius, The United Nations
Convention Against Torture: A Handbook on the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment 120−21 (1988) (“The 1975 Declaration
was drawn up by the Fifth UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders in response to a request from the General
Assembly ‘to include, in the elaboration of the Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners, rules for the protection of all persons subjected to
any form of detention or imprisonment (italics added) against torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. Two years after
the adoption of the 1975 Declaration, the General Assembly requested the
Commission on Human Rights to draw up a draft convention ‘in the light
of the principles embodied in the Declaration’. All work undertaken in the
framework of the Commission for preparing the present Convention was
performed under an agenda item reading ‘Question of the human rights
of all persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment (italics added)’.
The connection between the phenomenon of torture as dealt with in the
Convention and deprivation of liberty is also apparent from articles 10 and 11
which explicitly refer to persons ‘subjected to any form of arrest, detention
or imprisonment’.”).
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the death penalty as a “lawful sanction,” but those regulations also
emphasize that “lawful sanctions” do not include “sanctions that
defeat the object and purpose of the Convention Against Torture
to prohibit torture.”387 In fact, when the U.S. Senate ratified the
Convention Against Torture in 1994, it crafted the following
understanding to make clear that the “lawful sanctions” exception
was not without limits: “[T]he United States understands that
a State Party could not through its domestic sanctions defeat the
object and purpose of the Convention to prohibit torture.”388 In
387 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(3) (2018) (“Torture does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. Lawful
sanctions include judicially imposed sanctions and other enforcement
actions authorized by law, including the death penalty, but do not include
sanctions that defeat the object and purpose of the Convention Against
Torture to prohibit torture.”). Those regulations also cannot somehow
modify what a torturous act is; the factual nature of an act does not change
with how one describes it. A pronouncement on a piece of paper or in the
Code of Federal Regulations cannot transform a torturous act into a nontorturous one. The act has the characteristics inherent in it, and in the case
of the death penalty those characteristics (which include the fact that capital
charges and death sentences constitute death threats) are immutable.
388 Gail H. Miller, Defining Torture, in Occasional Paper #3 (Benjamin N.
Cardozo Sch. of Law/Floersheimer Ctr. for Constitutional Democracy,
New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2005, at 21. In the past, it has been noted that
the “lawful sanctions” provision of the Convention Against Torture has
“precluded arguments that capital punishment constitutes torture.” Id. at
20. But capital punishment has become unlawful in many places, and there
has been much controversy surrounding the “lawful sanctions” exception
(e.g., as regards the use corporal punishments in some countries). As one
commentator notes: “Many signatories agree that the lawful sanctions
language creates problematic ambiguities. It diminishes the universality of
the definition by infusing exceptions based on national law. As practices
that may be lawful in one state may be unlawful in another, this provision
undermines the effort to achieve a uniform definition of torture.” Id. at
21. “The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Nigel S. Rodley, recognized
the potential slippery slope of the lawful sanctions exemption and has
interpreted the provision so that differences in national laws would not
effect the strength of the CAT. Rodley concluded that the term ‘lawful
sanctions’ refers to practices that the international community widely
accepts as permissible sanctions, such as imprisonment. He cited the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners as an example
of international standards that may guide determinations of acceptable
practices. In particular, Rodley concluded that corporal punishment may
amount to torture: ‘I cannot accept the notion that the administration of
such punishments as stoning to death, flogging and amputation—acts
which would be unquestionably unlawful in, say, the context of custodial
interrogation—can be deemed lawful simply because the punishment
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other words, an act of torture is an act of torture—and a country
cannot turn a torturous act into a non-torturous one simply by
labeling it a “lawful sanction.”389 Given that the Eighth Amendment
has already been interpreted to bar torture390 and that the Eighth
Amendment’s meaning evolves with the times,391 and given that the
modern definition and understanding of torture now plainly includes
both physical and mental forms of torture,392 the U.S. Supreme
Court should rule that death sentences and executions constitute
impermissible sanctions because death threats are extremely cruel
and torturous in nature.393 Torture, by definition, involves the
infliction of severe pain or suffering,394 and that is exactly what

389

390
391

392
393
394

has been authorized in a procedurally legitimate manner, i.e. through the
sanction of legislation, administrative rules or judicial order. To accept
this view would be to accept that any physical punishment, no matter how
torturous and cruel, can be considered lawful, as long as the punishment has
been duly promulgated under the domestic law of a State.’” Id. at 22.
Ghebrehiwot v. Attorney General of U.S., 467 F.3d 344, 359 (3d Cir. 2006)
(citations omitted) (“[T]he regulation defines ‘lawful sanctions’ as ‘judicially
imposed sanctions and other enforcement actions authorized by law, . . .’
but only so long as those sanctions do not ‘defeat the object and purpose
of the [CAT] to prohibit torture.’ Consequently, ‘[a] government cannot
exempt torturous acts from CAT’s prohibition merely by authorizing them
as permissible forms of punishment in its domestic law.’”); Khouzam v.
Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2004) (“It would totally eviscerate
the CAT to hold that once someone is accused of a crime it is a legal
impossibility for any abuse inflicted on that person to constitute torture.’”).
Linda E. Carter et al., Understanding Capital Punishment §
4.04 (3d ed. 2012) (“the Eighth Amendment prohibits torture or barbaric
punishments”).
Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1048 (2017) (quoting Hall v. Florida, 134 S.
Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014)) (“‘To enforce the Constitution’s protection of human
dignity,’ we ‘loo[k] to the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society,’ recognizing that ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment is
not fastened to the obsolete.’”).
E.g., Encyclopedia of Interpersonal Violence 709 (Claire
M. Renzetti & Jeffrey L. Edelson eds., 2008) (discussing physical and
psychological torture).
Bessler, The Death Penalty as Torture, supra note 26, at 217−19.
State v. Piper, 709 N.W.2d 783, 799 (S.D. 2006) (“Torture requires: ‘(1) the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of severe pain, agony, or anguish; and (2)
the intent to inflict such pain, agony or anguish . . . .’”); State v. Zagorski,
701 S.W.2d 808, 814 (Tenn. 1985) (“Although the victims died from gunshot
wounds, the defendant also slit their throats, leaving them to bleed to death
in the woods. This evinces depravity of mind and is a form of torture.
Defendant’s actions were an infliction of gratuitous violence, and needless
mutilation of victims who were already helpless from fatal wounds . . . .”);
cf. State v. Holman, 540 S.E.2d 18, 23 (N.C. 2000) (“We have interpreted
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the death penalty—an unnecessary, barbarous and dehumanizing
punishment—does.395 In a world of maximum-security prisons and
life-without-parole sentences, death sentences and executions are
also completely unnecessary.396
VI. Conclusion
The psychological torture associated with capital punishment
is self-evident and undeniable. Death threats have long been
recognized as a form of torture, and there is no denying that the
death penalty involves the use of death threats and worse (i.e. actual
executions). Capital punishment, in truth, is a torturous practice
hiding in plain sight. It has been used for centuries, with jurists in
the past only occasionally, as in People v. Anderson,397 taking note of its
torturous nature. In the eighteenth century, Enlightenment thinkers
thought of torture and capital punishment in separate categories.
When the Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria, the anti-death
penalty pioneer, wrote in Dei delitti e delle pene (1764) about torture
and capital punishment, he did so in separate chapters. Jeremy
Bentham, the English criminal-law theorist, also conceptualized and
compartmentalized torture and punishment as separate practices.398
In writings not published in his lifetime, Bentham infamously
justified the use of torture on the basis of utilitarianism, with pre-

395

396

397
398

the phrase ‘unnecessarily torturous’ to encompass both physical and
psychological torture, and to include a killing that leaves the victim aware of
impending death but helpless to prevent it.”).
Gabriele Schwab, Haunting Legacies: Violent Histories and
Transgenerational Trauma 155 (2010) (“We should no longer think
of torture as a practice that happens in a torture chamber or dungeon and
consists exclusively of the unnecessary and willful infliction of atrocious
bodily pain, but as a much more encompassing practice of inflicting
unnecessary pain and instrumentalizing pain for punitive and disciplinary
measures or for purposes of control.”).
Bessler, Cruel and Unusual, supra note 190, at 334; see also
E. Thomas Sullivan & Richard S. Frase, Proportionality
Principles in American Law: Controlling Excessive
Government Actions 132 (2009) (“The means-proportionality
argument is that the death penalty is unnecessary and therefore excessive
relative to the next-most-severe alternative penalty (life in prison, with or
without parole) whenever death adds no additional deterrent or other social
benefits.”).
People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (1972) (referring to the
“psychological torture” associated with the death penalty).
Bessler, The Death Penalty as Torture, supra note 26, at 310−11
n.17.
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trial judicial torture frequently thought of in the civil law context
as necessary to procure confessions (with post-conviction torture
then used to discover the names of accomplices).399 But it is now
crystal clear, as confirmed by the text of the Convention Against
Torture, that punishments themselves can be torturous in nature.
And whereas torture was largely seen in Beccaria and Bentham’s
time as operating on the body, it is now clear that either physical
or mental torture is possible—and that both are strictly prohibited.
In reality, capital punishment has always been torturous,
even if it was more torturous in Medieval times when offenders were
disemboweled and drawn and quartered or burned or boiled alive400
instead of being put to death through lethal injection.401 Before
Furman v. Georgia,402 the California Supreme Court—in a telling
admission—candidly opined in its 1972 decision in People v. Anderson:
“The cruelty of capital punishment lies not only in the execution
itself and the pain incident thereto, but also in the dehumanizing
effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to execution during which
the judicial and administrative procedures essential to due process
of law are carried out.”403 “Penologists and medical experts agree,”
that court determined, “that the process of carrying out a verdict of
death is often so degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to
constitute psychological torture.”404 “When people on death rows are
waiting to die,” the wrongfully convicted boxer Rubin “Hurricane”
Carter stressed after his own exoneration, “it is easy for me to feel
exactly what they are going through: the torture of waiting, the
399 Michelle Farrell, On Torture 241−45 (Apr. 26, 2011) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, National University of Ireland Galway), https://aran.library.
nuigalway.ie/bitstream/handle/10379/2171/FarrellM_OnTorture_PhD2011.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. See also Leonore Loft, Passion,
Politics, and Philosophie: Rediscovering J.-P. Brissot 112
(2002); Thomas Glyn Watkin, An Historical Introduction to
Modern Civil Law 415 (2017).
400 Bessler, The Death Penalty as Torture, supra note 26, at 3−4
(describing ancient punishments).
401 Fordham law professor Deborah Denno has written at length about the
progression of methods of execution in the United States. E.g., Deborah W.
Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 Geo L.J. 1331 (2014); Deborah
W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has Dismantled the Death
Penalty, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 49 (2007); Deborah W. Denno, Getting to
Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 319 (1997).
402 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
403 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Cal. 1972).
404 Id.
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helplessness, the pain and humiliation, and the gagging death, the
obliteration.”405 “It is real torture,” Oklahoma death row inmate,
Richard Glossip, similarly observed from first-hand experience after
his execution was delayed at the last minute after he spent 50 days
in a windowless cell getting ready for his scheduled execution. “You
are just in that cell and it is just like a morgue,” Glossip reported.406
It is hypocritical for governments and state officials to
condemn the use of death threats, then turn around and use threats of
death as part of a misguided policy that, in all candor, strays into the
land of torture. It is also hypocritical for the judicial system to avoid
labelling death sentences and executions as torturous when various
non-lethal acts (and properly so) are already so characterized.407
When a person is murdered and the victim is aware of, but helpless to
prevent, death, American courts readily label the offender’s actions
as involving an act of extreme cruelty (i.e. torture).408 Yet, when it is
the offender who is aware of, but helpless to prevent, his or her own
death, the judicial system currently terms it a “lawful sanction.” Just
as governments should not tolerate individuals making death threats,
societies should not themselves resort to Orwellian or Kafkaesque
death threats. As Albert Camus warned against state-sanctioned
killing and the death penalty’s disproportionality in relation to acts
of criminality in “Reflections on the Guillotine”:
405 Rubin “Hurricane” Carter & ken klonsky, Eye of the
Hurricane: My Path from Darkness to Freedom 203 (2011).
406 Leon Neyfakh, Richard Glossip Describes Preparing to Die, Slate (Nov. 13,
2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/crime/2015/11/
richard_glossip_the_condemned_oklahoma_prisoner_describes_preparing_
to_die.html.
407 John D. Bessler, What I Think About When I Think About the Death Penalty, 62
St. Louis U. L.J. 781, 790 (2018); John D. Bessler, The Abolitionist Movement
Comes of Age: From Capital Punishment as a Lawful Sanction to a Peremptory,
International Law Norm Barring Executions, 79 Mont. L. Rev. 7, 38−40
(2018).
408 E.g., State v. Cooper, 718 S.W.2d 256, 259−60 (Tenn. 1986) (“It would be
difficult to describe a more deliberate, brutal and horrifying infliction of
death upon an innocent, unarmed person. In our opinion the circumstances
of this homicide were heinous, atrocious and cruel. The deliberate taunting
and threatening of a victim for hours before shooting at her once, causing
her and her fellow employee to dive to the floor for safety, and then
deliberately pumping the contents of four shotgun shells into her while
she was helplessly trapped inside a small building could, in our opinion,
convince a reasonable jury that the victim was subjected to torture and that
the perpetrator of such conduct evinced depravity of mind.”).
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For there to be equivalence, the death penalty would
have to punish a criminal who had warned his victim
of the date at which he would inflict a horrible
death on him and who, from that moment onward,
had confined him at his mercy for months. Such a
monster is not encountered in private life.409

409 “Reflections on the Guillotine,” in Resistance, Rebellion, and Death
(J. O’Brien, trans. 1960).

